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Abstract
This thesis examines empirically the e¤ect of nancial frictions and public debt on economic
variables and seeks for an appropriate scal consolidation strategy.
First, the thesis explores the determinants of output volatility, especially the roles
of nancial development and government debt. The analysis, based on a panel of 127
countries over four decades, employs system GMM dynamic panel regression. According
to the regression results nancial development is estimated to have a non-linear e¤ect
on output volatility. Increased government debt levels are statistically associated with
increased macroeconomic volatility. However, we need to interpret the results carefully due
to endogeneity problems. The e¤ect of the interactions between the two is insignicant.
Second, it analyses the role of nancial frictions on economic uctuations. When the
three models are compared with the U.S. data along the second moments, the rm friction
model helps in tting some macroeconomic variables and outperforms the other models.
In the impulse response functions, we nd that nancial frictions greatly amplify and
propagate the e¤ects of the exogenous shocks on economic variables. Specially, the rm
friction model shows more persistent response than the bank friction model. In addition,
the size of the response depends on the leverage in the model with nancial frictions.
Third, the thesis considers how the e¤ects of scal policy consolidation di¤er depending
on alternative strategies. To do this, we develop an open economy DSGE model with an
endogenous risk premium mechanism. The government consumption cut has larger nega-
tive e¤ects on output than the government investment cut because of a complementarity
with private consumption. The response of the tax hike is smaller than the expenditue cut
because the tax hikes reduce more debts and the lower risk premium crowds in consump-
tion and investment. Among three scal rules, the expenditure adjusted rule is the most
e¤ective for both preventing the economic downturn and reducing government debt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent economic crisis since 2007 was mainly caused by nancial instability. The
losses in the mortgage market due to the bursting of the housing bubble in the U.S. were
amplied into large turmoil in the nancial market and the world economy su¤ered from
a serious economic downturn (Brunnermeier, 2009). In order to get out of the economic
crisis many countries around the world took extraordinary scal measures. However, the
large scal stimulus packages and a slow ensuing recovery deteriorated the scal positions
of many industrial countries. In turn, the concern over defaults of so called PIIGS countries
(Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) deepened the global economic downturn since
2012.
Therefore, both nancial and scal instability are thought as the most important
causes of the recent economic crisis. This thesis attempts to analyse the impact of the two
factors on economic variables and nd an appropriate consolidation policy to overcome the
scal crisis. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. It empirically explores
the e¤ect of both nancial development and government debt on output volatility. Second,
it examines the role of nancial frictions on economic uctuations under New Keynesian
economy. Lastly, it analyses the performance of various scal policy strategies to reduce
government debt under an open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model.
Chapter 2 empirically examines the determinants of output volatility, especially two
specic factors - nancial development and government debt. Financial development is
traditionally considered to reduce output volatility. However, the recent nancial crisis
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highlights the destabilising role of nancial development because the repercussion of the
crisis is remarkable in nancially developed countries. Theoretically, larger nancial de-
velopment may imply higher leverage of economic agents, which propagate and amplify
external shocks through nancial frictions. Thus, this chapter revisits the relationship be-
tween nancial development and output volatility utilising new dynamic dataset for 127
countries over the years 1971-2010. This chapter augments the previous literature by at-
tempting to reconcile conicting results on the relationship between nancial development
and output volatility using various model specication such as alternative regression meth-
ods, time horizons, and di¤erent measures of nancial development.
Chapter 2 also contributes by examining the relationship between government debt
and output volatility. There are several mechanisms that government debt can a¤ect
output volatility such as the next; (i) restricting the scope of scal and monetary policy,
(ii) reducing the e¤ectiveness of scal policy, (iii) increasing sovereign default risk, (iv)
decreasing international condence. Especially it becomes an important research area to
nd the e¤ect of government debt on output volatility under the soaring government debt
in many countries as the aftermath of the recent nancial crisis. However, there has not
been much discussion on this topic. Chapter 2 lls this gap.
Analysing jointly nancial development and government debt, which is not tried so far
is another contribution of this chapter. As the recent nancial crisis suggests, both nancial
development and government debt are closely connected in the development of the crisis.
For example, in Ireland and Spain bail-outs of unstable banking system triggered scal
crisis by increasing government debt. In Greece and Italy unsustainable government debt
destabilised the nancial markets by raising doubts about banks with government bonds.
In order to analyse the interrelation between nancial development and government debt,
we add an interaction term between the two in the baseline model.
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The empirical analysis nds the following results. First, nancial development a¤ects
output volatility in a non-linear fashion like the previous literature. In other words, nan-
cial development reduces output volatility up to a certain level. Above this level, economies
become more unstable. However, the recent nancial crisis lowered the critical level from
152.6 percent of GDP to 140.9 percent of GDP in the baseline model suggesting the fact
that the destabilising role of private credit was strengthened during the crisis. Second,
government debt levels increase output volatility in a linear way. However, as macroeco-
nomic conditions can a¤ect government debt, the result may be sensitive to endogeneity
problem. Moreover, some robustness tests do not show the validity of the instruments for
the consistency of the estimation. Therefore, we need to interpret carefully the relation-
ship between government debt and output volatility. The e¤ect of nancial development
and government debt on output volatility is robust among non-OECD countries. How-
ever, we cannot get reliable results for OECD members because the sample is too small.
In addition, when we use lagged values of the two variables, the signicant relationship
disappears. The governments policy reaction may cause this result. Specically, as the
government can implement scal consolidation to cope with high levels of debt and raise the
interest rate against abundant private credit, the economy becomes stable in the following
period. Third, the interaction term between the two is statistically insignicant suggesting
that nancial development with higher government debt is not associated with economic
instability. This is because private credit and government debt have di¤erent cyclicality.
Chapter 3 focuses on the nancial sector. Since the recent nancial crisis GDP values
have showed very di¤erent time paths among impacted countries. Specically, in the
countries such as Spain and Iceland where experienced an abrupt increase of private credit
before the crisis, GDP declined more than 10% and it didnt recover the pre-crisis level in
2013. On the other hand, the U.S. showed modest contraction and soon rebounded above
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the pre-crisis level. What is specially noteworthy is that the amount of private credit
growth in the U.S. was not larger than other countries. Thus, it is possible to assume that
nancial frictions derived by the fast growth of private credit a¤ect the amplication and
the propagation of shocks. With this background the main purpose of this chapter is to
investigate empirically the role of nancial frictions on economic uctuations. We adopt the
DSGE model for this analysis. Standard DSGE models assume that there are no frictions
in the nancial sector. However, Bernanke et al. (1999) adopted nancial frictions at the
rm level and many papers have developed their mechanism. Recently, Gertler and Karadi
(2011) explicitly model nancial intermediaries as a source of nancial frictions. They
consider the fact that Bernanke et al. (1999) do not consider the nancial intermediaries
which are one of the most important disturbing factors in the recent nancial crisis.
Given these approaches, Chapter 3 contributes to the existing papers by trying to
identify the e¤ect of nancial frictions on the amplication and the persistence of economic
uctuations. Specically, the main themes of this chapter are as follows: (i) to conrm the
fact that nancial frictions are relevant to the amplication and the persistence of economic
uctuations; (ii) to ask which type of nancial frictions are more important in explaining
the amplied and persistent uctuation of economic variables; (iii) to analyse which type of
nancial frictions better match the economic uctuations during the recent nancial crisis.
Chapter 3 compares three DSGE models to investigate these topics. The rst model is the
no friction model which means the basic model without nancial frictions based on Smets
and Wouters (2007). The second one is the model with nancial frictions at the rm level
following Bernanke et al. (1999). The third one is the model with nancial frictions at the
nancial intermediaries level following Gertler and Karadi (2011). The three models are
calibrated with the U.S. data for the period 1960Q12015Q4.
This chapter nds the following results. First, in the moment comparison the presence
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of nancial frictions at the rm level improves the models t. This means that this
nancial friction is relevant for the U.S. data. Thus, the rm friction model outperforms
the other models. However, the contribution of the nancial frictions at the bank level
to the models t is not sure. Second, in the impulse response functions incorporating
nancial frictions of either type amplies and propagates the e¤ect of exogenous shocks on
the economic variables. As the exogenous shocks a¤ect the credit market, the impact on
investment and output can be expanded through the rise in the external nance premium.
Third, the response of macroeconomic variables depends on the leverage in the model with
nancial frictions. Higher leverage in the rm or the bank causes more change in the
external nance premium, and the impact on investment and output to the shocks is also
expanded. However, the persistence of the response is larger in the model with nancial
frictions at the rm level - the rm friction model. The reason is that exogenous shocks in
the rm friction model have persistent e¤ects on investment through the serial e¤ect on the
rms net worth. Therefore, the bank friction model with higher leverage is appropriate
for explaining the recent nancial crisis, while the rm friction model well describes the
persistent crisis. These ndings are another contribution of chapter 3.
Chapter 4 turns to the government debt issue. In order to examine the e¤ect of
scal consolidation strategies, we utilise an open economy DSGE model with various scal
instruments. This model is based on the extended version of the ECBs New Area-Wide
Model (NAWM) described by Coenen et al. (2013). Fiscal instruments include government
consumption, government investment and lump-sum transfers in the expenditure side, and
consumption tax, wage income tax, and capital income tax in the revenue side. We develop
this framework in some ways. First, we introduce an endogenous risk premium in the
DSGE model. Empirically the fall in the government debt to GDP ratio reduces the
risk premium of government bonds. Thus, we assume that the interest rate faced by the
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government increases by the risk premium which correlates positively with the government
debt levels. Second, this chapter contributes to the macroeconomic literature by attempting
alternative scal rules. The baseline model assumes that government expenditures are
adjusted according to the output and the debt ratio, and revenues are correlated with the
debt ratio. However, there is no generally accepted scal rule unlike the monetary policy
rule. As robustness test, two more rules - an expenditure adjusted rule and a tax adjusted
rule - are introduced.
Simulation results show that the government consumption cut has the largest negative
impact on output. Since we assume a complementarity between government consumption
and private consumption, the e¤ect of the government investment cut is less than the
government consumption cut. The lump-sum transfers cut does not show a signicant
e¤ect because it does not constitute the national income. The revenue based strategy
has generally smaller e¤ects on impact than the expenditure based strategy. Specially,
capital income tax rather raises output in the short run. Non-Keynesian e¤ect due to the
endogenous risk premium causes this result. As the tax hike has more signicant impact
on the debt ratio and the risk premium, the response in investment and consumption
is constrained. We can conrm this e¤ect when the model without the risk premium is
examined. When the risk premium is omitted, noticeable changes appear in the response of
macroeconomic variables. As the non-Keynesian e¤ect disappears, the response in the tax
hike becomes larger than the expenditure cut. This result is consistent with the previous
literature (e.g., Guajardo et al., 2014; Alesina et al., 2015). The scal rule also induces
remarkable changes in the e¤ect of the tax hike. As in the tax hike the debt ratio shows more
change according to the implementation of alternative rules, the di¤erence in the response
of investment and consumption between two cases becomes relatively larger. This result
suggests that it is necessary for us to pay attention to the relationship among economic
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variables such as the debt level, the scal rule, when we investigate the e¤ect of scal
consolidation. For example, when there is an obvious positive relationship between the
risk premium and government debt, the tax hike is desirable. If the scal rule is only
applied to the expenditure or the tax rate, the tax hike is better than the expenditure cut.
In addition, when private consumption is a complement to government consumption, we
need to avoid the government consumption cut and the consumption tax hike.
The thesis ends with a conclusion, future research areas.
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Chapter 2
The determinants of output volatility:
nancial development and government debt
2.1. Introduction
Developing countries exhibit signicantly greater output volatility than developed coun-
tries (Malik and Temple, 2009). Moreover, many papers have documented the fact that
business cycle volatility has been related to lower growth in output, investment and con-
sumption as volatility creates economic uncertainty (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aizenman
and Marion, 1999; Loayza et al., 2007). Furthermore, assuming risk-averse agents and
imperfect insurance in the economy, output volatility produces direct adverse real welfare
e¤ects.1 An episode of extreme output volatility - the recent nancial crisis2 - impacted de-
veloped countries and researchers have since focussed attention on the welfare implications
of output volatility. A better understanding of the causes of output volatility is essential
for developed countries as well as developing countries.
Previous research has addressed the determinants of output volatility utilising di¤erent
subsets of variables and data.3 This chapter analyses two specic determinants of output
volatility among others - nancial development and government debt levels. First of all, the
1Aizenman and Powell (2003) show that a weak legal system combined with imperfect information leads
to profound e¤ects of volatility on production, employment and welfare. They suggest that legal and
information problems explain why volatility has substantial e¤ects on emerging market economies.
2Unsurprisingly, Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) nd that large values for the volatility measures are
typically related to deep recessions.
3Specically, the e¤ects of nancial development on output volatility are analysed in Easterly et al.
(2001), Denizer et al. (2002), Ferreira da Silva (2002), Lopez and Spiegel (2002), Kunieda (2008), Mallick
(2009), and Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013). The e¤ects of trade (openness) variables are addressed in
Bejan (2006), Cavallo (2007), and Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). Gali (1994), Fatas and Mihov (2001),
Viren (2005), and Debrun et al. (2008) examine scal policy and government size. The role of institutions
is studied in Acemoglu et al. (2003), Mobarak (2005), and Malik and Temple (2009).
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role of nancial development on output volatility is traditionally analysed using credit mar-
ket imperfections and asymmetric information. Specically, as a nancial system develops
in an economy, in principle, credit market imperfections and information asymmetries are
eased (Tharavanij, 2007). In the economy, economic agents can diversify risk and manage
e¤ectively unexpected events (Dabla Norris and Srivisal, 2013). Accordingly, nancial de-
velopment may reduce output volatility. However, the recent nancial crisis has triggered
a di¤erent view on the role of nancial development. Larger nancial development may
also imply higher leverage of economic agents, which propagates and amplies external
shocks through nancial frictions (Bernanke et al., 1999; Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Thus,
we revisit the relationship between nancial development and output volatility in order to
verify the adequacy of these arguments using new dynamic panel dataset for 127 countries
over the years 1971-2010.
Concurrently, the past few years have witnessed signicant increases in government
debt in many countries as a result of the recent nancial crisis. In addition, projections
of standard measures of public debt relative to GDP for the next 30 years indicate that
debt levels may be unsustainable for many countries (Cecchetti et al., 2010). High debt
has the potential to restrict the scope for countercyclical scal policies, which may cause
higher output volatility (Kumar and Woo, 2010). According to Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009),
government debt surges are also an antecedent to banking crises. Thus, it is necessary to
examine whether the scal expansion seen in some countries during the recent nancial
crisis increases output at the sacrice of more volatile economy in the future (Schurin,
2012). However, there has not been much discussion about the impact of government debt
on output volatility. Therefore, one of the objectives of this chapter is to shed some light
on this issue by investigating the impact of government debt on output volatility. In this
context, we address a new empirical question: Is there a link between government debt
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levels and output volatility?
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a rigorous analysis of the impacts
of nancial development and government debt on output volatility. It di¤ers from earlier
work in many signicant ways. First, this chapter includes the recent nancial crisis period
to investigate the impact of the nancial crisis on output volatility. The second contribution
is a systematic analysis of the e¤ect of government debt on output volatility. Furthermore,
we examine jointly nancial development and government debt using an interaction term
between the two. Third, we try to reconcile conicting results in the literature using a
di¤erent regression method, di¤erent time horizons and an alternative measure of nancial
development.
The ndings are as follows. First, nancial development a¤ects output volatility in a
non-linear fashion. This is consistent with earlier work. Specically, nancial development
will reduce output volatility up to a certain level (when private credit equals 140.9 percent
of GDP in the regression using the sample of 65 countries). Above this level, economies
on average become more volatile. Before the nancial crisis this threshold value is higher
- 152.6 percent of GDP - suggesting the strengthened destabilising role of private credit
during the nancial crisis. In addition, increased government debt levels are statistically
associated with increased macroeconomic volatility. A one-standard deviation increase in
the ratio of government debt to GDP - 53.2 percent of GDP in the sample - raises output
volatility by about one percent. This connection is not non-linear unlike nancial develop-
ment. However, these results are not valid under some robustness tests. For example, when
alternative time periods are used, Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation do not ensure
the validity of the specication and the results. We also nd totally di¤erent results when
we use lagged values of the two. This conicting result arises from endogeneity problems.
Therefore, we need to interpret the results carefully. Third, the interaction between the
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two is statistically insignicant suggesting that nancial development with scal problems
is not related to economic instability.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a review
of the literature. Section 2.3 explains estimation methodologies and discusses the system
Generalized Methods of Moments (system GMM). In Section 2.4, our dataset is described.
Section 2.5 presents the main regression results and Section 2.6 provides a series of robust-
ness checks. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2. Literature review
2.2.1. Financial development and output volatility
A considerable literature has already examined the relationship between nancial devel-
opment and output volatility. Some papers have theoretically analysed their connections.
Specically, Aghion et al. (1999) show that economies with a high degree of physical
separation between savers and investors, and capital market imperfections embodied in
constraints on the amounts investors can borrow from savers, may uctuate to a greater
extent around the steady state growth path. In other words, those economies will tend to
be more volatile. In contrast, when there exists a developed capital market, the economy
converges to a stable growth path along which only exogenous shocks make the economy
uctuate.4
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also examine the link between nancial development
and output volatility by emphasising the role that diversication plays in reducing risk.
They show that in early stages of development with scarcity of capital and the presence
of indivisible projects, agents will not able to diversify away risk e¤ectively because only a
limited number of imperfectly correlated projects can be undertaken. This will make the
4Therefore, Aghion et al. (1999) suggest that nancial market development may stabilise the economy
(Spiliopoulos, 2010).
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earlier stages of development highly volatile. As wealth builds up, however, economies can
diversify risk better, increase investment, and reduce investment risk and volatility.
Aghion et al. (2007) nd that nancial development reduces macroeconomic volatil-
ity using a overlapping generation growth model in which rms engage in two types of
investment: a short-term one and a long-term productivity enhancing one.5
However, nancial development can also have a positive e¤ect on output volatility.
Wagner (2010) shows that diversication of risks within nancial institutions increases the
probability of system crises even though it alleviates each institutions individual risk.6
Shleifer and Vishny (2010) also nd that bank credit and real investment will be unstable
when prices of securitised loans are variable. In their model, banks invest in securitised
loans using their capital when asset prices are high because of high protability of this
investment in booms. Thus, real investment further increases with securitisation. However,
banks are forced to sell their assets at lower prices in recessions. This accelerates price falls
and there is much less investment. This mechanism implies that the real economy becomes
more volatile with bankssecuritisation.
On the basis of these theoretical predictions a number of empirical papers have at-
tempted to examine whether nancial development reduces output volatility. Some, but
not all, empirical research support the stabilising role of nancial development. Specically,
Ferreira da Silva (2002) nds that output, investment and consumption volatility are nega-
tively related to all proxies of nancial system development applying Generalized Methods
of Moments (GMM) techniques on a panel data set of forty countries spanning the years
5Since it takes a longer time to complete, long-term investment has a higher liquidity risk as well as a
relatively less procyclical return. Under complete nancial markets, they show that long-term investment
is countercyclical, thus mitigating volatility. But when there are tight credit constraints, long-term invest-
ment turns procyclical, thus amplifying volatility. Therefore, tighter credit leads to higher macroeconomic
volatility.
6 In his model with two banks, banksrisk becomes similar through more diversication and this increases
the probability of simultaneous failure, i.e. a system crisis.
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1960 to 1997.7 Using the Fixed E¤ects (FE) methodology, with di¤erent control variables
and aggregation periods, Denizer et al. (2002) also generally support a negative correlation
between nancial development and growth, consumption, and investment volatility.8 They
also show that the way in which the nancial system develops matters.9 Lopez and Spiegel
(2002) also nd a signicantly negative relationship between nancial development and
income volatility from a cross-country panel spanning the years 1960 to 1990, using the
system GMM estimation with time and country xed e¤ects.10 Their results also suggest
that nancial development alleviates economic uctuations in the long run.
In addition, some papers nd evidence for a non-linear relationship between nancial
development and output volatility. The non-linear relationship means that nancial system
development reduces volatility up to a limit, but thereafter reduces stability. For example,
Easterly et al. (2001) nd that nancial system development is signicantly associated
with less volatility, but the relationship is non-linear in a panel of 60 countries over the
periods 19601997.11 Their point estimates suggest that output volatility begins to in-
7Ferreira da Silva (2002) uses a diverse set of proxies to measure the nancial system development: (i)
the ratio of a countrys liquid liabilities to its GDP (ii) the ratio of the assets of deposit money banks to the
total assets of the nancial system (iii) the ratio of the claims to the non-nancial private sector divided by
the total domestic credit or the ratio of the claims to the non-nancial private sector devided by the GDP
(iv) the growth rate of the nancial sector real GDP. The three indicators, (ii)  (iv) are from King and
Levine (1993).
8Denizer et al. (2002) use panel data from 70 countries for the period 1956 to 1998. They also use the
four measures from King and Levine (1993) as the nancial development indicators.
9Particularly, the role of banks in the nancial sector has explanatory power for the output, consumption,
and investment volatility, whereas the ratio of credit supplied to the private sector is only important in
explaining consumption volatility.
10Lopez and Spiegel (2002) measure volatility as the square of the change in income per capita unlike
other papers. They also get the indicators of nancial development from King and Levine (1993).
11Easterly et al. (2001) evaluate the impact of many factors such as nancial system development, trade
(nancial) openness, price exibility and policy volatility on growth volatility using OLS and 2SLS. For the
measure of the nancial system development, they use the ratio of credit to private sector to GDP. They
also use a range of instrumental variables including indicators for legal origin, initial GDP per capita, the
urban share of the population, life expectancy, the standard deviation of terms of trade changes, indicators
of oil and other commodity exporters, and a measure of political stability because the ratio of credit to the
private sector to GDP is found to be endogenous. Their empirical results nd that trade (nancial) openness
seems to play much role in explaining output volatility, but wage rigidities is not signicant determinant of
volatility.
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crease when the credit to the private sector reaches 100 percent of GDP. Recently, Dabla
Norris and Srivisal (2013) also nd strong evidence of a non-linear relationship between
nancial development and the volatility of output, consumption, and investment using a
110-country panel dataset over the periods 19742008.12 Specically, nancial develop-
ment has a benecial role in dampening volatility, but only up to a certain level. At high
levels (again, over 100 percent of GDP), nancial development magnies consumption and
investment volatility.
On the other hand, other papers do not nd a negative relationship between nancial
development and output volatility. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2003) suggest that
distortionary macroeconomic policies are symptoms of underlying institutional problems
rather than being the ultimate causes of economic volatility.13 They nd that nancial
aspects become insignicant for explaining volatility once the e¤ect of institutions are
taken into account. Beck et al. (2006) investigate the channels through which nancial
development potentially a¤ects output volatility using a panel of 63 countries over the
years 19601997 and also do not nd a strong and robust relationship between nancial
development and growth volatility.14 Specically, they nd ination volatility intensies
output volatility in countries with low level of nancial development, but no e¤ect in
the countries with better nancial system using OLS regressions. They also nd weak
evidence for a restraining e¤ect of nancial system development on the impact of terms of
12Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013) evaluate nancial development by the aggregate private credit provided
by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of GDP. They also consider three
indicators measured as a share of GDP total liquid liabilities, depository banksassets, and total deposits
in nancial institutions following King and Levine (1993).
13Acemoglu et al. (2003) use the constraint on the executive variable as the indicator of institutions in
order to develop the argument that the fundamental cause of post-war instability is institutional. And they
use data on the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the 17th
and 19th centuries as the instrumental variable for institutions to tackle the reverse causality problem.
14Their indicator of nancial system development is private credit, the claims on the private sector by
nancial intermediaries as share of GDP.
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trade volatility.15
Tharavanij (2007) also investigates the e¤ect of capital market development and nancial
development on volatility together and nds that nancial development is almost always
insignicant.16 He suggests that output and investment volatility are negatively related
to measures of capital market development using panel data covering 44 countries from
1975 to 2004.17 In addition, there is some evidence that capital market development also
lowers consumption volatility. Unlike other research, Mallick (2009) separately estimates
the e¤ect on di¤erent parts of volatility - business cycle volatility and long-run volatility
- and nds that nancial development a¤ects only business cycle volatility and does not
a¤ect long-run volatility. Since total volatility is composed of business cycle volatility and
long-run volatility, the e¤ect of nancial development on total volatility is argued to be
weak.
Another strand of literature empirically studies the relationship between credit cycles
and economic crises. For example, Schularick and Taylor (2012) nd that lagged credit
growth turns out to be highly signicant as a predictor of nancial crises using an annual
dataset of 14 developed countries over the years 18702008. Based on a similar dataset,
Jorda et al. (2012) also nd that higher rate of change of bank credit is associated with
a deeper recession implying that larger credit booms are followed by deep recessions and
sluggish recoveries.
15However, the FE regressions show somewhat di¤erent results. In particular, they show more signicant
results for the interaction of terms of trade volatility and private credit, whereas less signicant results for
the interaction of ination volatility with private credit.
16Specically, when output volatility and consumption volatility are used, nancial development is always
insignicant. Nonetheless, this paper presents the evidence of a signicant negative relationship between
nancial development and investment volatility.
17This paper uses the ratio of private sector credit to GDP and the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP as
the indicator of nancial development. Also it apply both the value of shares traded on domestic exchanges
divided by the total value of listed shares (Turnover Ratio) and the ratio of value of tatal shares traded on
the stock market divided by GDP over the claims of the banking sector on the private sector as a share of
GDP (Structure Activity index) as the measure of capital market development.
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In summary, previous work has established substantial theoretical and empirical grounds
to understand the relationship between nancial development and output volatility. Based
on these studies, nancial development generally reduces output instability up to the cer-
tain level. Above the level, economies become more unstable. However, we still have open
questions. First of all, we dont know how the relationship between nancial develop-
ment and output volatility has changed during the recent nancial crisis. Existing studies
generally investigate the pre-crisis period. However, the recent nancial crisis ended the
so-called Great Moderation18 in the developed countries and larger nancial sectors in
some developed countries may considerably a¤ect economic outcome, especially economic
stability. Second, some studies nd a weak relationship between nancial development
and output volatility. The di¤erence of conclusions, however, remains unclear. Third, the
number of sample countries is not su¢ cient. Panel data comprise 116 countries19 at most
in existing papers and most studies have 40~70 countries in the sample. According to
these questions, we develop the empirical analysis on the e¤ects of nancial development
on output volatility in following way. First, we expand the length of the sample period
into the recent nancial crisis. Thus, we can examine the e¤ect of the recent nancial crisis
on output volatility using panel data over the years 19712010. Second, we attempt to
consolidate conicting results among the existing work. The di¤erence of conclusions may
result from the measures of nancial development considered, the sets of controls, aggre-
gation periods, country samples, and the estimation techniques employed (Dabla Norris
and Srivisal, 2013). For example, among the studies which show conicting conclusions
Beck et al. (2006) utilise the FE regression instead of the system GMM regression. Ace-
18The U.S. entered a period of great moderation with the long and large decline in output volatility
since 1980s (Blanchard and Simon, 2001). This decline in output volatility was shown in other developed
countries. Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) also examine the causes of the decline of the output gap volatility
in the G7.
19Mallick (2009) includes 116 countries in some regressions. Recently, Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013)
employs the panel data for 110 countries.
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moglu et al. (2003) also use the ratio of real M2 to GDP as a measure of the importance
of nancial intermediation instead of the ratio of private sector credit to GDP generally
used. Tharavanij (2007) add the measure of capital market development and nd more
private credit is not associated with less output volatility. We, thus, investigate whether
di¤erent specications cause di¤erent results or not as robustness tests. Third, we increase
the number of sample countries compared to the previous work. Our panel is composed of
127 countries and this helps to obtain reliable results.
2.2.2. Government debt and output volatility
The e¤ect of government debt on macroeconomic stability is unclear. On the one hand, due
to the automatic stabilisers and discretionary scal policy reacting to a negative shock, in-
creased government debt may mitigate the propagation of a shock during recession, thereby
contributing to macroeconomic stability. However, on the other hand, high levels of gov-
ernment debt can increase output volatility through a variety of mechanisms. First, high
government debt constrains scal and monetary policy by causing large scal consolidation
or temporary monetary loosening (Pescatori et al., 2014). Second, increased government
debt in itself may raise macroeconomic volatility because scal policy to reduce output
volatility becomes less e¤ective at high government debt levels (Sutherland and Hoeller,
2012).20 Third, government debt also increases output volatility by increasing a prob-
ability of sovereign default. Since defaults are associated with deep recessions, higher
government debt is linked to output volatility through default risks.21 Fourth, government
debt increases output volatility by the impact on international condence (Elmendorf and
20Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) show that high government debt levels reduce the e¤ectiveness of scal
policy because higher sovereign default risk at very high debt levels may reduce investment.
21Also, external debt as a share of GDP is higher when countries default according to Mendoza and Yue
(2012). This explains the relationship between government debt and output volatility because external debt
takes up a considerable part of government debt.
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Mankiw, 1998). International investors may worry about high government debt levels. It
can cause a signicant outow of foreign capital and make the economy unstable.
Some papers theoretically analyse the e¤ect of government debt on volatility using
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. For instance, Corsetti
et al. (2013) analyse a sovereign risk channel through which higher public debt nega-
tively a¤ects private-sector nancing costs and show that the sovereign risk may exacer-
bate macroeconomic instability in the DSGE model proposed by Curdia and Woodford
(2009).22 Schurin (2012) also shows that output becomes more volatile when countries
have signicant amounts of government debt because the risk premium on government
bonds is countercyclical and the economy substantially becomes unstable with rising risk
of default.
Meanwhile, some research nds that high government debt statistically weakens growth,
sometimes in a non-linear manner (e.g., Caner et al., 2010; Kumar andWoo, 2010; Checherita
and Rother, 2010; and Cecchetti et al., 2011).23 However, there are not many papers
which statistically examine the e¤ect of government debt on output volatility. Spiliopoulos
(2010)24 includes short term and long term government debt as determinants of macro-
economic volatility within a cross-section of 50 countries over the period 19741989 and
nd the ratio of short term debt to GDP is an important correlate of output volatility.25
22Specically, an upward shift of the government decit raises the risk premium on public debt and,
through the sovereign risk channel, this drives up private borrowing costs, unless higher risk premium is
neutralized by relaxed monetary policy. Then, sovereign risk tends to exacerbate the e¤ects of cyclical
shocks.
23Specically, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) nd that above 90 percent of debt to GDP ratio growth rates
fall considerably more. However, Herdon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) raise objection to their result showing
that the relationship between government debt and GDP growth varies by time periods and country.
24Spiliopoulos (2010) has some characteristics in the methodology. This paper employs Bayesian Model
Averaging techniques. This also uses the downside semideviation of GDP growth rates  the standard
deviation of GDP growth rates below the mean growth over the time period as a measure of volatility,
instead of using the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rates like other studies.
25However, the direction of relationship is ambiguous. The short term debt is found to have positive
e¤ect on output volatility, but long term debt negatively a¤ects volatility. He concludes that the e¤ect of
long term debt is inconclusive because including only long term debts lowers an inclusion probability into
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Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) examine simple bivariate relationships between various debt
measures and macroeconomic volatility using OECD countriesquarterly data. They nd
that increase in government debt results in higher output volatility, though private sector
debt levels are not strongly and robustly associated with output volatility. However, their
probit estimation reveals that the e¤ect of more government debts on the probability of
a recession occurring is negative and strong. Pescatori et al. (2014) focus on advanced
economies and can not nd non-linear relationship between government debt and output
volatiity. However, they suggest a positive relationship, even if there is the large inter-
quartile range. In particular, above 56 percent of debt to GDP ratio a relatively higher
output volatility exists.
Like this, it is not clear whether government debt makes an economy unstable. Further-
more, existing literature does not systematically analyse the relationship between govern-
ment debt and output volatility. First of all, previous work does not correct for possible
endogeneity. Second, the sample period26 and the number of sample countries27 are not
su¢ cient to get reliable results like previous subsection. Thus, we improve the current
understanding of the relationship between government debt and output volatility in fol-
lowing way. First, we employ dynamic panel methodology, the system GMM regression to
alleviate the endogeneity problem. We also use lagged values of government debt in the
robustness section so that we investigate the relationship between government debt at the
beginning of a period and subsequent output volatility. Second, we expand the length of
the sample period using panel data over the years 19712010. In addition, we increase the
number of countries and our panel is composed of 65 countries.
0.26 in the Bayesian Model Averaging techniques.
26Spiliopoulos (2010) excludes the recent nancial crisis period. Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) only
include 15 years (1995-2010) in the sample period.
27Spiliopoulos (2010) includes 50 countries and Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) only include OECD coun-
tries in the sample.
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2.2.3. Interactions between nancial development and government
debt
As stated above, existing literature analyses the e¤ect of nancial development and gov-
ernment debt on output volatility separately. However, the two factors may interact and
a¤ect jointly output volatility in a particular way. The recent crisis especially shows that
analysing private credit and government debt separately is not appropriate (Jorda et al.,
2013). For example, when the real estate bubble collapsed in Ireland and Spain, a banking
system became unstable. Bail-outs of the banking system abruptly increased government
debt and turned into a sovereign debt crisis. In addition, unsustainable government debt
in Greece and Italy raised doubts about banks with government bonds.
Using a statistical toolkit relied on local projection approach Jorda et al. (2013) clearly
show that the recovery from economic crisis can be delayed if high levels of government debt
and a private credit overhang occur simultaneously based on the analysis of 150 crises in 17
advanced countries since 1870. However, they nd that adding the interactions between the
two in the logit model does not increase the generation probability of nancial crisis. This
result can be explained by di¤erences in the cyclicality of private credit and government
debt. Private credit seems to be pro-cyclical while government debt shows counter-cyclical
in developed countries. Except for Jorda et al. (2013), its not easy to nd related studies
in this area. Thus, we improve their research to examine the e¤ect of the interactions
between nancial development and government debt on output volatility. First, we employ
the system GMM regression instead of the logit model because we are not interested in
the generation probability of nancial crisis, but output volatility. Second, we increase the
number of countries to 65 countries. Lastly, we expand the number of control variables.
Jorda et al. (2013) do not consider other control variables, while we include various control
variables such as exchange rate, trade, ination and institution.
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2.3. Econometric methodology
2.3.1. Methodology
Previous empirical work and the recent nancial crisis motivate the following hypotheses.
First, the theory and previous evidence suggest that we should expect to nd a non-linear
relationship between nancial development and output volatility. A second hypothesis is
that government debt levels may increase output volatility. Third, the interactions between
nancial development and government debt are associated with higher output volatility. In
order to examine these hypotheses we use the system GMM dynamic panel regression by
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). We
also compute Arellano-Bond standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation.
The baseline panel regression specication is as follows:
V OLi;t = V OLi;t 1 + 1FDi;t + 2FD
2
i;t
+1GDi;t + 2GD
2
i;t + FDi;t GDi;t + Xi;t + ut + i + i;t (2.1)
where V OL is a measure of output volatility at time t for country i; FD is a measure of
nancial development; GD is a measure of the government debt level; X is a set of other
variables; ut is the time-specic xed e¤ect; i is the country-specic xed e¤ect; and i;t
is the error term. We examine the e¤ects of nancial development and government debt
on output volatility simultaneously.28 We also include the lagged dependent variable in
the system GMM dynamic panel regression in order to control a persistent e¤ect of the
28We also examine the e¤ect of nancial development omitting government debt and the e¤ect of gov-
ernment debt omitting a measure of nancial development as the robustness check.
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dependent variable.
The above equation is based on Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013). We include a linear and
a squared terms of private credit to test the non-linear impact of nancial development
on output volatility and expect that the linear term, 1 < 0, and the quadratic term,
2 > 0 according to Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013). However, we extend their work in
the following ways: (i) our equation includes the measure of government debt to examine
its impact on output volatility (ii) the interaction term between nancial development and
government debt is included. Regarding government debt, we use GD to examine the
e¤ect of government debt levels. A positive sign on 1 would indicate a magnifying role
of government debt levels on output volatility. In order to examine the existence of a
non-linear relationship between government debt and output volatility we add a quadratic
term, GD2.29 Lastly, we include the interaction term between the two, FD  GD, to
examine jointly the e¤ect of private credit and government debt on output volatility.
We consider two more regression specications according to "General-to-Specic Ap-
proach". First, a parsimonious specication I excludes the quadratic term of government
debt and the interaction term. Second, in order to maintain the number of available obser-
vations a parsimonious II excludes government debt related terms. The two more regression
specications are as follows.
V OLi;t = V OLi;t 1 + 1FDi;t + 2FD
2
i;t + 1GDi;t + Xi;t + ut + i + i;t (2.2)
V OLi;t = V OLi;t 1 + 1FDi;t + 2FD
2
i;t + Xi;t + ut + i + i;t (2.3)
29An assumption of a non-linear relationship between government debt and output volatility is not based
on a prediction of the theory or previous research. However, it is meaningful to test this assumption under
the non-linear relationship between government debt and economic growth shown in the literature.
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2.3.2. System GMM
As stated above, we adopt the system GMM dynamic panel regression. Some previous
papers use the FE panel regression. The FE panel regression deals with the omitted
variables bias resulting from the correlation between country specic xed e¤ects and the
independent variables in the pooled OLS. However, the use of the system GMM regression
instead of the FE panel regression can be justied as follows. The FE panel regression
still has the measurement error bias and the endogeneity problem - both output volatility
and nancial development (or government debt) jointly respond to some other unobserved
factors - which are inherent in the OLS.30 Specically, a serious di¢ culty arises with the
FE model in the context of a dynamic panel data model particularly in the small number of
time periods and large number of individuals context (Nickell, 1981). This arises because
the demeaning process which subtracts the individuals mean value of dependent variables
and each explanatory variables from the respective variable creates a correlation between
regressor and error. The bias arises even if the error process is i.i.d. If the error process is
autocorrelated, the problem is even more severe given the di¢ culty of deriving a consistent
estimate of the AR parameters in that context. One solution to this problem involves taking
rst di¤erences of the original model. Arellano and Bond (1991) begin by di¤erencing all
regressors using the GMM. And they nd that the lagged dependent variables are valid
instruments in the di¤erenced equations. Specically, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose
the di¤erence GMM estimator with following moment conditions31
E [V OLi;t s(i;t   i;t 1)] = 0 for s  2; t = 3; : : : ; T; (2.4)
E [Yi;t s(i;t   i;t 1)] = 0 for s  2; t = 3; : : : ; T; (2.5)
30See Kumar and Woo (2010).
31This explanation partly follows Kunieda (2008).
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where Y indicates explanatory variables other than the lagged dependent variables. How-
ever, the lagged dependent variables are poor instruments for the regression if the ex-
planatory variables follow a random work (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In order to correct
this problem, Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) assume that rst
di¤erences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the xed e¤ects. This allows us
to introduce more instruments, and increases e¢ ciency (Roodman, 2006). Specically,
lagged di¤erences of dependent variables are included as instruments. This assumption is
explained by following moment conditions
E [(V OLi;t s   V OLi;t s 1)(i + i;t)] = 0 for s = 1 (2.6)
E [(Yi;t s   Yi;t s 1)(i + i;t)] = 0 for s = 1: (2.7)
We can obtain consistent and e¢ cient estimators with these four moment conditions. These
estimators are called as the system GMM estimators.
According to this approach we utilise the lagged levels of the regressors as the instru-
ments for the regression in di¤erences and the lagged rst di¤erences of the corresponding
variables as the instruments for the regression in levels. However, the system GMM can
generate numerous instruments and this causes some problems (Roodman, 2009).32 Rood-
man (2009) suggests two main techniques to limit the number of instruments in the system
GMM. The rst is to use only certain lags instead of all available lags for the instruments.
The second method collapses the instrument matrix. We combine the two approaches col-
lapsing the instruments and using only the two-period lags of the dependant variable, the
32Specically, the problems of too many instruments are as follows. First, it can overt endogenous
variables. Second, it violates a Hansen test of overidentication.
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valid latest one.
However, above discussion is reasonable only under the hypothesis that explanatory
variables are weakly endogenous33 (Dabla Norris and Srivisal, 2013). Thus, to cope with
the endogeneity problem we substitute the lagged levels of private credit and government
debt for the contemporaneous levels in the robustness checks.
2.4. Data
Our panel dataset spans 40 years from 197134 to 2010 for 127 countries (40 high-income,
58 middle-income, and 29 low-income countries).35 The number of our sample countries
is larger than previous research. However, data for some regressors used in the regres-
sions - especially, government debt - are not available for many countries for the whole
period. Therefore, the sample size reduces to 65 countries for which data for all variables
are available (27 high-income, 34 middle-income, and 4 low-income countries). Appendix
shows the list of countries included in the sample. We include the recent nancial crisis
periods because output volatility potentially related to both increasing private credit and
government debt during the nancial crisis is an important part of this chapter.36 The
data set comprises eight non-overlapping ve-year periods (197175, 197680, . . . , 2001
05, 200610).37 To check the robustness of our results we also consider alternative time
horizon - 3 year periods (197173, 197476, . . . , 200710).
Our measure of output volatility is the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of
real GDP per capita.38 The GDP data are taken from release 7.1 of the Penn World Table
33Weakly endogeneity means that explanatory variables are not correlated with future values of the error
term.
34We choose 1971 as the rst year because of data availability.
35Regarding income levels of countries, we follow World Bank classication.
36Previous research does not include the recent nancial crisis periods. For example, Dabla Norris and
Srivisal (2013) stop in 2008.
37A panel dataset transforming the time series data into ve-year periods is now standard in the literature
(Dabla-Norris and Srivisal, 2013).
38Previous research such as Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013) also use the same measure.
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(PWT), due to Heston et al. (2012). We use the chain-weighted real output series named
RGDPCH in PWT 7.1, and measure annual growth rates using log di¤erences.
The measure of nancial development is "Private credit", dened as the ratio of domestic
credit supplied to the private sector by depository banks and other nancial institutions to
GDP.39 Private credit is the most commonly used indicator of nancial development (e.g.,
Easterly et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2006; Tharavanij, 2007; Mallick, 2009). Other papers
also use alternative measures such as total liquid liabilities, depository banksassets, and
total deposits in nancial institutions from Levine and King (1993). As in previous work
alternative measures from Levine and King (1993) show similar results with private credit.
Thus, we dont consider these alternative measures.40 However, we consider "Money" as
another measure of nancial development because Acemoglu et al. (2003) nd di¤erent
results using this measure. Money is dened as the ratio of real M2 to GDP. On the other
hand, we examine whether an inclusion of the measure of capital market development
changes the importance of nancial development or not as a robustness test. Following
Tharavanij (2007), we employ two measures: "Structure activity index" and "Turnover
ratio". Turnover ratio is dened as the value of shares traded on domestic stock market
divided by the total value of listed shares. And structure activity index is dened as the
ratio of value of total shares traded on the stock market divided by GDP over the domestic
credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP.41 In addition, we use the ratio of
total (domestic and external) gross central government debt to GDP from Reinhart and
Rogo¤ (2011) as the indicator of government debt levels.
39Particularly, domestic credit to private sector indicates nancial resources supplied to the private sector,
such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and the trade credits and other accounts receivable,
that certify a claim for repayment (Tharavanij, 2007).
40Levine and King (1993) also indicate problems in these alternative measures. In specic, these measures
do not di¤erentiate between the liabilities of various nancial institutions, and may not be closely related
to nancial services such as risk management and information processiong.
41Turnover ratio is identied as an absolute measure of capital market, whereas structure activity index
relatively measures stock market activity compared to banks (Tharavanij, 2007).
34
Clearly, it is necessary to control for other variables which can a¤ect output volatility
in order to estimate the impact of nancial development and government debt on output
volatility more precisely. As controls we include a number of variables that have shown to
be associated with output volatility in the literature. First of all, this includes beginnings-
of-period real GDP per capita to control for economic size.42 We also consider the standard
deviation of real exchange rates changes to control for foreign exchange shocks, as exchange
rate changes can a¤ect production and consumption decisions.43
Other control variables, measured as averages within each 5-year period, include trade
openness44, as measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, the ratio of govern-
ment consumption expenditure to GDP45. Also, we include an index of the type of political
regime (Polity index)46 which captures the institutionalised qualities of the governing au-
thority, and may have a bearing on economic stability.47 Finally, the standard deviation of
ination can be used as an indirect measure of the strength of monetary policy regimes.4849
42A number of papers such as Easterly et al. (2001) use initial GDP per capita as control variables and
nd that developing countries tend to undergo much more output volatility than developed countries.
43Denizer et al. (2002) also attempts to control for macroeconomic shocks by including the standard
deviation of the exchange rate and nd that greater exchange rate volatility is related to more GDP
volatility. The next series of papers that investigate output volatility (e.g., Ferreira da Silva, 2002; Kunieda,
2008; Dabla Norris and Srivisal, 2013) follow this method by incorporating the standard deviation of the
exchange rate.
44The e¤ects of trade openness on output volatility are addressed in Bejan (2006), Cavallo (2007), and
Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). They show signicantly destabilising role of trade openness.
45Rodrik (1998) argues that the government plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to external
risk by providing social insurance. Tharavanij (2007) includes this variable as a control variable besides
Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013).
46This index is taken from Polity-IV dataset and ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consol-
idated democracy).
47For example, Mobarak (2005) nds that higher levels of democracy is more stable.
48We use the standard deviation of ination, while other studies such as Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013)
include the level of ination. This is because the former is more signicant variable than the latter (Denizer
et al., 2002). Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) also nd that the level of ination has insignicant e¤ect on
output volatility. Blanchard and Simon (2001) nd that the level of ination is insignicant in explaining
changes in output volatility. Among the related work, Beck et al. (2006) and Kunieda (2008) use the
volatility of ination as control variables.
49We omit a measure of nancial openness unlike Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013) because some papers
such as Buch et al. (2005) do not show signicant relationship between nancial openness and output
volatility.
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The denition and sources for all variables are given in Appendix.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of all variables. There are some important points.
Output volatility is decreasing with income level. There are also di¤erences in nancial
development. High income countries tend to have deeper nancial system, measured by
private credit to GDP ratio. Another measure of nancial development, money, also shows
similar pattern depending on the income level. And two measures of capital market,
structure activity index and turnover ratio, are increasing with the income level. However,
the ratio of government debt to GDP is clearly decreasing with the income level. It is the
highest for the low income countries, while it is almost half in the high income countries.
Table 2.1. Summary statistics (5-year panel)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Low Middle High
income income income
Output volatility 989 1.99 1.91 2.41 2.06 1.55
Private credit 898 41.25 39.61 13.38 32.17 74.22
Money 866 53.25 144.22 42.67 44.74 77.59
Structure Activity index 353 18.12 174.95 3.86 17.73 20.45
Turnover ratio 308 47.63 53.58 15.25 33.99 66.11
Government debt 485 53.78 53.20 90.60 56.41 46.11
Initial GDP 989 3.60 0.58 2.87 3.55 4.24
Real exchange rate volatility 976 67.16 372.88 138.01 8.94 4.14
Domocracy 977 1.80 7.19 -2.32 0.90 6.36
Trade openness 915 73.50 47.14 55.72 73.71 86.28
Ination volatility 958 41.28 410.50 55.66 54.54 9.87
Government spending 909 15.91 6.30 13.66 15.02 18.82
Figure 2-1 illustrates the behavior of output volatility over the sample period. The
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data roughly show a downward trend. However, output volatility increased for the 2006
2010 period, especially for the high income countries. For example, volatility in the high
income countries doubled that in the rst half of 2000s. The notable exception is the low
income countries, where output volatility decreased recently though relative to historic
high levels. Thus, during the period 20062010 they became more stable than the high
income countries. This reects the fact that the nancial crisis mostly impacted developed
countries.
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Figure 2-1. Output volatility
The mean ratio of private credit to GDP has consistently increased over the last
four decades (Figure 2-2). However, the magnitude of increase varies with income levels.
Specically, the low income countries have remained at similar levels and the middle income
countries exhibit a moderate increase of private credit, whilst there was a dramatic rise of
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private credit in the high income countries, especially in the 2000s. This increase of private
credit may be associated with the recent nancial crisis in developed countries following
previous research such as Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009).
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Figure 2-2. Private credit
The mean government debt levels in Figure 2-3 display a signicant increase until the
1980s followed by a downsizing. The middle and low income countries exhibit strikingly
similar time trends throughout. However, the debt of the high income countries has con-
sistently risen over the last four decades.50 Finally, a turnaround of the ordering showed
up recently. The debt of the high income countries was larger than the lower income level
50Contrary to expectations, the debt ratio of the high income countries showed a quite smooth increase
during the recent nancial crisis. This is because the abrupt increase of government debt is conned to
some Eurozone countries and United States.
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countries. This reversal presumably implies that developed countries adapted vigorous
scal policy to overcome the nancial crisis.
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Figure 2-3. Government debt
In addition, in order to examine the relative impact of the various factors, Table 2.2
presents bivariate correlations of output volatility and the variables of interest - those
relating to nancial development, government debt, initial GDP, openness, democracy
and policies. The result shows that private credit is negatively associated with output
volatility in raw terms, but that government debt is correlated with output volatility.
Money is negatively correlated with output volatility. As a correlation between private
credit and money is also high, the relationship between money and output volatility may be
presumably similar to that between private credit and output volatility. Regarding control
variables, higher levels of initial GDP and democracy are associated with reduced output
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volatility. Exchange rate volatility, trade openness, ination volatility and government
spending are positively associated with output volatility, but the degree is not that big.
Table 2.2. Five-year panel correlations between variables
Variable Output Private Money Gov. Initial
volatility credit debt GDP
Output volatility 1
Private credit -0.3353 1
Money -0.2556 0.8189 1
Gov. debt 0.1173 -0.1401 0.0489 1
Initial GDP -0.2254 0.7138 0.6099 -0.1239 1
Exchange rate volatility 0.0293 -0.0208 -0.0179 0.1066 -0.0656
Democracy -0.3039 0.4731 0.4067 0.0150 0.5501
Trade openness 0.0802 0.1962 0.2743 0.2763 0.2355
Ination volatility 0.0625 -0.1289 -0.0660 0.1310 -0.0494
Gov. spending 0.0385 0.3402 0.3534 0.1593 0.3396
Variable Exchange rate Democracy Trade Ination Gov.
volatility openness volatility spending
Exchange rate volatility 1
Democracy -0.0084 1
Trade openness -0.0040 0.0687 1
Ination volatility -0.0033 -0.0007 -0.0585 1
Gov. spending -0.0789 0.1073 0.3642 -0.0223 1
2.5. Regression results
This section shows regression results of the determinants of output volatility, focussing on
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the roles of nancial development and government debt. We begin with simple cross-section
regressions and then move on to the system GMM dynamic panel regression.
2.5.1. Cross-section regression results
We start with a preliminary regression to examine the e¤ect of nancial development and
government debt on output volatility using averages across countries over the period 1971
2010 presented in Table 2.3. To evaluate the relative impact of nancial development and
government debt we regress output volatility against a variety of regressors. Column (1)
presents the baseline cross-country regression including both nancial development and
government debt. Regarding the connection between nancial development and output
volatility we nd that the sign of the linear term is negative and statistically signicant
at the 5% signicance level. This is consistent with Dabla Norris and Srivisal (2013).
However, government debt levels are not found to signicantly a¤ect output volatility in
Column (1). This result is di¤erent from previous papers such as Spiliopoulos (2010) and
Sutherland and Hoeller (2012).51
In order to increase the sample size, in Column (2) of Table 2.3 we only examine
the relationship between nancial development and output volatility eliminating govern-
ment debt.52 The empirical result shown in Column (2) is the same as discussed above.
Private credit is displayed to signicantly a¤ect output volatility implying that nancial
development does expose a country to reduced output volatility.53
Since the regression results discussed above have many limitations, their interpretation is
problematic. For example, certain time periods in our data may be associated with greater
51This di¤erence comes from aggregation periods, country samples, and the estimation techniques. Specif-
ically, Spiliopoulos (2010) employs Bayesian Model Averaging technigues with 50 countries from the period
19741989.
52Our sample includes observations on 126 countries in Column (2). However, our sample size reduces to
64 countries when government debt is included in Column (1).
53This result is also similar to a simple reduced-form cross-section regression of Dabla Norris and Srivisal
(2013).
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nancial development and reduced volatility or there may be certain country-specic char-
acteristics associated with increased nancial development and decreased volatility (Denizer
et al., 2002). Also both output volatility and nancial development (or government debt)
may jointly respond to some other unobserved factors due to the endogeneity problem. To
address this matter, we employ the system GMM dynamic panel regression. We also use the
lagged variables of nancial development and government debt to tackle the endogeneity
problem in the robustness test.
Table 2.3. The result of cross-section regression
Regression type (1) (2)
Private credit -0.7899099 (-2.32) -1.366163 (-2.76)
Government debt -0.1183789 (-0.34)
Initial GDP 0.0581523 (0.22) 0.4487283 (1.56)
Exchange rate volatility 0.00000114 (6.01) 0.000000972 (5.75)
Democracy -0.0472881 (-2.71) -0.0785791 (-3.03)
Trade openness 0.5590275 (2.06) 1.551415 (2.77)
Ination volatility 0.0005986 (1.42) -.0002276 (0.98)
Government spending 0.0849353 (0.12) 0.5241861 (0.86)
Intercept 2.038762 (2.71) -.4783477 (-0.46)
R2 0.5264 0.2749
Observations 64 126
Note: t-values in parentheses
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
2.5.2. System GMM results
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We now advance to the system GMM regression.54 The estimated e¤ects of nancial
development and government debt on output volatility are presented in Table 2.4. The
baseline regression shown in Column (1) is based on the equation (2.1). We nd that the
linear term of private credit enters negatively and the quadratic term enters positively.
Both terms are also signicant at the conventional level. This implies that the relationship
between nancial development and output volatility is U-shaped, i.e., in early stages of
nancial development, as the nancial system matures in an economy, it has a stabilising
e¤ect. However, as the nancial system develops above a certain level, output volatility
begins to increase. Our ndings conrm previous studies (e.g., Easterly et al., 2001; Dabla-
Norris and Srivisal, 2013).
In Column (2) of Table 2.4 we eliminate insignicant variables according to the equation
(2.2).55 Our main results of the U-shaped connection between private credit and output
volatility still hold. The level of signicance of private credit is especially much higher. In
addition, when we eliminate government debt related terms to increase the sample size in
Column (3) following the equation (2.3), the result is similar to the above ones.
This U-shaped volatility suggests that there is an optimal nancial development. What is
the theoretical rationale of the optimal nancial development? As a nancial system devel-
ops, households can smooth consumption opportunities and rms can diversify production
possibilities. Since agents anticipate less shock in normal times, this nancial deepening
contributes to the stabilisation of the economy. However, this positive e¤ect happens only
up to the threshold. As the development of the nancial system becomes deeper than the
threshold, higher leverage of private sector will exacerbate risk through several channels,
especially in crisis times.56 Credit overhang, thus, contributes to exacerbating a slowdown
54We allow output volatility to follow an AR(1) process.
55 In Column (2), the quadratic term of government debt and the interaction term are omitted.
56For example, lower interest rate resulting from more private credit will lower the quality of investments
and again increase the average risk of investment (Spiliopoulos, 2010). In addition, nancial accelerator
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into a recession and may cause output instability. According to the mechanism given
above, countries under the high leverage of private sector are increasingly vulnerable to
negative shocks and nancial development begins to a¤ect negatively economic stability
by amplifying shocks to the economy (Easterly et al., 2001).
From the equation (2.1), the threshold at which the e¤ect of nancial system on output
volatility changes from negative to positive is calculated as ( 1=22) (Dabla-Norris and
Srivisal, 2013). The threshold estimated from the system GMM regression is 174.4 percent
of GDP in Column (1). However, it drops to 140.9 percent and 129.9 percent of GDP in
Columns (2) and (3), respectively.57 Above the threshold, nancial development does not
act as a stability mechanism any longer. During the recent nancial crisis many countries,
especially developed countries, exceeded this threshold. Specically, there are 15 countries
from our sample on the basis of the regression in Column (3). The list is as follows: Cyprus,
Denmark, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Our result suggests
that those countries may need to reduce private credit to stabilise the economy.
The relationship between government debt and output volatility is shown in Column
(1) of Table 2.4. The result shows that the linear term of government debt levels enters
negatively whilst the quadratic term enters positively. However, the both terms are not
signicant at the conventional level suggesting that the connection between government
mechanisms in crisis times are also likely to be stronger under larger private credit (Jorda et al., 2012).
Paul Krugman in the New York Times (July 10, 2014) especially proposes that the recent nancial crisis
is a kind of "balance sheet recession". Under high debt levels people become aware of its riskiness at some
point. Thus, creditors demand to pay back the debt and debtors cannot but decrease their consumption
for deleveraging. This simultaneous reduction of consumption may result in a depression. And this lower
income will again cut consumption. This chain e¤ect will further amplify the economic downturn. On
the other hand, nancial frictions also result from balance sheets of nancial intermediaries (Gertler and
Karadi, 2011). Bankruptcy of the rms with the high leverage ratio in recession gives a negative impact
on the nancial institutions and this reduces their ability and willingness to lend to the rms. Some rms
can not help giving up investment due to a shortage of funds and this may aggravate the slowdown.
57Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) show that the threshold value is 147 percent of GDP. Our threshold
estimate is less than theirs on the basis of the equation of Column (3) which is similar to their one.
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debt and output volatility does not appear to be non-linear. Therefore, contrary to nancial
development, there may be no limit at which the impact of government debt levels on output
volatility changes its sign.
However, government debt enters with a positive sign and is signicant at the 5%
condence level in the parsimonious regression shown in Column (2) of Table 2.4. This
result suggests that larger government debt will be statistically associated with higher
output volatility. Specically, a one-standard deviation increase in government debt to
GDP - 53.2 percent of GDP in the sample - raises output volatility by about one percent.
This is basically consistent with previous work such as Spiliopoulos (2010), and Sutherland
and Hoeller (2012) which nd a signicant destabilising role of government debt.
In Column (1), we include the interaction term between private credit and government
debt according to the baseline equation (2.1). The interaction term between the two
has a positive sign, but is not statistically signicant at the conventional level. This
result means that nancial development with scal problems is not signicantly related to
economic instability. As explained in subsection 2.2.3, the di¤erence in the cyclicality of
private credit and government debt may cause this insignicant result. During the boom
private credit tends to increase, whilst government debt decreases in developed countries.
Therefore, it is di¢ cult to generalise some Eurozone cases explained in the section 2.1.
We need to check the validity of the instruments for the consistency of the estimation.
We utilise two specication tests following the literature. The rst is an Arellano-Bond test
for autocorrelation which examines the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in
the rst-di¤erenced error terms. We nd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis (p-value
= 0.262). The second test is the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which analyses
the moment conditions. Table 2-4 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
full set of orthogonality conditions are valid (p-value = 0.458).
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Table 2.4. The result of system GMM (full sample, 5-year panel, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent variable -0.0415752 (-0.58) -0.0313347 (-0.43) 0.07517 (0.65)
Private credit -6.889294 (-2.29) -5.361302 (-2.81) -5.54377 (-2.84)
Private credit square 1.975202 (2.91) 1.903188 (3.00) 2.133435 (3.36)
Government debt -2.034902 (-1.32) 1.034569 (2.38)
Government debt square 0.6129722 (1.30)
Interaction term 0.7390806 (0.92)
Initial GDP 2.433177 (2.03) 2.312843 (1.82) 0.2508624 (0.59)
Exchange rate volatility 0.000156 (1.83) 0.0001612 (1.84) 0.0002073 (2.15)
Democracy 0.0424812 (1.00) 0.0421137 (1.04) -0.0108528 (-0.43)
Trade openness 0.5415663 (0.78) 0.3554796 (0.51) 2.220773 (1.73)
Ination volatility 0.0002368 (1.13) 0.0002308 (1.11) -0.0000555 (-0.53)
Government spending 1.141744 (1.09) 1.147794 (1.09) 1.677045 (1.76)
Intercept -6.200321 (-1.20) -9.058235 (-1.74) -2.399298 (-1.07)
Number of countries 65 65 127
Observations 406 406 765
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 21 19 18
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.262 0.235 0.159
Hansen test p-values2) 0.458 0.430 0.551
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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2.5.3. E¤ect of country group
In this subsection, we divide the complete sample into OECD member and non-member
countries.58 This analysis is done under the assumption that we can understand the de-
terminants of output volatility more accurately among homogenous groups. Table 2.5 
2.6 display the e¤ect of private credit and government debt on output volatility in OECD
and non-OECD countries, respectively.59 In Table 2.5, the coe¢ cients of private credit and
government debt become insignicant. Specically, we cant nd the U-shaped relationship
between nancial development and output volatility. The linearly positive relationship be-
tween government debt and macroeconomic volatility also disappears. This result means
that the rise in private credit and government debt do not signicantly make the economy
unstable in the developed countries. The interaction term between the two variables is
statistically insignicant as ever. To understand this result we need to be reminded of the
fact that the small number of time periods and large number of individuals context is an
appropriate precondition for the system GMM. As the sample size is not su¢ ciently big to
get reliable results in this analysis, this should be carefully interpreted.
In contrast, we nd the non-linear relationship between private credit and output
volatility in non-OECD countries as shown in Table 2.6. This is consistent with Dabla and
Srivisal (2013). Government debt also has a positive and signicant correlation with output
volatility in Column (2). The interaction term shows insignicant coe¢ cients. Thus, the
main results shown in Table 2.4 are valid for low-income and middle-income countries.
Both the Hansen test and the A-B AR(2) test do not reject the validity of the instruments
in Table 2.6.
58Countries are divided according to OECD membership in 1975 because some middle income countries
has become OECD member since then and homogenous character among member countries is weakened.
59Two tables consist of 3 columns like Table 2.4 : (1) the baseline regression by the equation (2.1) (2)
the parsimonious regression I by the equation (2.2) (3) the parsimonious regression II by the equation (2.3)
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Table 2.5. The result of system GMM (OECD, 5-year panel, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent variable -0.0488405 (-0.59) -0.0327831 (-0.42) -0.0751011 (-0.95)
Private credit -0.3207905 (-0.14) 0.4888672 (0.51) 0.3333053 (0.33)
Private credit square 0.1339466 (0.61) 0.1166148 (0.52) 0.165213 (0.74)
Government debt -2.537687 (-1.43) -0.1525859 (-0.61)
Government debt square 0.5366649 (1.66)
Interaction term 0.4436177 (0.40)
Initial GDP -1.549785 (-0.86) -1.984548 (-1.16) -1.839711 (-1.29)
Exchange rate volatility 0.0000967 (1.26) 0.0000992 (1.06) 0.0000832 (0.96)
Democracy 0.0407347 (0.70) 0.0424981 (0.71) 0.0303262 (0.53)
Trade openness 1.854083 (1.35) 1.737656 (1.31) 1.541673 (1.34)
Ination volatility 0.0513296 (3.15)*** 0.0518711 (3.13)*** 0.0517224 (3.45)***
Government spending 3.047362 (1.81) 3.029821 (2.01) 2.642733 (1.85)
Intercept 1.021202 (0.12) 0.6549986 (0.08) 0.8629506 (0.12)
Number of countries 22 22 23
Observations 152 152 159
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 21 19 18
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.109 0.129 0.125
Hansen test p-values2) 0.311 0.376 0.302
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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Table 2.6. The result of system GMM (non-OECD, 5-year panel, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent variable -0.0584749 (-0.80) -0.0491241 (-0.67) 0.0740315 (0.65)
Private credit -12.65243 (-3.39)*** -9.638859 (-3.83)*** -6.308893 (-2.63)***
Private credit square 3.671152 (3.69)*** 3.512048 (3.67)*** 2.528936 (3.01)***
Government debt -2.670936 (-1.56) 1.032281 (1.89)*
Government debt square 0.5226936 (0.94)
Interaction term 1.420174 (1.32)
Initial GDP 2.285053 (1.62) 2.014615 (1.37) 0.2609372 (0.59)
Exchange rate volatility 0.0001464 (1.85)* 0.0001539 (1.88)* 0.0002033 (2.12)**
Democracy 0.0422501 (0.93) 0.0423024 (0.97) -0.0083907 (-0.33)
Trade openness 1.504686 (1.76) 1.105674 (1.44) 2.458787 (1.73)*
Ination volatility 0.0002205 (1.04) 0.0002174 (1.05) -0.000061 (-0.60)
Government spending 0.8725147 (0.74) 0.7609676 (0.67) 1.452299 (1.41)
Intercept -1.287515 (-0.23) -4.713997 (-0.85) -2.325263 (-0.92)
Number of countries 43 43 104
Observations 254 254 606
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 21 19 18
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.705 0.593 0.142
Hansen test p-values2) 0.595 0.562 0.686
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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2.5.4. E¤ect of lagged variables
Contemporaneous values of private credit and government debt are used in the main regres-
sions in Table 2.4. In this subsection, we use lagged values of private credit and government
debt to examine the relationship between nancial development (or government debt) at
the beginning of a period and subsequent output volatility. This specication also helps to
alleviate endogeneity problems (Denizer et al., 2002).
We nd a statistically insignicant relationship between output volatility and lagged
private credit in Table 2.7.60. Furthermore, the both terms of private credit do not display
expected signs. This result suggests that the established levels of nancial development
do not signicantly a¤ect output volatility in the following period. This is consistent with
Denizer et al. (2002). According to them, this is because private credit is linked to mone-
tary policy. When private credit is likely to increase, the central bank reacts by monetary
contraction. Both changes in private credit and monetary policy actions a¤ect the follow-
ing periods output volatility. Financial development with smoother business cycle does
not show up because it is di¢ cult to separate the e¤ect of monetary policy from the total
size of private credit. The interaction term between the two also reveals an insignicant
coe¢ cient. However, in Column (2) we nd a signicant and negative relationship between
government debt and output volatility suggesting that larger government debt in the pre-
vious period is statistically associated with lower output volatility in the following period.
This is obviously di¤erent from the main result in Table 2.4. This di¤erence may be related
to the mechanism linking government debt to output volatility explained in Section 2.2.
Countries with high government debt are under policy constraint. They may be pressured
to reduce debt and cut interest rates. This scal consolidation and expansionary monetary
policy in the previous period reduce output volatility in the following period.
60The regression structure of Table 2.7 is the same as the main regressions in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.7. The result of system GMM (lagged variables, 5-year panel, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent variable 0.0670775 (0.83) 0.0591536 (0.74) 0.0759762 (0.63)
Lagged private credit 3.247894 (1.63) 1.615907 (1.18) -1.029204 (-0.63)
Lagged credit square -0.4876631 (-1.20) -0.408862 (-1.01) 0.6183748 (1.18)
Lagged government debt -1.464436 (-0.56) -1.257768 (-2.97)
Lagged debt square 0.4668215 (0.72)
Interaction term -0.8118995 (-0.96)
Initial GDP 2.59891 (1.90) 2.444689 (1.77) 0.1787402 (0.49)
Exchange rate volatility 0.000000417 (2.39) 0.00000042 (3.51) 0.000000378 (4.10)
Democracy 0.035449 (0.70) 0.0433949 (0.85) -0.0191786 (-0.72)
Trade openness 0.4150452 (0.39) 0.3878794 (0.37) 1.647385 (1.18)
Ination volatility 0.0001178 (0.63) 0.0001202 (0.65) 0.0000162 (0.18)
Government spending 0.7161189 (0.58) 0.6383277 (0.54) 1.477145 (1.83)
Intercept -11.62158 (-1.61) -9.652008 (-1.55) -3.787688 (-1.09)
Number of countries 65 65 127
Observations 395 395 743
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 21 19 18
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.863 0.907 0.135
Hansen test p-values2) 0.999 1.000 0.610
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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2.6. Robustness checks
This section provides a series of sensitivity checks to investigate whether the system GMM
regression results shown in Table 2.4 are robust or not depenidng on the specication of
the regression. First, to account for conicting results in the previous literature, we use
the FE panel regression instead of the system GMM regression. Second, we consider two
alternative time horizons. Third, we exclude the period 20082010 over the sample period
to examine the e¤ect of the recent nancial crisis. Fourth, we use M2 instead of private
credit as the measure of nancial development. Lastly, we examine the e¤ect of nancial
development on output volatility when capital market development is included.
2.6.1. FE regression results
As mentioned before, the FE panel regression has a few limitations. However, we also
introduce the FE panel regression to reconcile conicting results in the previous literature.
Table 2.8 contains the FE regression results of output volatility using the measures of
nancial development and government debt. In the baseline regression shown in Column
(1) of Table 2.8, the linear term of private credit enters negatively and is signicant at
the 1% signicance level. And the quadratic term enters positively and is also signicant
at the 1% signicance level. This result displays the U-shaped e¤ect of private credit on
output volatility conrming the results of the system GMM regression.61 In Columns (2)
and (3)62, the non-linear relationship between nancial development and output volatility
remains robust.63 This non-linear relationship in the FE regression is a new nding because
61This also means that economies with fully developed or poorly developed nancial system seem to be
unstable, while economies with nancial development of an intermediate level seem to be stable.
62 In Column (2), we eliminate the insignicant regressors - the quadratic term of government debt and
the interaction term like the system GMM regression. Similarly, in Column (3), we omit government debt
from the regressors.
63For reference, the estimated threshold values of nancial development in the FE regression are 139.8
percent, 150.4 percent and 132.7 percent of GDP in Columns (1)~(3), respectively.
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previous work such as Lopez and Spiegel (2002) which employ the FE panel regression do
not examine the non-linear connection between nancial development and volatility.64 Beck
et al. (2006) even do not nd the signicant impact of nancial development on output
volatility in the FE panel regression.65
Regarding the e¤ect of government debt levels on output volatility, in Column (1),
the signs of the linear and the quadratic terms are positive, but the both terms are not
signicant at the conventional level. This conrms the fact that the relationship between
government debt and output volatility is not non-linear. However, when the insignicant
variables are omitted in Column (2), the sign of government debt is positive and signicant
at the 1% condence level. These results for the relationship between government debt
and output volatility are broadly similar to the result of the system GMM regression
suggesting that government debt will statistically amplify output volatility. However, the
e¤ect of government debt on output volatility is smaller than the system GMM regression
result. Specically, a one-standard deviation increase in government debt to GDP raises
output volatility by about 0.68 percent.
In Column (1), the interaction term between nancial development and government
debt has a negative sign unlike the system GMM regression. However, it is still statistically
insignicant at the conventional level. This result, thus, supports the fact that nancial
development with larger government debt does not signicantly a¤ect output volatility.
64As explained in the literature review, some papers nd the non-linear relationship. However, Easterly
et al. (2001) use OLS and 2SLS, while Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) use the system GMM.
65Beck et al. (2006) have a di¤erent study approach with ours as follows: (i) the time horizon (ii) the
number of sample period (iii) the number of sample country. These factors can cause di¤erent conclusions.
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Table 2.8. The result of FE regression (full sample, 5-year panel, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Private credit -3.763651 (-2.74) -4.07619 (-3.80) -2.699936 (-2.68)
Private credit square 1.345873 (4.25) 1.355286 (4.43) 1.017506 (3.11)
Government debt 0.7609571 (0.94) 0.6762186 (4.04)
Government debt square 0.0664181 (0.24)
Interaction term -0.1765178 (-0.43)
Initial GDP -0.4063447 (-0.56) -0.4110385 (-0.57) -0.1480925 (-0.42)
Exchange rate volatility 0.0001612 (1.79) 0.0001625 (1.80) 0.0001173 (1.15)
Democracy -0.0089834 (-0.52) -0.0076752 (-0.49) -0.0170615 (-1.14)
Trade openness 0.9561339 (1.77) 0.9825451 (1.84) 1.039015 (1.55)
Ination volatility 0.0004033 (1.57) 0.0004007 (1.56) 0.0000451 (0.30)
Government spending 0.5321367 (0.87) 0.4999447 (0.81) 0.20374 (0.32)
Intercept 2.967246 (1.21) 3.308734 (1.29) 2.670585 (1.84)
Number of countries 65 65 127
Observations 454 454 848
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.2299 0.2294 0.1058
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
2.6.2. Di¤erent time horizon
The main regression in Table 2.4 is based on eight non-overlapping ve-year periods. It is
necessary to test how the result changes when alternative time horizons are applied. In this
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section, we consider shorter three-year periods.66 Table 2.9 presents the robustness test re-
sults to the three-year periods. The non-linear relationship between nancial development
and output volatility considerably changes with the alternative time horizon in Columns
(1) and (2). In other words, the U-shaped connection between nancial development and
output volatility is not consistent with the di¤erent time horizon. However, the U-shaped
relationship again appears and the both terms become signicant at the conventional level
in Column (3).
When we examine the relationship between government debt and output volatility, we
also nd that the results are consistent with the main regressions. When the quadratic term
of government debt and the interaction term are omitted in Column (2), government debt
displays the signicant and positive relationship with output volatility. However, we need to
pay attention to the simultaneity in the determination of output volatility and government
debt. Changes in macroeconomic conditions generally a¤ect government debt through
the budget decit and thus more sensitive to endogeneity problems (Fatas and Mihov,
2003). Therefore, when the system GMM regression partly controls endogeneity problems,
the regression results may produce di¤erent results depending on the time horizon. This
suggests that we need to interpret carefully the relationship between government debt and
output volatility.
In addition, the interaction term between nancial development and government debt
shows an insignicant sign in Column (1).67 Therefore, this result conrms the fact that
there is no unambiguous relationship between nancial development with the scal problem
and output volatility.
66We also estimate longer seven-year periods. However, we do not report the estimation result because
the validity of the instruments is not certain. The A-B AR(2) test result rejects the null hypothesis. This
problem in the longer time horizon comes from the fact that the number of time periods is relatively small
compared to the number of sample.
67Furthermore, unlike the main result, the sign of the interaction term becomes negative in the 3-year
panel regression shown in Table 2.9.
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Table 2.9. The result of system GMM (full sample, 3-year panel, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent variable 0.0033334 (0.06) 0.0030834 (0.05) 0.1360813 (1.88)
Private credit 1.12891 (0.75) -0.01835 (-0.01) -5.085878 (-2.57)
Private credit square 0.2723035 (0.69) 0.3350841 (0.79) 2.198607 (3.03)
Government debt 1.103542 (0.65) 1.0297 (2.66)
Government debt square 0.2405196 (0.63)
Interaction term -0.5462189 (-0.64)
Initial GDP 0.0738547 (0.03) 0.2938376 (0.14) -0.259477 (-0.12)
Exchange rate volatility 0.0001284 (3.62) 0.0001327 (3.76) 0.0001673 (3.89)
Democracy -0.0048607 (-0.19) -0.0041826 (-0.17) -0.0098234 (-0.54)
Trade openness 0.999148 (1.31) 1.09666 (1.47) 2.429333 (2.42)
Ination volatility 0.0001123 (1.58) 0.0001084 (1.57) -0.0001244 (-0.94)
Government spending 0.2162828 (0.20) 0.1935616 (0.18) -0.8729403 (-0.72)
Intercept -5.422125 (-0.66) -5.424958 (-0.67) 0.7468372 (0.08)
Number of countries 65 65 126
Observations 691 691 1297
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 26 24 23
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.601 0.584 0.150
Hansen test p-values2) 0.802 0.850 0.641
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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2.6.3. E¤ect of the nancial crisis
The baseline panel data set spans 40 years from 1971 to 2010 including the recent nancial
crisis. As a robustness check, in Table 2.10 we exclude the period 20082010 over the sample
period to account for the e¤ect of the recent nancial crisis.68 Regarding private credit,
the empirical results shown in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 2.10 are the same as the main
regression results. Thus, we still nd the U-shaped relationship between private credit and
output volatility. The threshold value of private credit is 152.6 percent of GDP in Columns
(2). This value is higher than Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) which use a similar time
period (1974-2008). This value is slightly higher than the one from the main regression
model in Table 2.4 suggesting the nancial crisis since 2008 has lowered the threshold value
of private credit. As many developed countries which have increased private credit before
the crisis have experienced the recession, the recent nancial crisis seems to accelerate an
instabilising role of private credit on the economic performance.69
On the other hand, the both terms of government debt do not show signicant and
expected signs in Column (1). Similarly, the interaction term between the two does not
signicantly a¤ect output volatility. However, a positive and statistically signicant re-
lationship between government debt and output volatility appears in Column (2). This
result means that government debt levels are a statistically important factor a¤ecting out-
put volatility before the crisis. However, the e¤ect of government debt on output volatility
is larger than the main regression result. Specically, a one-standard deviation increase in
government debt to GDP raises output volatility by about 1.31 percent.
68As above Column (1) is the baseline model. Column (2) eliminates the quadratic term of government
debt and the interaction term. Column (3) omits all the variables related to government debt.
69 An interesting point is that the both terms of nancial development lose signicance despite the
expected signs in Column (3) of Table 2.10. Since many developing countries are added to the sample in
Column (3), private credit is not assumed to have a clear relationship with output volatility in developing
countries before the nancial crisis.
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Table 2.10. The result of system GMM (full sample, 5-year panel, 19712007)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent variable 0.0077849 (0.08) 0.0138001 (0.14) 0.0459709 (0.41)
Private credit -6.594568 (-2.21) -5.542502 (-2.37) -2.971983 (-1.22)
Private credit square 1.870563 (2.32) 1.815884 (2.28) 1.080343 (1.34)
Government debt -0.66616 (-0.29) 1.307947 (3.32)
Government debt square 0.3695962 (0.79)
Interaction term 0.5013391 (0.64)
Initial GDP 3.832314 (2.48) 3.780662 (2.45) 0.2885093 (0.63)
Exchange rate volatility 0.0001392 (3.53) 0.0001503 (3.74) 0.0001737 (4.35)
Democracy 0.0437677 (1.03) 0.0427823 (1.03) -0.0054593 (-0.20)
Trade openness 0.6274247 (0.78) 0.5123016 (0.63) 2.437381 (1.84)
Ination volatility 0.0002348 (1.16) 0.0002333 (1.16) -0.0000102 (-0.10)
Government spending 1.291548 (1.28) 1.291357 (1.28) 2.122281 (2.59)
Intercept -12.74001 (-1.86) -14.78554 (-2.26) -4.103952 (-1.52)
Number of countries 65 65 126
Observations 344 344 651
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 20 18 17
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.728 0.771 0.144
Hansen test p-values2) 0.899 0.912 0.526
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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2.6.4. Alternative measure of nancial development
So far we have considered private credit from banks and other nancial institutions. Previ-
ous research obtains very similar results on the impact of nancial development on output
volatility with alternative measures of nancial development.70 However, Acemoglu et al.
(2003) use real M2 as a measure of nancial development and do not nd any strong ev-
idence supporting weak nancial system as a main cause of output volatility. In order to
examine their conclusion, we use M2 instead of private credit. Table 2.11 presents this
robustness test.71 In Columns (1)-(3), the linear and the quadratic terms of money no
longer are statistically signicant. Moreover, the both terms do not show expected signs
in Columns (1)-(2). Therefore, more quantity of money is not associated with less output
volatility, and they do not show the U-shaped relationship. This is because each measure
of nancial development captures a di¤erent aspect of it (Denizer et al., 2002). Specically,
M2 measures the overall size of the nancial system. Private credit is a measure of the
magnitude to which nancial services are provided to the private sector. These results are
consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2003). Thus, the relationship between nancial develop-
ment and output volatility seems to depend on the measure of nancial development.
Regarding government debt and the interaction term, the results shown in Table 2.11 are
similar to the above result. Specically, higher government debt is statistically associated
with economic instability. The relationship between government debt and output volatility
is not U-shaped. In addition, the interaction term between money and government debt
does not have the signicant e¤ect on output volatility.
70Specically, these measures are as follows: (i) the ratio of total liquid liabilities to GDP (ii) the ratio
of depository banksassets to GDP (iii) the ratio of total deposits in nancial institutions to GDP.
71As above Column (1) is the baseline regression. Column (2) eliminates the quadratic term of government
debt and the interaction term. Column (3) omits all the variables related to government debt.
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Table 2.11. The result of system GMM (M2, 5-year panel, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent variable -0.0000904 (-0.00) -0.0016574 (-0.02) 0.1000289 (0.86)
Money 0.6014445 (0.21) 0.9814117 (0.45) -3.651366 (-1.22)
Money square -0.2504855 (-0.55) -0.2503992 (-0.53) 0.8988728 (1.13)
Government debt -1.700796 (-0.61) 0.9946844 (2.31)
Government debt square 0.7370902 (1.30)
Interaction term 0.2199488 (0.19)
Initial GDP 2.855689 (2.32) 2.900044 (2.30) 0.2550774 (0.61)
Exchange rate volatility 0.0001613 (1.75) 0.0001664 (1.78) 0.0002178 (2.13)
Democracy 0.0256583 (0.53) 0.0252239 (0.54) -0.0195414 (-0.79)
Trade openness -0.2597566 (-0.26) -0.3105336 (-0.30) 1.618036 (1.23)
Ination volatility 0.0002576 (1.20) 0.0002457 (1.14) -0.000015 (-0.10)
Government spending 1.322288 (1.02) 1.360669 (1.07) 2.028321 (2.14)
Intercept -11.35788 (-1.82) -13.91781 (-2.30) -1.321426 (-0.42)
Number of countries 65 65 127
Observations 374 376 731
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 21 19 18
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.277 0.226 0.147
Hansen test p-values2) 0.517 0.404 0.313
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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2.6.5. Inclusion of other controls
When capital market development and nancial development are taken together, nancial
development loses a signicant role on output volatility (Tharavanij, 2007). We also con-
sider two measures of capital market development, structure activity index and turnover
ratio, to examine this conclusion in our model. Tables 2.1272 shows this regression result.
We nd a negative and signicant relationship between capital market development and
output volatility, irrespective of used measures of capital market development. This result
means that capital market development is statistically associated with decreased output
volatiity.
However, the relationship between nancial development and output volatility changes a
bit. Specically, we still nd the U-shaped relationship between private credit and output
volatility in Columns (1)-(2). However, the both terms become insignicant. This result
suggests that private credit is not signicantly associated with output volatility. These
results show that capital market development has dampening roles of output volatility and
relatively tends to reduce the importance of nancial development on output volatility
conrming the results of Tharavanij (2007).
However, the Hansen test result is not available in Table 2.12 meaning that the instru-
ments may be correlated with the residuals. Still, the A-B AR(2) test ensures the validity of
the result. Thus, we need to interpret this result carefully under the endogeneity problem.
72Since we focus on the relationship between nancial development and output volatility in this subsection,
we use only the parsimonious regression II based on the equation (2.3).
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Table 2.12. The result of system GMM
(capital market development, 5-year sample, 19712010)
Regression type (1) (2)
Lagged dependent variable 0.0708556 (0.94) 0.0695865 (0.84)
Private credit -3.216731 (-1.42) -2.988061 (-1.43)
Private credit square 1.104743 (1.63) 1.035363 (1.56)
Initial GDP 2.027224 (2.09) 3.222734 (2.00)
Exchange rate volatility 0.0001966 (2.08) 0.000208 (2.21)
Democracy -0.0355002 (-1.27) -0.0557387 (-1.92)
Trade openness 1.678433 (1.98) 0.8158557 (0.79)
Ination volatility 0.0007871 (5.79) 0.0006761 (0.81)
Government spending 0.9847128 (0.71) 0.1220348 (0.07)
Structure activity index -0.4812238 (-2.69)
Turnover ratio -0.535844 (-2.48)
Intercept -8.166077 (-1.71) -
Countries 85 85
Observations 345 299
Time dummies Yes Yes
Number of instruments 17 17
A-B AR(2) test p-values1) 0.539 0.586
Hansen test p-values2) - -
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are in parentheses.
Levels of signicance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
1) The null hypothesis is that the rst-di¤erenced errors exhibit no second-order correlation.
2) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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2.7. Conclusion
During the recent nancial crisis both private credit and government debt rose in many
countries and these factors amplied the crisis. This phenomenon has made a lot of re-
searchers take interests in their economic impact. In this light, this chapter attempts to
improve the current understanding of the determinants of output volatility beyond the
existing literature. Specically, this chapter addresses the e¤ects of nancial development
and government debt on output volatility. It expands the length of time-series by includ-
ing the recent nancial crisis and increases the number of sample countries by a panel of
127 countries. Methodologically, we utilise a number of econometric techniques and also
examine the non-linear relationship as well as the e¤ect of the interaction of the two factors.
This chapter nds solid evidence that higher nancial system development mitigates
output volatility following previous researches. There is also some consistent evidence
of non-linearity - the e¤ect of nancial development on output volatility changes from
negative to positive beyond the certain level. The robustness test shows that the main
results are valid irrespective of the regression method, the sample period. Our estimated
threshold value of private credit is 140.9 percent of GDP in the sample of 65 countries.
We nd that during the nancial crisis this threshold value becomes lower than before
suggesting the strengthened destabilising role of private credit. Therefore, many advanced
countries need to reduce private credit in order to stabilise their economies because they
exceeded the threshold during the recent nancial crisis. When we use a measure of capital
market development to reconcile conicting results in the literature, the e¤ect of nancial
development on output volatility diminishes. This means that capital market development
plays a similar role with nancial development. However, the impact of capital market
development should be interpreted carefully because the Hansen test result is not available.
In addition, our result shows the signicant and positive relationship between govern-
63
ment debt levels and output volatility meaning that larger government debt is statistically
associated with higher output volatility. This means that the highest government debt
levels which are unparalleled in history may act as the destabilising factor of the economy.
However, some robustness tests do not show the validity of the instruments for the con-
sistency of the estimation. For example, using longer time periods, A-B AR(2) test result
rejects the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the rst di¤erenced errors.
This result especially suggests that the relationship between government debt and output
volatility should be interpreted carefully given endogeneity. Further empirical research is
certainly necessary to gain condence in the role of government debt on output volatil-
ity. Especially, in order to control endogeneity problems, we need to nd an appropriate
instrumental variable for government debt.
In some European countries, the nancial crisis and the scal crisis escalated further
each other. Thus, we also examine the e¤ect of the interactions between private credit and
government debt on output volatility. However, the interaction term between the two does
not signicantly a¤ect output volatility throughout our analysis suggesting that nancial
development with scal problems is not related to the economic instability. Di¤erent
cyclicality between private credit and government debt causes this result. Therefore, we
cannot generally apply some Eurozone countries case to other countries. In addition,
when we use the lagged values of private credit and government debt, the two factors do
not signicantly a¤ect output volatility. As higher private credit or government debt makes
the government take counter policies, the economy in the following period can be stabilised.
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Appendix
A. List of countries
High income country Low income country
Australia* Korea, Rep.* Bangladesh Mozambique
Austria* Luxembourg Benin Nepal
Bahrain Netherlands* Burkina Faso Niger
Belgium* New Zealand* Burundi Rwanda
Canada* Norway* Cambodia Sierra Leone
Chile* Oman Cent. African Rep.* Togo
Croatia Poland* Chad Uganda
Cyprus Portugal* Comoros Zambia*
Czech Rep. Russia* Congo. Dem. Rep. Zimbabwe*
Denmark* Saudi Arabia Ethiopia
Equa. Guinea Slovak Republic Gambia, The
Estonia Slovenia Guinea
Finland* Singapore* Guinea-Bisau
France* Spain* Haiti
Germany* Sweden* Kenya*
Greece* Switzerland* Liberia
Ireland* Trinidad&Tobago Madagascar
Israel United Kingdom* Malawi
Italy* United States* Mali
Japan* Uruguay* Mauritania
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Middle income country
Albania Fiji Pakistan
Algeria* Gabon Panama*
Angola Ghana* Papua New Gui.
Argentina* Guatemala* Paraguay*
Bhutan Guyana Peru*
Bolivia* Honduras* Philippines*
Botswana Hungry* Romania*
Brazil* India* Senegal
Bulgaria* Indonesia* Sri Lanka*
Cameroon Iran South Africa*
Cape Verde Jamaica Sudan
China* Jordan Suriname
Colombia* Lebanon Swaziland
Congo, Rep. Lesotho Syria
Costa Rica* Malaysia* Thailand*
Djibouti Mauritius* Tunisia*
Dominican Rep.* Mexico* Turkey*
Ecuador* Morocco* Venezuela*
Egypt* Namibia
El Salvador* Nicaragua*
Note : * indicates countries for which data for all variables are available.
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B. Variables used in regression analysis
Variables Description Source
Output volatility Standard deviation of annual growth of real, Penn World
chain-weighted GDP per capita Table 7.1
Private credit Private credit supplied by depository banks and World Bank
other nancial institutions as percentage of GDP WDI
Money Money and quasi money (M2) World Bank
as percentage of GDP WDI
Structure The ratio of value of total shares traded on the stock World Bank
Activity Index market divided by GDP over the domestic credit WDI
provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP
Turnover ratio The total value of shares traded divided by World Bank
the average market capitalization for the period WDI
Government debt Total gross central government debt Reinhart and
as percentage of GDP Rogo¤ (2011)
Real exchange Stnadard deviation of real exchange rate IMF IFS
rate volatility in unit of national currency per US dollar
Democracy Index ranging from -10 (autocratic regimes) Polity IV
to +10 (democratic regimes) Project
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP World Bank
Ination volatility Standard deviation of average consumer prices. IMF WEO
Average consumer prices are year-on-year changes.
Government All government current expenditure World Bank
expenditure for purchases of goods and services WDI
as percentage of GDP
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Chapter 3
The role of nancial frictions in the prop-
agation of shocks
3.1. Introduction
The nancial market turmoil beginning in 2007 has led to the most severe nancial crisis
since the Great Depression with large repercussions for the real economy (Brunnermeier,
2009).73 Of course, nancial crises are nothing new. They have been around since the
development of money and nancial markets. Financial crises have continued to thrive
through the ages, and they plague countries to this day (Kindleberger, 1993; Reinhart
and Rogo¤, 2009). Therefore, issues relating to nancial stability have always been part
of macroeconomics, but they have often been introduced as mainly of historical interest,
or generally of relevance to emerging markets.74 However, the recent crisis has made it
plain that even in economies like the United States, signicant disruptions of nancial
intermediation remain a possibility (Woodford, 2010).
Figure 3-1 displays quarterly time series for real GDP of some OECD countries from
2008 to 2013.75 The GDP values are expressed as percentages of GDP in the second
quarter of 2008. This gure shows that GDP values have decreased since the nancial
crisis in 2008. However, GDP values show di¤erent time paths depending on the countries.
73Many economists have also attributed the economic downturn of the Great Depression to the failure of
nancial markets. For example, see Fisher (1933), Keynes (2006), Minsky (2008), and Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2012).
74Since the 1990s, emerging markets have become increasingly integrated into global nancial markets.
Contrary to what was widely predicted by policymakers and economic theorists, their access to international
markets has turned out to be very volatile, with frequent periods of market closures (Fostel and Geanakoplos,
2008).
75We also collect a quarterly GDP data from OECD database.
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For example, Estonias GDP declined by nearly 20% in the third quarter of 2009 and
still didnt recover the pre-crisis level. Spain and Iceland did not show an abrupt fall like
Estonia. However, their economies did not improve and became worse over time. On the
contrary, United States experienced a modest contraction compared to other countries and
surpassed the pre-crisis level from 2011. This is similar to Germany. A variety of factors
can induce this di¤erent time paths of GDP. However, we note nancial frictions derived by
an abrupt increase of private credit. In Spain, Estonia, and Iceland private credit increased
at an unprecedented speed before the crisis, while U.S and Germany did not experience
such exceptional case.76 Thus, it is possible to assume that nancial frictions a¤ect the
amplication and the propagation of external shocks. The main purpose of this chapter is
to investigate whether or not such a relationship exists.
Researchers began to investigate how nancial imperfections could be introduced into
the existing macroeconomic models such as the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models. The standard DSGE models like Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007) assume that there are no frictions in the nancial sector. Thus,
these models cannot reect nancial market disruptions. However, the DSGE literature
on the nancial system has been expanding in recent times. The literature o¤ers di¤erent
approaches to incorporating nancial frictions. The rst approach is to model nancial
frictions at the rm level following Bernanke et al. (1999). Many papers have adopted this
approach (Christensen and Dib, 2008; De Graeve, 2008; Queijo von Heideken, 2009; Nolan
and Thoenissen, 2009). However, this approach emphasises credit market constraints on
non-nancial borrowers and treats nancial intermediaries largely as a veil (Gertler and
Kiyotaki, 2010). The second approach is to explicitly model the nancial intermediaries as
76Since 2000, just before the nancial crisis the amount of privae credit has more than doubled in Estonia,
Spain, and Iceland. However, its growth was not noticeable in the U.S. In Germany private credit rather
declined.
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a source of nancial frictions. Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
adopt this approach with the presence of a moral hazard problem between the depositors
and the nancial intermediaries.
80
85
90
95
10
0
10
5
2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
time
Estonia Germany
Iceland Spain
United States
Real GDP (2008 Q2=100)
Figure 3-1. Quarterly time series of real GDP during the recent nancial crisis
Given these alternative approaches, the main themes of this chapter are: (i) to conrm
the fact that nancial frictions are relevant to the amplication and the persistence of
economic uctuations; (ii) to ask which type of nancial frictions are more important in
explaining the amplied and persistent uctuation of economic variables; (iii) to analyse
which type of nancial frictions better match the economic uctuations during the recent
nancial crisis. This chapter compares three DSGE models to examine these issues. The
rst model is the basic model without nancial frictions (henceforth the no friction model).
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The second model is the model with nancial frictions at the rm level (henceforth the
rm friction model). The last one is the model with nancial frictions at the nancial
intermediaries level (henceforth the bank friction model). The no friction model is based
on Smets and Wouters (2007) model. Smets and Wouters (2007) extended the basic DSGE
model by adding habit formation in consumption, investment adjustment costs, variable
capital utilisation, sticky wages, and price indexation to past ination.77 The rm friction
model incorporates nancial frictions following Bernanke et al. (1999). In this model
nancial frictions come from a costly state verication framework a la Townsend (1979),
in which lenders must pay a xed auditing cost to observe an individual borrowers
realised return. This drives the external nance premium (the di¤erence between the
cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal to the rm). The
key mechanism of the model is that the external nance premium depends inversely on the
rms net worth.78 Lastly, the bank friction model incorporates nancial frictions following
Gertler and Karadi (2011). In the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model, the source of nancial
frictions is the balance sheets of nancial intermediaries. To motivate why the condition
of intermediary balance sheets inuences the ow of credit, they introduced an agency
problem between the intermedaries and the depositors. The agency problem induces an
endogenously determined leverage ratio, which has the e¤ect of tying overall credit ows to
the intermedariescapital. The comparison among the three models is conducted using the
moment comparison and the impulse response function analysis. Thus, the three models are
calibrated with the U.S. data for the period 1960Q12015Q4. We also investigate how the
77However, we leave out some elements like sticky wages in Smets and Wouters (2007) model since labour
market variables are not our main interest.
78Specically, this mechanism arises if there is a shock that a¤ects the rms net worth. If a shock has a
negative impact on the net worth, the rm will need to borrow much more for a given investment. However,
a higher leverage ratio means a more risk for the lenders, and they will demand a higher premium. This
increased cost will lower investment and the price of capital. This fall in the price of capital again decreases
the rms net worth, and this causes an increase in the external nance premium. Thus, these e¤ects
amplify and propagate the original contraction in the economy.
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three models respond to exogenous shocks such as a monetary policy shock, a technology
shock, a capital quality shock, a government spending shock, and wealth shocks.
Our main ndings are as follows. First, in the moment comparison the introduction
of nancial frictions originating in the rm improves the tting with the U.S. data. Thus,
the rm friction model outperforms the other models. However, the bank friction model
displays mixed results. It generates more volatility for investment and less volatility for
consumption. For the cross-correlation with GDP it is not preferred to the no friction
model. Second, the impulse response functions show that incorporating nancial frictions
of either type greatly amplies and propagates the e¤ects of most exogenous shocks on
economic variables. However, we nd an attenuator e¤ect of nancial frictions on the
technology shock in the rm friction model. In particular, the response of output to the
technology shock is stronger in the no friction model than the rm friction model. The
decline in the marginal product of capital due to the technology shock reduces investment,
thus, the rms loan. The rms leverage improves and the external nance premium also
drops. As investment rebounds, the response of output is reduced compared to the no
friction model. Third, the response to the exogenous shocks depends on the leverage.
In our baseline set-up, the response of output is greater in the bank friction model than
the rm friction model. This result can di¤er when other values of the rms leverage
or the banks leverage are used. Higher value of the leverage expands the response of
output to the shock. Fourth, the responses of output in the rm friction model are more
persistent because the shock causes the chain reaction of investment. The fall in the rms
net worth to the shock also reduces investment and the level of capital. The rms net
worth further declines and continuously induces investment to fall. On the other hand, in
the bank friction model output is adjusted much faster. The fall in the banks net worth
to the shock raises the external nance premium and decreases investment. However, as
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higher nance premium reduces the demand for the loan, this limits the fall in the nance
premium. Thus, investment and output soon rebounds. Therefore, we may infer that the
bank friction model with high leverage is appropriate for explaining deeper nancial crises,
whereas the rm friction model can capture both the magnitude and the persistence of
economic downturns. Specially, the high leverage of the banks before the recent nancial
crisis might aggravate the repercussion of the crisis.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we summarise related literature.
Section 3.3 introduces the three DSGE models. Section 3.4 discusses the calibration and
compares the response of the three models to ve standard shocks. Section 3.5 checks
robustness of the results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2. Literature review
The discussion of the importance of nancial frictions in the amplication and the persis-
tence of economic uctuations to the exogenous shocks comes from Bernanke and Gertler
(1989). They showed that the presence of asymmetric information in credit markets can
give the balance sheet conditions of borrowers a role to play in the business cycle through
their impact on the external nance premium. The procyclical nature of rm net worth
leads the wedge between the cost of external nance and internal funds, the external nance
premium, to fall during booms and to rise during recessions. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
demonstrated the quantitative importance of the Bernanke and Gertler (1989) mechanism,
nding that it can produce a hump-shaped output response to shocks in an otherwise
standard real business cycle model. The propagation brought about by nancial frictions
allows the model to better match the data, but it does not amplify the response of output.79
79Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) compared the real business cycle (RBC) model and the agency-cost model
with nancial frictions. The RBC model shows a jump in investment and output to a positive productivity
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Bernanke et al. (1999) also showed that the nancial accelerator mechanism both amplies
the impact of shocks and provides a quantitatively important mechanism that propagates
shocks at business cycle frequencies.80 Queijo von Heideken (2009) also indicated that
nancial frictions are relevant for both the U.S. and the Euro area using Bayesian esti-
mation techniques and the nancial market structure can play an important role in the
transmission mechanism of shocks.81 Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) found that a shock to
the nancial accelerator mechanism is very tightly linked with the onset of recessions, more
so than total factor productivity shock or monetary shock.82
However, other research di¤ers on the signicance of the nancial accelerator mech-
anism. For example, Christensen and Dib (2008) showed that the role of the nancial
accelerator mechanism a la Bernanke et al. (1999) in investment uctuations depends on
the nature of the shocks.83 In particular, the nancial accelerator mechanism dampens
the rise of investment following a positive technology shock and an investment-e¢ ciency
shock while that mechanism signicantly amplies and propagates the impact of monetary
policy, money demand, and preference shocks on investment and the price of capital.84 De
shock. Capital doesnt have a role in the RBC model. However, in the agency-cost model, the entrepre-
neurial net worth has an impact on the dynamics of the variables. A technology shock increases the net
worth and this boosts the demand for capital. The increase of demand for capital forces up the price of
capital and this chokes o¤ investment demand. Therefore, on impact, output is muted compared to the
RBC model and the models dynamics hereafter follows the RBC model.
80However, the empirical success of the costly external nance model lies partly in the fact that more
investment requires more borrowing for a xed amount of internal funds (Gomes et al., 2003).
81Queijo von Heideken (2009) studied an extended version of Bernanke et al. (1999) model with other
frictions that are justied to be important to t the data. These include price indexation to past ination,
sticky wages, habit formation in consumption and variable capital utilisation.
82Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) included a shock which is located in the entrepreneurial sector - the source
of the nancial accelerator mechanism - to the nancial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) and
compared the response of the shock with total factor productivity or monetary shock.
83Christensen and Dib (2008) extended Bernanke et al. (1999) with two features: (i) the debt contracts are
written in terms of the nominal interest rate reecting the nature of debt contracts in developed economies;
(ii) the monetary policy is characterized by a modied Taylor rule under which the monetary authority
adjusts short-term nominal interest rates in response to ination, output, and money-growth changes. They
estimated this model for the U.S. using maximum likelihood method and presented evidence in favor of the
nancial accelerator mechanism.
84This result is partly due to the aggressive response of the monetary authority to output variations when
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Graeve (2008) also found that the responses of investment and output are substantially
lower in the model with nancial frictions conditional on an investment supply shock and a
productivity shock.85 Therefore, it can be concluded that the e¤ect of the external nance
premium is strongly dependent on the assumptions such as nominal rigidities, adjustment
costs, and the kind of exogenous shocks while the introduction of the external nance pre-
mium generally improves the t of economic data characteristics such as the degree and
the persistence of economic uctuations (Brazdik et al., 2011).
The models with nancial frictions explained above were constructed without an explicit
role for nancial intermediation. In other words, the focus was primarily on the demand
side of credit. However, the aim of explaining specic features of the nancial crisis mo-
tivated researchers to introduce nancial intermediaries into DSGE models. Some papers
have investigated the role of a banking sector in monetary policy analysis by including a
banking sector in the model. The pioneering model introducing nancial intermediaries
into the DSGE models is Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). The banking sector is intro-
duced to describe the interaction and di¤erences between various types of interest rates
to determine how much the central bank is misled by relying on a standard model with-
out the banking sector.86 The next important contribution to the literature comes from
Curdia and Woodford (2009). They developed a New Keynesian model with a banking
sector and found that including the credit channel in the model does not fundamentally
the nancial accelerator is included.
85De Graeve (2008) appended the nancial friction of Bernanke et al. (1999) model to a baseline DSGE
model like Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) in order to study uctuations in the
external nance premium.
86Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) also demonstrated the competitive banking market setup creates
two opposite external nance premium e¤ects. The rst is called the banking attenuator e¤ect since the
banking sector attenuates a monetary policy shock because the external nance premium grows in booms
and drops in recessions. On the other hand, the banking accelerator e¤ect arises from the fact that the
monetary policy shock raises the opportunity cost of investment, therefore the marginal product of capital
and the price of capital have to increase. They argued that for reasonable parameter values the attenuator
e¤ect is stronger and the external nance premium is procyclical.
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change optimal monetary policy.87 More recently, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) applied a similar mechanism to nancial intermediation. They de-
veloped a DSGE model with nancial intermediaries that face endogenously determined
balance sheet constraints and showed that a decrease of the nancial intermediariesnet
worth disrupts lending and borrowing in a way that raises the external nancial premium
with spillover e¤ects in the real economy.88 Villa and Yang (2011) also estimated a model
with nancial intermediaries for the U.K economy and suggested that nancial frictions
play an important role in explaining U.K business cycles.89
On the other hand, some papers proposed DSGE models with leverage constraints both
in the rm and in the bank (e.g. Gerali et al., 2010; Meh and Moran, 2010; Rannenberg,
2012). Gerali et al. (2010) assumes imperfect competition in the banking sector and sticky
interest rates and the amount of lending to entrepreneurs is constrained by entrepreneurs
holding of capital. Their model can rationalise an attenuator mechanism on the role of
banks in the business cycle to a monetary policy shock and a technology shock, whereas
the nancial intermediation may introduce additional volatility to the business cycle for
the consequence of shocks originating in credit markets. Meh and Moran (2010) intro-
duced two moral hazard problems to study the role of bank capital for the transmission
87Curdia and Woodford (2009) produced two di¤erent interest rates - the interest rate available to savers
and the interest rate that borrowers pay for the loan - to show the result.
88Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) introduced an agency problem between
intermediaries and their depositors. This agency problem endogenously constrains intermediary leverage
ratios, which have the e¤ect of tying overall credit ows to the net worth of the intermediary sector. Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) also introduced an inter-bank market. The disruption to the inter-bank market besides
the agency problem has impacts on real activities. Gertler and Karadi (2011) showed that the intermediary
balance sheet mechanism produces a modest amplication of declines in output and investment relative to
the conventional DSGE model. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) did not explicitly compare models and used
this model to assess the impact of three forms of intervention: (i) a direct lending by the Central Bank to
households; (ii) an indirect lending through increased lending in the interbank market; (iii) the government
acquisiton of private banks.
89Specially, Villa and Yang (2011) showed that the banking sector shock explains about half of the fall
in output during the recent recession.
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of macroeconomic shocks.90 They showed that the presence of this bank capital channel
of tranmission amplies and propagates the e¤ects of technology shocks on output, invest-
ment and ination but has a more limited role for the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks.
Rannenberg (2012) combined the costly state verication problem between rms and banks
following Bernanke et al. (1999) with the moral hazard problem between banks and de-
positors following Gertler and Karadi (2011) and compared the model with the Bernanke
et al. (1999) type model. His modication amplies the response of the overall economy
to the shocks and better matches U.S data compared to the Bernanke et al. (1999) type
model.
This chapter is closely related to Villa (2013). It also compared three models in order to
analyse whether nancial frictions are empirically relevant and, if so, which type of nancial
frictions is preferred by the data.91 However, this chapter and Villa (2013) di¤er in several
respects as follows. First, we calibrate the three models to the U.S. data including the
nancial crisis period, whilst Villa (2013) estimates the models to the Euro Area during
the pre-crisis period. Second, for the result of the moment comparison Villa (2013) nds
that the introduction of either type of nancial frictions improves the models t and
the bank friction model outperforms the rm friction model. However, our result shows
that the rm friction model ts the data better than the bank friction model. Third, in
the results of the impulse responses function the rm friction model shows more persistent
90Two moral hazard problems are as follows. The rst moral hazard occurs between entrepreneurs
and banks. Entrepreneurs may choose projects with a low probability of success to raise their private
benets. As a monitoring mechanism, banks demand entrepreneurs to invest their net worth when lending
to them. And the second moral hazard happens between banks and investors. Investors cannot monitor
entrepreneurs so they deposit funds at banks. However, banks may not rightly monitor since monitoring is
private and costly. Therefore, investors require banks to invest their net worth in entrepreneursprojects.
This mechanism means that the dynamics of bank capital a¤ect how much banks can lend, and the dynamics
of entrepreneurial net worth inuence how much entrepreneurs can borrow.
91The three models are as follows: (i) Smets and Wouters (2007) model (SW model); (ii) a SW model
with nancial frictions originating in non-nancial rms a la Bernanke et al. (1999), (SWBGG model); (iii)
a SW model wih nancial frictions originating in nancial intermediaries, a la Gertler and Karadi (2011),
(SWGK model).
77
responses of output and investment to the shocks, while the bank friction model shows much
faster adjusted responses. In addition, the two models with nancial frictions display more
amplied responses with higher leverage. This result is one of our important contribution
because it is not denitely mentioned in Villa (2013).
3.3. The models
This section presents the three DSGE models: the no friction model, the rm friction model
and the bank friction model. The no friction model is a closed-economy DSGE model
similar to that of Smets and Wouters (2007). The model we consider is the framework of
the DSGE model with monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidities. And in the
rm friction model we incorporate the nancial accelerator largely following Bernanke et
al. (1999) while the bank friction model is similar to that of Gertler and Karadi (2011). In
all the models the economy is populated by a representative household, capital producers,
intermediate goods rms, nal goods producers, and the policy maker. And in the bank
friction model nancial intermediaries are added to the economy.
3.3.1. The no friction model (Smets and Wouters, 2007)
3.3.1.1. Households
There is a continuum of households where the population measures to unity. Households are
innitely-lived and consume intertemporally and intratemporally over di¤erentiated goods
provided by nal goods rms. Further, households provide labour service to intermediate
goods rms. The representative household derives utility from consumption Ct, and labour
supply Lt. Thus, householdspreferences are given by the expected utility function
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i=0
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ln (Ct+i   hCt+i 1)  
1 + '
(Lt+i)
1+'
)
(3.1)
where a discount rate  2 (0; 1), a habit parameter h 2 (0; 1), a relative utility weight of
labour  > 0, and an inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply ' > 0: The representative
households utility is separable in consumption and leisure and allows for habit formation
in consumption following Smets and Wouters (2007). The household saves by depositing
funds with nancial intermediaries and by buying government bonds. Both of these assets
have a maturity of one quarter, yield a gross real risk-free return Rt from t  1 to t. In the
equilibrium considered here, these assets are both riskless and are thus perfect substitutes
and earn the same interest rate. Let Wt be the real wage rate, t net distributions from
ownerships of both non-nancial and nancial rms, Tt lump sum taxes, and Bt+1 the total
quantity of short term debt the household acquires. Then their budget constraint is given
by
Ct =WtLt +t   Tt +Rt Bt  Bt+1 (3.2)
Maximisation of householdspreferences (3.1) subject to the budget constraint (3.2) gives
the following rst order conditions with respect to Ct; Lt; Bt:
Ct : t = (Ct   hCt 1) 1   hEt (Ct+1   hCt) 1 (3.3)
Lt : tWt = L
'
t (3.4)
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Bt : 1 = Ett;t+1Rt+1 (3.5)
where t denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint and
t;t+1 =
t+1
t
:
3.3.1.2. Capital producers
At the end of period t; competitive capital producers purchase the stock of depreciated
capital from intermediate goods rms and then repair depreciated capital and produce
new capital. The new and re-furbished capital is then sold back to intermediate goods
rms and any prots are transfered to households. We assume that the value of a unit of
new capital is Qt and the cost of replacing depreciated capital is unity. We also suppose
that there are ow adjustment costs associated with producing new capital and there are
no adjustment costs associated with refurbishing capital following Christiano et al. (2005).
A representative capital producers accumulation technology is given by
Kt+1 = tKt + Int (3.6)
where Kt is capital stock, Int  It   (Ut) tKt is net capital created, and t is a stochastic
shock to the quality of capital following an autogressive process
ln t =  ln t 1 + 

t ; 0 <  < 1; 

t  N(0; ) (3.7)
Thus, tKt is the e¤ective quantity of capital at period t. The capital quality shock t is
introduced to capture economic depreciation or obsolescence of capital (Gertler and Karadi,
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2011). And Ut is the utilisation rate of capital and  (Ut) is the depreciation rate depending
on the utilisation rate of capital. The depreciation rate is as follows:
 (Ut) = ss +
(Rss + EFPss)  (1  ss)
(1 + )   U
1+
t (3.8)
where ss is the steady state depreciation rate, Rss is the steady state gross real risk-free
interest rate, EFPss is the steady state external nance premium,  is the price mark-up
and  is the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to utilisation rate.
Therefore,  (Ut) tKt is the quantity of capital refurbished. Investment adjustment costs
are also given by
f(
It
It 1
) =

2

It
It 1
  1
2
; f (1) = f
0
(1) = 0 and f
00
(1) > 0 (3.9)
where It is gross capital created and  means inverse elasticity of net investment to the
price of capital. The function f summarises the technology that transforms current and
past investment into installed capital for use in the following period (Christiano et al.,
2005). Then, real expected prots of the capital producer are given by
maxEt
1X
=t
T tt;

(Q   1) In   f

In
In 1

In

(3.10)
The rst order condition for investment gives the following relation for net investment
assuming all capital producers choose the same net investment rate.
Qt = 1 + f () + Int
Int 1
f
0
()  Ett;t+1(Int+1
Int
)2f
0
() (3.11)
From the equation (3.11), the price of capital goods is equal to the marginal cost of invest-
ment goods production.
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3.3.1.3. Intermediate goods rms
Intermediate goods rms hire labour and combine it with capital and produce wholesale
goods that are nally sold to nal goods producers in a perfectly competitive market. These
rms are risk-neutral and have a nite horizon. At the end of period t; each intermediate
goods rm i buys capital Kit from capital producers at a given price Qt and produces
output Yit, using the capital and labour Lit. Then production technology is given by the
following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yit = At (UttKit)
 L1 it (3.12)
where At denotes total factor productivity and follows an AR(1) process:
lnAt = A lnAt 1 + 
A
t ; 0 < A < 1; 
A
t  N(0; A) (3.13)
and  is e¤ective capital share. Let Pmt be the price of intermediate goods output. We
assume that the replacement price of used capital is unity. Then, the rst order conditions
are as follows:
Kit : Pmt
Yit
Ut
= 
0
(Ut) tKit (3.14)
Lit : Pmt (1  ) Yit
Lit
=Wt (3.15)
With the assumption of perfect capital markets, the return to capital is equal to the gross
real risk-free interest rate.
Et
it;t+1+iRkt+1+i = Et
it;t+1+iRt+1+i (3.16)
82
where Rkt is the return to capital from t  1 to t.
3.3.1.4. Final goods producers
In order to introduce monopolistic competition in the goods market, this model comprises
a retail sector. Final goods producers purchase intermediate goods Yit at the market price
Pmt and re-package those goods into retail output Yft that are sold in a monopolisticly
competitive market. It takes one unit of intermediate good to make a unit of retail good,
i.e. Yit = Yft. Final output Yt is a constant elasticity substitution composite of a continuum
of mass unity of di¤erentiated nal goods rms that use intermediate output as the sole
input. The nal output composite is given by
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
(" 1)="
ft df
"=(1 ")
(3.17)
where Yft is output by nal goods producer f and " is the elasticity of substitution. From
cost minimisation by users of nal output, Yft is given by
Yft =

Pft
Pt
 "
Yt (3.18)
where Pt =
hR 1
0 P
1 "
ft df
i1=(1 ")
is the aggregate price index.
Final goods producers are subject to nominal rigidities following Calvo (1983) and Yun
(1996). Specically, only a fraction 1   P of rms is allowed to adjust its price each
period. Those rms not allowed to optimise its price can index its price to the lagged
ination at a rate rP . Denoting the optimal price as P t , nal goods producers decide the
price as follows:
maxEt
1X
i=0
iit;t+1

P t
Pt+i
ik=1 (1 + t+k 1)
rP   Pmt+i

Yft+i (3.19)
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where t is the rate of ination from t  1 to t: The rst order conditions are given by
Et
1X
i=0
iit;t+1

P t
Pt+i
ik=1 (1 + t+k 1)
rP   Pmt+i

Yft+i = 0 (3.20)
with the price mark-up  = 11 1=" . Thus, the aggregate price index evolves as follows:
Pt =
h
(1  ) (P t )1 " + 
 

P
t 1Pt 1
1 "i1=(1 ") (3.21)
3.3.1.5. Monetary policy and equilibrium
We assume that the monetary authority sets risk-free nominal interest rate Rn;t to stabilise
output and ination according to a simple Taylor rule of the form
log

Rn;t
R

= (1  )

 log

t


t
+ y log

Yt
Y t

+ 

Rn;t 1
R

+ Rt  > 1; y  0
(3.22)
with an interest rate smoothing parameter  2 [0; 1) and Rt  N(0; R) is an exogenous
shock to monetary policy (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). The strength of the monetary
authoritys reaction to uctuations of ination and output is determined by the ination
coe¢ cient  and the output gap coe¢ cient y; where we impose the Taylor principle as
 > 1 (Taylor, 1993). The following Fisher equation shows the relation between nominal
and real interest rates.
1 +Rn;t = Rt
EtPt+1
Pt
(3.23)
Output consists of comsumption, investment, investment adjustment cost, and government
spending. Thus, the economy-wide resource constraint is given by
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Yt = Ct + It + f

Int
Int 1

Int +Gt (3.24)
The term Gt represents a government spending shock that follows an AR(1) process:
lnGt = G lnGt 1 + 
G
t ; 0 < G < 1; 
G
t  N(0; G) (3.25)
3.3.2. The rm friction model (Bernanke et al., 1999)
The introduction of nancial frictions at the rm level changes the set-up of intermediate
goods rms compared to the no friction model explained above. The rm friction model is
identical to the no friction model otherwise. Intermediate goods rms are, in fact, the key
for the working of the nancial accelerator mechanism since nancial frictions arise from
asymmetric information in the relationship between borrowers (i.e. intermediate goods
rms) and lenders (i.e. a nancial intermediary who ultimately represents household and
thus need not be modeled explicitly). In this subsection, we leave out the explanation of
households, capital producers and nal goods rms, since these parts are the same as the
no friction model.92 Then, we show the set-up of intermediate goods rms.
3.3.2.1. Intermediate goods rms
Intermediate goods rms produce goods in a perfectly competitive market following the
no friction model. This optimisation problem is identical to that in the no friction model
described by equations (3.12) - (3.15). Given that the rm earns zero prots, it pays out
the ex post return to capital to the nancial intermediary. Accordingly, Rkt+1 is given by
92Therefore, we maintain some frictions - habit formation in consumption, variable capital utilisation and
price indexation to past ination - unlike Bernanke et al. (1999).
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Rkt+1 =
h
Pmt+1
Yt+1
t+1Kt+1
+Qt+1    (Ut+1)
i
t+1
Qt
(3.26)
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that each rm survives until the next period
with probability e and his expected lifetime is equal to 1=(1  e). This assumption ensures
that intermediate goods rms net worth will never be enough to fully nance the acquisiton
of capital. Thus, they buy the capital from capital goods producers using both their net
worth and loans from nancial intermediaries. We also assume the existence of an agency
problem between intermediate goods rms and intermediaries. Intermediate goods rms
can costlessly observe their returns. However, the intermediaries have to pay monitoring
costs to observe the realised output of the rms. This is a costly state verication framework
a la Townsend (1979). Thus, entrepreneurs cannot borrow at the riskless rate and have to
pay the external nance premium.
In particular, the ex post gross return of intermediate goods rm j is !jRkt+1; where
!j is an idiosyncratic shock to intermediate goods rm js return. The variable !j is i.i.d.
cross time and cross the intermediate goods rms, with cumulative density function F (!),
and E

!j
	
= 1. The auditing cost is assumed to equal a proportion  of the realised
gross return to intermediate goods rms capital. Intermediate goods rm j has his own
net worth N jt+1 at the end of t and has to borrow an amount L
j
t+1 to acquire capital goods.
Thus, the above relationship is given by
Ljt+1 = QtK
j
t+1  N jt+1 (3.27)
where Ljt+1 is an amount of loan at the end of t. And the intermediary faces an opportunity
cost of funds between t and t+1 equal to the stochastic return on the portfolio of loans to
intermediate goods rms, Rt+1.
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Given QtK
j
t+1, L
j
t+1, and Rt+1, the optimal contract may be characterized by a gross non-
default loan rate, RLjt+1, and a threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock $
j , such that for
values of the idiosyncratic shock greater than or equal to $j , the intermediate goods rm
is able to repay the loan at the contractual rate, RLjt+1. That is, $
j is dened by
$jRkt+1QtK
j
t+1 = R
L
jt+1L
j
t+1 (3.28)
If !j < $j , the intermediate goods rm cannot pay the contractual return and declares
default. The value of $j and RLjt+1 under the optimal contract are determined by the
requirement that households receive expected returns equal to the opportunity costs of
their funds. Accordingly, the loan contract must satisfy

1  F  $jRLjt+1Ljt+1 + (1  )Z $j
0
!jRkt+1QtK
j
t+1dF
 
!j

= Rt+1L
j
t+1 (3.29)
Combining equations (3.27) and (3.28) with equation (3.29) yields the following expression
for $j :
(
1  F  $j$j + (1  )Z $j
0
!jdF
 
!j
)
Rkt+1QtK
j
t+1 = Rt+1

QtK
j
t+1  N jt+1

:
(3.30)
Given the state-contingent debt form of the optimal contract, the expected return to the
intermediate goods rm may be expressed as
E
Z 1
$j
!jRkt+1QtK
j
t+1dF
 
!j
   1  F  $j$jRkt+1QtKjt+1 (3.31)
Combining this relation with equation (3.30) allows us to simplify intermediate goods rms
objective to maximisation of
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E("
1  
Z $j
0
!jdF
 
!j
#
Rkt+1=E (Rkt+1)
)
E (Rkt+1)QtK
j
t+1 Rt+1

QtK
j
t+1  N jt+1

(3.32)
The formal investment and contracting problem then reduced to choosingKjt+1 and a sched-
ule for $j to maximise equation (3.32), subject to the set of state-contingent constraints
implied by equation (3.30).
We assume E fRkt+1=Rt+1g  1 because the intermediate goods rms purchase capital in
the competitive equilibrium. Thus, the rst-order condition yields the following relation
for optimal capital purchases:
QtK
j
t+1 =  (E fRkt+1=Rt+1g)N jt+1, with  (1) = 1;  
0
() > 0 (3.33)
Equation (3.33) can be expressed as a di¤erent way.
E fRkt+1g = s
 
N jt+1
QtK
j
t+1
!
Rt+1; s
0
() < 0 (3.34)
As shown in the above equation, the premium over the risk-free rate the intermediary
demands is a negative function of the share of intermediate goods rms capital investment
that is nanced by his net worth.
Following Christensen and Dib (2008), intermediate goods rms net worth at the end of
period t is given by
Nt+1 = eVt + (1  e)N et (3.35)
where Vt is the equity held by intermediate goods rms at t   1 who are still in business
at the period t and N et is the transfer that newly entering intermediate goods rms receive
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from the rms who depart from the market. Here, intermediate goods rms equity is given
by
Vt = Rkt+1Qt 1Kt  

Rt+1 +

R $
0 !Rkt+1Qt 1KtdF (!)
Qt 1Kt  Nt 1

(Qt 1Kt  Nt 1) (3.36)
3.3.3. The bank friction model (Gertler and Karadi, 2011)
We add nancial intermediaries to the no friction model in order to verify the role of nan-
cial frictions at the bank level. With the introduction of the nancial intermediaries the
set-ups of households and intermediate goods rms are a little modied. The bank friction
model is similar to the no friction model except the set-ups of the nancial intermediaries,
households and the intermediate goods rms.
3.3.3.1. Households
The optimisation problem of households in the bank friction model is similar to ones in
the two models explained above. However, within each household there are two types of
members like Gertler and Karadi (2011). A banker manages a nancial intermediary. At
any moment in time the fraction f of the household members are workers and the fraction
1  f are bankers. We assume that bankers have a nite horizon to avoid the possibility of
full self-nancing of all investment. In particular, a banker at t  1 survives at the period t
with probability . Thus, each period the fraction 1  of bankers fail and become workers.
The same number of workers become bankers, keeping the relative proportion of each type
of members constant. New bankers receive a transfer from households.
3.3.3.2. Financial intermediaries
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Financial intermediaries lend funds obtained from households to non-nancial rms. In
addition, nancial intermediaries in this model are meant to capture the entire banking
sector, i.e., investment banks as well as commercial banks (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).93 Let
Sjt be the quantity of nancial claims on non-nancial rms that the intermediary holds;
Qbt the relative price of each claim; N
b
jt the net worth that intermediary j has at the end
of period t; and Bjt+1 the amount of deposits the intermediary obtains from households.
The nancial intermediarys balance sheet is then given by
QbtSjt = N
b
jt +Bjt+1 (3.37)
Household deposits with the intermediary at time t pay the non-contingent real gross return
Rt+1 at t+1. And the intermediary earns the stochastic return Rkt+1 on the assets over this
period. Both Rkt+1 and Rt+1 will be determined endogenously. Then the intermediarys
net worth is given by
N bjt+1 = Rkt+1Q
b
tSjt  Rt+1 Bjt+1 (3.38)
= (Rkt+1  Rt+1 )QbtSjt +Rt+1 N bjt (3.39)
Any growth in net worth above the riskless return depends on the premium Rkt+1 Rt+1 the
intermediary earns on his assets, as well as his total assets, QbtSjt. Since the intermediary
will not fund assets with a discounted return less than the discounted cost of borrowing,
for the intermediary to operate in period t, this constraint can be expressed by
Et
it;t+1+i (Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i)  0 (3.40)
93Thus, we use nancial intermediaries mixed with banks.
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where it;t+i is the stochastic discount factor which the intermediary at t applies to
earnings at t + i and i  0. With perfect capital markets, the relation always holds with
equality. So the risk adjusted premium is zero. With imperfect capital markets, however,
the premium may be positive due to limits on the intermidiarys ability to obtain funds.
So long as the intermediary can earn a risk adjusted return that is greater than or equal to
the return the household can earn on its deposits, it pays for the banker to keep building
assets until exiting the industry. Thus, the objective function of the intermediary can be
given by
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) ii+1t;t+1+i

N bjt+1+i

= maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) ii+1t;t+1+i
h
(Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i)QbtSjt +Rt+1+i N bjt+i
i
(3.41)
where Vjt is the expected terminal wealth of the bank j. To the extent the discounted risk
adjusted premium in any period, it;t+i (Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i), is positive, the intermediary
will want to expand its assets indenitely by borrowing additional funds from households.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we introduce the moral hazard problem between the
bankers and households. We assume that after collecting deposits, the banker can choose to
divert some of funds for his own consumption. Specically, the banker can divert fraction
0  b  1 of funds. In this case, the depositor can force the intermediary into bankrupcy
and recover the remaining fraction 1 b of funds. This implies that lenders are willing to
supply funds to the banker if the following incentive constraint is satised:
Vjt  bQbtSjt (3.42)
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In the above inequality Vjt is what the banker would lose by diverting a fraction of funds
and bQtSjt means the gain from doing so.
From the equation (3.41) we can express Vjt as follows:
Vjt = tQ
b
tSjt + tN
b
jt (3.43)
with
t = Et f(1  )t;t+i (Rkt+1  Rt+1 ) + t;t+ixt;t+1t+1g (3.44)
t = Et

(1  )t;t+iRt+1 + t;t+izt;t+1t+1
	
(3.45)
where xt;t+1  Qbt+1Sjt+1=QbtSjt, is the gross growth rate in assets between t and t + 1,
and zt;t+1  N bjt+1=N bjt is the gross growth rate of net worth. The variable t means the
expected discounted marginal gain to the banker of expanding assets QbtSjt by a unit,
holding N bjt constant, and while t has the interpretation of the expected discounted value
of having another unit of N bjt, holding the assets Q
b
tSjt constant. Using (3.43) we can show
the incentive constraints (3.42) as
tQ
b
tSjt + tN
b
jt  bQbtSjt (3.46)
If this constraint binds, we can obtain following relationship between the banks assets and
the banks net worth:
QbtSjt =
t
b   t
N bjt = tN
b
jt (3.47)
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where t is the bankers leverage ratio.
94 Holding constant net worth, expanding the assets
raises the bankers incentive to divert funds. The equation (3.47) limits the intermediaries
leverage ratio to the point where the bankers incentive to cheat is exactly balanced by the
cost. Therefore, the moral hazard problem yields an endogenous capital constraint on the
intermediarys ability to expand the assets.
Combining (3.47) with (3.39) allows to express the evolution of the bankers net worth as
N bjt+1 = [(Rkt+1  Rt+1 )t +Rt+1 ]N bjt (3.48)
In addition, it follows that
zt;t+1 = N
b
jt+1=N
b
jt = (Rkt+1  Rt+1 )t +Rt+1 (3.49)
xt;t+1 = Q
b
t+1Sjt+1=Q
b
tSjt =
 
t+1=t
 
N bjt+1=N
b
jt

=
 
t+1=t

zt;t+1 (3.50)
All the components of t depend only on economy wide variables. This allows for total
aggregation across the intermediaries, obtaining
QbtSt = tN
b
t (3.51)
where QbtSt denotes the aggregate quantity of intermediary assets and N
b
t reects aggregate
intermediary net worth. In the general equilibrium of our model, variation in N bt , will
induce uctuations in overall asset demand by intermediaries.95
94An interpretation of this condition is as follows (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). With frictionless competi-
tive capital markets, intermediaries will expand borrowing to the point where rates of return will adjust to
ensure t is zero. However, the moral hazard problem between the banker and household may place limits
on this arbitrage. Specically, the intermediarys loans are constrained by its net worth.
95This mechanism of nancial frictions at the bank level also arises if there is a shock that a¤ects the
banks net worth. If a shock has a negative impact on the net worth, the bank has to decrease the loans
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N bt consists of the net worth of existing intermediaries, N
b
et; and the one of new bankers,
N bnt.
N bt = N
b
et +N
b
nt (3.52)
N bet is given by
N bet = 

(Rkt  Rt)t 1 +Rt

N bt 1 (3.53)
because bankers in business in period t   1 did not die at t with the ratio : We also
suppose that the funds the household gives its new banker equal to a small fraction of
the value of assets that exiting bankers had intermediated in their nal operating period.
Assuming that the exit probability is i.i.d., the nal period assets of exiting bankers at t
is (1  )QbtSt 1. Thus, we suppose that each period the household gives = (1  ) of this
value to its entering bankers.96 Accordingly, in the aggregate,
N bnt = Q
b
tSt 1 (3.54)
Combining equations (3.53) and (3.54) gives the equation of motion for N bt .
N bt = 

(Rkt  Rt)t 1 +Rt

N bt 1 + Q
b
tSt 1 (3.55)
3.3.3.3. Intermediate goods rms
The optimisation problems of intermediate goods rms follow the above two models, de-
to the rms. The leverage ration expands the contraction of the loans. This fall of the loans will lower
investment, thus output.
96Here,  is a parameter for the transfer to the entering bankers.
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scribed by equations (3.12) - (3.15), (3.26).
The rm nances its capital acquisition by obtaining funds from intermediaries. To
acquire the funds, the rm issues St claims equal to the number of units of capital acquired
Kt+1 and prices each claim at the price of a unit of capital Qbt . That is, Q
b
tKt+1 is the
value of capital acquired and QbtSt is the value of claims against this capital as follows:
QbtKt+1 = Q
b
tSt (3.56)
3.4. Calibration and model comparison
3.4.1. Calibration
The three models are calibrated with U.S. data over the period from 1960Q12015Q4.
The data includes real GDP, real consumption, real private investment, ination. The
parameters which are not recognised in the dataset or are linked to target values of the
variables are calibrated following the previous literature. In the no friction model, we
generally use conventional parameters according to Bernanke et al. (1999), and Gertler
and Karadi (2011). The discount factor, , is 0.99, meaning a quarterly steady state real
interest rate of 1%. The steady state depreciation rate, ss, is 0.025, implying an annual
depreciation rate of 10%. The capital share, ; is 0.33, corresponding to one third of the
total income. The elasticity of substitution between goods, "; is equal to 4.167 and the
government expenditure share is equal to 0.2. Also, we normalise the steady state utilisa-
tion rate Uss at unity. Other parameters are calibrated in accordance with the estimates
reported in Primiceri et al. (2006), as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). These parameters are
as follows: the habit parameter h; the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to
the utilisation rate , the investment adjustment parameter , the relative utility weight on
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labor ; the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ' 1; the price rigidity parameter ; and the
price indexing parameter P : For the monetary policy rule, we also use the conventional
Taylor rule parameters. And for the exogenous shocks, we use quite persistent values but
the shock to the quality of capital following Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Regarding the parameters for the rm friction model the survival probability of inter-
mediate goods rms e follows Bernanke et al. (1999). We adopt the estimate used in De
Graeve (2008) for the steady state capital to net worth ratio K=N and the elasticity of the
external nance premium s.97 The steady state external nance premium EFPss is also
modied following Gertler and Karadi (2011) to increase the comparability of the three
models.
The parameters related to the nancial sector - the survival probability of the banks
, the fraction of capital that can be diverted ; and the proportional transfer to entering
banks  - are selected following Gertler and Karadi (2011). These parameters are decided
to obtain following three target values. Specically, the target of the banks capital to net
worth ratio is calibrated as 4 according to the aggregate data.98 The steady state interest
rate target is the pre-2007 spreads between mortgage rates and government bonds and
between BAA corporate versus government bonds. The average horizon of the banks is set
to a decade. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the parameter values for the three models.
97The previous literature with nancial frictions at the rm level mostly calibrated the steady state
capital to net worth as 2 (e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; Christensen and Dib, 2008). However, De Graeve
(2008) estimated this parameter using Bayesian methods. This estimate may be more reasonable because
the U.S. macroeconomic data used in his paper covers the period 1954 to 2004. Therefore, we use 1.42 as
the steady state capital to net worth ratio in the rm friction model. In section 3.5, we check an impact of
the capital to net worth ratio using the conventional value 2.
98The banks leverage ratio was extraordinarily high during the recent nancial crisis. The leverage ratio
is at the range of 25~30 for investment banks, and 15~20 for commercial banks. However, these high ratio
mainly reects housing nance (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
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Table 3.1. Common parameter values for the three models
Name Denition Value Source
 Discount factor 0.99 Bernanke et al. (1999)
h Habit parameter 0.815 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Relative utility weight of labour 3.409 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
' Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Uss Steady state capital utilisation rate 1.0 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ss Steady state depreciation rate 0.025 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Rss Steady state gross real risk-free rate 1= Bernanke et al. (1999)
 Investment adjustment parameter 1.728 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 E¤ective capital share 0.330 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Elasticity of marginal depreciation 7.2 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
" Elasticity of substitution 4.167 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Probability of keeping prices xed 0.779 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
p Measure of price indexation 0.241 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Smoothing parameter of Taylor rule 0.8 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Ination coe¢ cient of Taylor rule 1.5 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
y Output gap coe¢ cient of Taylor rule 0.125 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Persistence of shock to quality of capital 0.66 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
A Persistence of total factor productivity shock 0.9 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
G Persistence of government spending shock 0.95 Bernanke et al. (1999)
G
Y Steady state ratio of government expenditures 0.20 Bernanke et al. (1999)
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Table 3.2. Parameter values for nancial frictions
Name Denition Firm Bank Source
friction friction
e Survival probability 0.972 - Bernanke et al. (1999)
 Survival probability of bankers - 0.972 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
EFPss Steady state nance premium 100 100 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
(basis point)
K=N Steady state capital 1.42 - De Greave (2008)
to net worth ratio
K=N b Steady state capital - 4 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
to net worth ratio of bank
s Elasticity of nancial premium 0.06 - De Greave (2008)
 Fraction of capital divertable - 0.381 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Transfer to the entering bankers - 0.002 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
3.4.2. Comparison of business cycle moments
We compare the cyclical properties of the data generated by the three models to the empiri-
cal U.S. data to discuss the goodness of t of each model. The real variables considered are
GDP, personal consumption expenditures, non-residential investment and ination rate.
The nancial variables considered are interest rate for the three models, the rms net
worth for the rm friction model and the banks net worth for the bank friction model.99
99Data source is as follows : (1) GDP, personal consumption expenditures, non-residential investment
: NIPA table from Bureau of Economic Analysis (2) ination : GDP deator in NIPA table (3) interest
rate : E¤ective Federal Fund Rate from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (4) rms net worth : sum
of "Nonfarm nonnancial corporate business; net worth" and "Nonfarm nonnancial corporate business;
proprietors equity in noncorporate business" in Flow of Funds Account of the Federal Reserve Board (5)
banks net worth : Tangible Common Equity calculated using Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations
"Quarterly Banking Prole"
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All the empirical data is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott lter.
Table 3.3 reports the relative standard deviations to GDP of some selected variables.
The rm friction model ts the data better in terms of relative volatility of consumption
and investment. The bank friction model generates considerably more volatility than the
other two models for investment, although the relative volatility of consumption is too low
compared to the data. The three models generate similar standard deviation of ination
and real interest rate. However, for the former the three models well capture the data,
whilst for the latter they fail to replicate the value in the data. The relative volatility of
the net worth in the two models with nancial frictions is much higher than in the data,
although the rm friction model comes closer to the data.
Table 3.3. Standard deviations relative to GDP
Variable Data No friction Firm friction Bank friction
GDP 1 1 1 1
Consumption 0.82 1.11 0.70 0.40
Investment 3.11 5.08 4.77 5.69
Ination 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.15
Interest rate 1.02 0.14 0.10 0.12
Net worth (Firm) 2.21 4.51
Net worth (Bank) 2.06 10.21
In Table 3.4 the comparison of the cross-correlation with GDP reveals the rm friction
model gets closer to the data. The rm friction model ts the data better than the other
two models in terms of all the related variables. The no friction model is preferred to the
bank friction model when compared to the data. The rm friction model performs similarly
well at matching the correlation of the net worth with GDP compared to the bank friction
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model. However, the bank friction model generates a strong procyclicality of the bank net
worth, whilst this variable is mildly countercyclical in the data.
Table 3.4. Correlations with GDP
Variable Data No friction Firm friction Bank friction
GDP 1 1 1 1
Consumption 0.90 0.47 0.63 0.32
Investment 0.86 0.74 0.90 0.97
Ination 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.61
Interest rate 0.65 0.39 0.57 0.90
Net worth (Firm) 0.70 0.92
Net worth (Bank) -0.15 0.84
Table 3.5 also displays the autocorrelation coe¢ cients of order 1. The three models
reproduces similar values of the autocorrelations for the related variables. The variables
such as consumption and ination are more autocorrelated in the three models than in the
data. Regarding GDP and interest rate the rm friction model and the no friction model
match well with the autocorrelation observed in the data. Regarding ination, there is not
a unique model to successfully replicate the dynamics in the data.
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Table 3.5. Autocorrelations
Variable Data No friction Firm friction Bank friction
GDP 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.89
Consumption 0.87 0.95 0.95 0.96
Investment 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.90
Ination 0.48 0.68 0.66 0.73
Interest rate 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.91
Net worth (Firm) 0.92 0.71
Net worth (Bank) 0.72 0.66
Overall, even if not all the moments are replicated by the models, the introduction of
nancial frictions originating in the rm improves the models tting with the U.S. data.
However, whether the introduction of nancial frictions at the bank level is preferred in
the data or not is not certain. Thus, the rm friction model outperforms the bank friction
model. This result is not consistent with the literature such as Villa (2013) which nds
that the bank friction model is empirically relevant and it ts the data better than the rm
friction model in the estimation with the Euro Area data for the pre-crisis period. The
repercussion on the nancial market in the U.S. during the nancial crisis may cause the
discrepancy.
3.4.3. Comparison of impulse responses
This section presents the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to the struc-
tural shocks in the three models. Figures 3-2 to 3-6 examine ve shocks - monetary policy
shock, technology shock, capital quality shock, government spending shock, and wealth
shocks - in order to highlight how the presence of nancial frictions a¤ects the movement
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of economic variables and the transmission mechanism of these shocks. We particularly
emphasise both the magnitude and the persistence of the responses of economic variables
such as output, consumption and investment. All the shocks are set to produce a down-
turn. Each variablesresponse is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady-state
level.100
3.4.3.1. Monetary policy shocks
Figure 3-2 presents the responses of the three models to a temporary negative monetary
policy shock. The monetary shock is 25 basis point increase in the short term interest
rate. The directions of the impact responses are similar among the three models, since in
all the models an increase in the nominal interest rate has negative e¤ects on investment
and, thus, output. However, the strengths of the responses are di¤erent. The presence
of nancial frictions implies a signicant amplication and propagation of the monetary
policy shock on macroeconomic variables, since the responses of these variables in the two
models with nancial frictions are greater than the no friction model and persist for longer.
The response of output is strongest in the bank friction model with a trough of -0.69%,
reached in quarter 3,101 while it is weakest in the no friction model, where the trough of
output equals -0.27%. The response of output in the rm friction model is in between
the two models, with a trough of -0.37%. Note that the path of output in the no friction
model remains persistently above the paths of output in the two models with nancial
frictions. The di¤erence in the output response across the three models is mainly caused
by the investment response. The trough of investment is -3.93% in the bank friction model,
100Version 4.3.1 of Dynare toolbox for Matlab is used for the computations.
101The larger response of output to the monetary policy shock in the bank friction model compared to
the no friction model is in line with euro area evidence by Maddaloni et al. (2011). They found that when
the impact of the monetary policy shock on changes in credit supply related to the banks balance sheet is
neutralized, the response of GDP to the monetary policy shock is reduced by 50% in a vector autoregressive
(VAR) analysis.
102
-1.95% in the rm friction model and -1.24% in the no friction model, while the paths of
consumption are similar across the three models.
The transmission mechanisms of monetary policy are also di¤erent among the three
models. Following the shock, the nominal interest rate rises and output, investment, con-
sumption, labour supply, and ination fall on impact. This is the standard interest rate
channel of monetary policy transmission (Villa, 2013). In the models with nancial fric-
tions, however, the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy shock is also enhanced
through its impact on credit markets. In the rm friction model, the decline in the price
of capital due to the tightening of monetary policy causes a fall in the net worth of in-
termediate goods rms, and the external nance premium rises (Bernanke et al., 1999).
This mechanism further reinforces the contraction in capital and investment. In the bank
friction model, due to the negative e¤ects on investment, the assets of intermediaries de-
crease as well. At the same time the fall in asset prices worsens nancial intermediaries
balance sheets. The fall in prots makes nancial intermediaries increase the lending rate
more than the increase in the deposit rate, in order to restore prots. Hence the external
nance premium rises. The increase in nancing costs causes a further decline in loans and
investment (Villa, 2013). Thus, the reason why the response of output to the monetary
policy shock is stronger in the models with nancial frictions than the no friction model is
well understood.
To understand why output responds more strongly to the monetary policy shock in the
bank friction model than in the rm friction model, it is useful to examine the response of
the banks and the rms net worths, the external nance premium, and the price of capital
in the two models (Rannenberg, 2012). In specic, the external nance premium increases
by 0.70% in the bank friction model and 0.12% in the rm friction model, respectively.
More a signicant decline of the return to capital in the bank friction model in turn
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causes a stronger drop in the price of capital and the banks net worth. The stronger
drop in the banks net worth itself contributes to the stronger increase in the external
nance premium in the bank friction model, since it implies a stronger increase in the bank
leverage, which increases the external nance premium. Finally, the stronger decline in the
price of capital causes the stronger contraction of investment observed in the bank friction
model.102 However, the validity of this result depends on the leverage. When the rms
leverage is higher, the response of output in the rm friction model can be larger than the
bank friction model. We examine the e¤ect of the leverage in the robustness section.
The result for the monetary policy shock is generally consistent with earlier litera-
ture. In particular, most earlier papers showed the signicance of the nancial accelerator
mechanism to the monetary policy shock (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999; Christensen and Dib,
2008; Queijo von Heideken, 2009). However, De Graeve (2008) found that the investment
response in the model with nancial frictions is no longer uniformly greater than the model
where nancial frictions are shut o¤, even if the investment response is amplied.103
For the accelerator e¤ect of nancial frictions at the intermediaries level our result does
not accord to some papers (e.g. Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007; Gerali et al., 2010).
In particular, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) recognised that the negative monetary
policy decreases the demand for bank deposits, thereby tending to reduce the external
nance premium for a givern value of assets in the economy. This attenuates the e¤ect
102Above result is related to the fact that external funding is more expensive than using internal resources
(Banerjee, 2002; De Graeve, 2008). This is due to the increase in the costs of lenders, who have to evaluate
the prospects of success of the investment projects and monitor the borrowers conduct. For a better t of
the data, thus, models should try to account for the observed positive premium on external funds (Brazdik
et al., 2011).
103De Graeve (2008) pointed out that the form of adjustment costs causes this di¤erence. In other words, he
used investment adjustmet costs while other papers used capital adjustment costs. In his model, temporary
uctuations in the external nance premium will have less impact on the economy compared to the model
with capital adjustment costs since changing the ow of investment is costly. However, we nd that the rm
friction model consistently displays stronger responses of investment and output to the monetary policy
shock than the no friction model despite investment adjustment costs. This result conrms that nancial
frictions at the rm level strengthen the amplication and the propagation of economic uctuations.
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of the monetary policy that weakens output. In Gerali et al. (2010), the introduction
of a banking sector also attenuates the impact of the monetary policy tightening. This
result largely comes from sticky interest rates, which reduce the response of retail loan
rates, thus, lessening the contraction in loans, consumption and investment. However,
other papers showed that nancial frictions at the intermediaries level have amplication
e¤ects on output and investment for the monetary policy shock like our paper (e.g. Meh
and Moran, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Rannenberg, 2012).104
Unlike the above-mentioned literature we also nd that in the bank friction model the
response of output to the monetary policy shock is adjusted faster than the rm friction
model even if the responses of output are persistent in the two models.105 This result
suggests an interesting nding that the bank friction model has relatively a shorter recession
to the monetary policy shock, whereas the rm friction model shows persistent recession
to the same shock. This di¤erence comes from the persistent response of investment to the
shock in the rm friction model.106 What causes these di¤erent responses of investment
in the two models with nancial frictions? First of all, some frictions incorporated in the
three models - variable capital utilisation and habit formation in consumption - contribute
to the persistent response of output. For example, Christiano et al. (2005) suggested
that variable capital utilisation is important to explain output persistence in response to
monetary shock.107 Dotsey and King (2006) also showed the importance of variable capital
104Rannenberg (2012) also showed the amplication e¤ect of nancial frictions despite the rise in the
banks net worth. This is associated with two assumptions. One is the maturity of contracts and the other
is the absence of traded assets from the banks portfolio. Unexpected entrepreneurial defaults dont have
the impact with the one quarter maturity of contracts and the loss in value of assets dont a¤ect the banks
prot with the absence of traded assets.
105After 10 years, output in the two models is still below their steady state. However, output in the bank
friction model becomes greater in 17 quarters than the rm friction model, whereas the maximum decrease
of output in the bank friction model is almost twice as large as that the rm friction model.
106 Investment in the bank friction model becomes positive in 17 quarters, whereas in the rm model
investment remains negative for 10 years.
107Christiano et al. (2005) used a model that incorporates price and wage rigidities, habit formation in
consumption, adjustment cost in investment and variable capital utilisation and found that wage rigidity
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utilisation for output persistence.108 And Bouakez et al. (2005) found that habit formation
in consumption increases output persistence through its e¤ect on labour supply.109 Nolan
and Thoenissen (2009) also found that habits in consumption helps to generate persistent
responses in a number of macro aggregates following certain shocks.
These frictions which are helpful to output persistence equally apply to the three models
in this section. However, the rm friction model discussed here has another persistence
mechanism besides the common ones. In the rm friction model the temporary shock
has much stronger persistence through the feedback e¤ect of tightened nancial frictions.
In particular, in the rm friction model a negative monetary policy shock decreases the
rms net worth which in turn increases nancial frictions and forces the rm to invest less.
This results in a lower level of capital and decreases the rms net worth in the following
period. This fall again leads to lower investment and lowers the net worth in the following
periods (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). According to this mechanism, the shock to the rms
net worth induces persistent e¤ects in the rm friction model. However, the bank friction
model has a restricted persistence mechanism compared to the rm friction model. In
the bank friction model, as explained above the decreased net worth of the bank increases
the external nance premium and this lowers investment. Again, lower investment causes
declines in bank earnings and thus bank capital decreases in subsequent periods, which
and variable capital utilisation are important factor for output persistence. According to their results,
habit formation and investment adjustment costs play a much smaller role than variable capital utilisation
in promoting output persistence. To understand their mechanism it is notable for rms to set prices as
a mark-up over marginal costs. The major components of marginal costs are wages and the rental rate
of capital. By allowing the service of capital to decrease after a negative monetary policy shock, variable
capital utilisation helps dampen the lagre fall in the rental rate of capital that would otherwise happen. This
in turn reduces the fall in marginal costs and, hence, prices. The resulting inertia in ination means that
the fall in nominal spending that happens after the negative monetary policy shock generates a persistent
fall in real output.
108They constructed a model incorporating variable capital utilisation, materials input, and labour exi-
bility and indicated that these three features are mutually reinforcing and magnifying output persistence.
109 In particular, habit formation induces households to adjust their labour supply more gradually to
achieve a smoother and more persistent consumption prole than under time-separable preferences.
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propagates the negative e¤ect of the shock until the trough. But decreased investment
means a reduced demand for the banks assets. This less demand for the banks assets
rather lowers the external nance premium and investment rebounds with the decrease in
nancing costs.110 And this increase in investment contributes to the recovery of the banks
net worth. Through this process the e¤ect of nancial frictions is mitigated and investment
or output can be adjusted faster in the bank friction model. Thus, the bank friction model
shows less persistent responses of output and investment than the rm friction model, since
there is no feedback e¤ect of tightened nancial frictions and the mitigating mechanism of
nancial frictions rather works. This nding suggests that the main objective of nancial
frictions at the rm level is to capture the extent and the persistence of uctuation in
aggregate output, whereas introducing nancial frictions at the bank level into the DSGE
models has been motivated mainly by the aim of explaining specic features of the nancial
crisis (Brazdik et al., 2011).
110This reaction of investment is displayed as the fast adjustment after the trough.
107
Figure 3-2. Response to monetary policy shock
3.4.3.2. Technology shocks
Figure 3-3 displays the responses of the three economies to a contractionary transitory
technology shock. The technology shock is a negative one percent innovation in total factor
productivity, with a quarterly autoregressive factor of 0.95. The technology shock has a
direct impact on output by making factors less productive, and leads to an increase in prices
due to the contraction in aggregate supply (Villa, 2013). Since the Taylor rule is operating,
the nominal interest rate rises as shown in Figure 3-3. Investment and consumption decline
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due to the contraction in output. In the rm friction model, the external nance premium
does not show a denite rise and a fall in investment is less than the no friction model.
However, in the bank friction model this shock also implies a decrease in asset prices,
which worsens the nancial intermediariesbalance sheet. Such a deterioration makes the
nancial intermediaries willing to push up the external nance premium to increase prots.
The increase in the nancing cost, further reduces the loan demand by the intermediate
goods rms, which enhances the downturn in investment and asset prices.
The response of output is stronger in the bank friction model than in the rm friction
model all the time. In specic, the trough of output is -0.88% shown in quarter 5 in the bank
friction model and -0.59% reached in quarter 6 in the rm friction model. The stronger
decline in the bank friction model is mainly caused by a drop in investmet displaying the
trough of -3.82% and -1.89%, respectively. The response of output in the no friction model
is between the two models with the trough of -0.76%. The no friction model, of course, does
not have the e¤ect through the rms net worth or the nancial intermediariesbalance
sheet, since the premium is xed at zero.
The reason for the weaker output response of the rm friction model compared to the
no friction model lies in the e¤ect of entrepreneurial leverage (Rannenberg, 2012)111. In
particular, the technology shock reduces the marginal product of capital. Thus, investment
decreases and this causes the capital stock to fall. As the rms demand less loans, their
leverage declines. This persistently lowers the external nance premium. This attenuates
the fall of investment due to the negative technology shock, thus, output in the rm friction
111On the other hand, De Graeve (2008) showed that the main reason for the weaker responses is the
form of adjustment costs because investment adjustment costs are more dynamic than capital adjustment
costs. In particular, if investment is negative today, it will be negative for an extended period, in order to
minimise costs related to changing its ow. In case of the negative productivity shock, investment which is
low for a long time, means that the capital stock is much less than the rms net worth, thereby decreasing
borrowing needs. This results in a drop in the external nance premium. Investment will be higher in all
periods, since long lasting negative investment will not be costly due to a low future premium for external
nance.
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model relative to the no friction model.
We also nd that the response of output in the bank friction model is adjusted faster than
the no friction model in spite of the persistent response of output in the three models.112
This fact also results from the faster adjustment of investment in the bank friction model
like the monetary shock.113 This di¤erence may be explained by the mitigating mechanism
of nancial frictions introduced in the section 3.3.2.1. Particularly the two models with
nancial frictions have the same frictions which contribute to output persistence such as
variable capital utilisation and habit formation in consumption. However, the persistence
of output and investment in the bank friction model is restricted due to the mitigating
mechanism of nancial frictions. Another interesting nding is that the rm friction model
doesnt show the most persistent responses of output and investment.114 In the rm friction
model, the negative technology shock again has persistent e¤ects through the feedback
e¤ect of tightened nancial frictions.115 However, as the fall in the marginal productivity
reduces the rms loan, the rise in the external nance premium is restrained. This partially
o¤sets the persistent decrease of investment. After all, the degree of output persistence in
the rm friction model is similar to the no friction model.
The result for the technology shock in the rm friction model is consistent with earlier
literature (e.g. Christensen and Dib, 2008; De Graeve, 2008116; Rannenberg, 2012; Villa,
112After 10 years, output is still below its steady state in the three models.
113 Investment in the bank model becomes greater than the no friction model in 10 quarters, whereas its
trough in the bank friction model is much larger than the no friction model.
114The values of output and investment in the rm friction model remain above those in the bank friction
model all the periods. The reversal of the values between the two models like the monetary policy shock
doesnt turn up.
115The shock in period t decreases the wage and therefore the current rms net worth. This raises
borrowing frictions and leads to decreased investment for period t + 1. The lower investment reduces
output in period t+1 and therefore the wage which means a lower net worth for the next generation of the
rms. The next generation also invests less and the e¤ect persists further (Brunnermeier et al., 2012).
116 In De Graeve (2008), a smaller response of investment in the model with nancial frictions is o¤set
by a greater consumption response, leading to similar output response over the di¤erent models. However,
in our setting, the response of consumption in the rm friction model is also smaller than the no friction
model, resulting in much smaller output response in the rm friction model.
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2013). However, in Bernanke et al. (1999), a positive productivity shock decreases the
external nance premium and thus boosts investment compared to the model without
nancial frictions. In addition, this chapter shows consistent results with earlier papers
for nancial frictions at the intermediaries level (e.g. Meh and Moran, 2010; Gertler and
Karadi, 2011; Rannenberg, 2012; Villa, 2013). Gerali et al. (2010) found that the responses
of consumption and output are attenuated, while the response of investment is amplied
with imperfectly competitive banks and sticky interest rate setting. To understnd this
result, it is helpful to consider how their models assumption changes the transmission
mechanism of nancial frictions at the bank level.117
117The amplication mechanism of investment in Gerali et al. (2010) is as follows. With imperfectly
competitive banking, the rise in the policy rate to the technology shock triggers a larger rise in loan rates.
Investment is decreased both by the technology worsening and by more di¢ cult access to credit.
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Figure 3-3. Response to technology shock
3.4.3.3. Capital quality shocks
Figure 3-4 shows the e¤ects of a capital quality shock in the three models. The initiating
shock is a ve percent decline in capital quality, with a quarterly autoregressive factor
of 0.66. In the no friction model, this shock causes a decrease in the price of capital,
which leads to a fall in investment and, hence, output. In the rm friction model, the
shock also implies the fall in the price of capital. But a change in the price of capital has
another e¤ect besides the decline of investment. The rms net worth decreases due to the
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lower return on capital. This e¤ect causes a rise in the external nance premium. This
should cause more contraction in investment. Thus, the response of output is amplied
compared to the no friction model. The bank friction model also generates two additional
e¤ects. Firstly, the retrenchment in investment leads to a lower demand for the assets
of the nancial intermediaries, a¤ecting in turn their prots. Secondly, the net worth of
the nancial intermediaries decreases because of the lower return on capital.118 These two
additonal e¤ects act in the direction of reducing investment and output. Thus, the presence
of nancial frictions at the bank level generates two additional economic contraction e¤ects
and the response to the capital quality shock is the strongest in the bank friction model. In
specic, the trough of output is -7.36% of quarter 4 in the bank friction model, -4.11% of
quarter 4 in the rm friction model and -2.69% of quarter 3 in the no friction model. The
di¤erences in the output declines across the three models are also caused by the decline of
investment. The trough of investment is -35.12% in the bank friction model, -15.73% in
the rm friction model and -8.07% in the no friction model.
The output declines to the capital quality shock are very persistent in the three models.119
However, we also nd that typically in the bank friction model the response of output is
adjusted faster than the other two models like the monetary policy shock and the technology
shock.120 The faster adjustment in the bank friction model is mainly caused by the response
of investment.121 The explanations introduced in the earlier section equally apply to the
118The capital quality shock can be translated directly into a shock to the banksbalance sheet in the
bank friction model, since the capital is identical to the assets of nancial intermediaries. Thus, Gertler
and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) regard an exogenous decline in capital quality as the
initiating feature of the current crisis.
119After 10 years, they are still below their steady states.
120Output gradually increases after the trough in the no friction model and the rm friction model, but
the bank friction model displays an abrupt rise after the trough. For example, the response of output in the
rm friction model is greater than the bank friction model in 13 quarters, whereas the value of the trough
in the bank friction model is almost twice as large as that in the rm friction model.
121While the response of investment in the rm friction model remains around the steady state since 14
quarters, investment in the bank friction model rebounds right away from the trough and increases to the
value of 10.35% in 5 years.
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capital quality shock.122
Figure 3-4. Response to capital quality shock
3.4.3.4. Government spending shocks
Figure 3-5 displays the e¤ects of a government spending shock in the three models. The
responses of economic variables are generally similar among the three models, but the order
122 In sum, some frictions - variable capital utilisation and habit formation in consumption - identically
apply to the three models. However, in the rm friction model the feedback e¤ect of tightened nancial
frictions contributes to more persistent responses of output and investment. And the faster adjustment in
the bank friction model results from the mitigating mechanism of nancial frictions.
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of the output response is di¤erent from other shocks. The instant response of output to a
negative government spending shock is the same among the three models. The trough of
output is -0.21% in the rm friction model, -0.20% in the bank friction model and the no
friction model. However, the response of output in the rm friction model are persistently
larger than the bank friction model and the no friction model. This di¤erence results
from the response of investment because the response of consumption is similar among the
three models. And the di¤erence of the investment response comes from the fact that the
crowding-out e¤ect of investment due to the negative government spending shock is the
smallest in the rm friction model (Rannenberg, 2012).123 We nd from Figure 3-5 that
investment also increases in the no friction model, since the capital stock rises. However,
in the rm friction model, the external nance premium rises, since the net worth of the
intermediate goods rm persistently decreases and the capital stock declines. This limits
the increase in investment even if there is the crowding-out e¤ect of investment. In the
bank friction model, the capital asset ratio of the bank increases persistently, since the
banks net worth falls and the capital stock doesnt show any change. This movement
restricts the increase of investmen due to the crowding-out e¤ect. However, the degree
of the investment contraction in the bank friction model is smaller than the rm friction
model as we can nd out from the fact that the external nance premium rather decreases
in the bank friction model. Finally, in the bank friction model the response of output
to the government spending shock is adjusted faster than other models, even though the
di¤erence is not that large compared to other shocks.
123When the government spending increases, the crowding-out e¤ect decreases private investment and
consumption. Accordingly, the crowding-out e¤ect increases private investment and consumption with the
reduction of government spending.
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Figure 3-5. Response to government spending shock
3.4.3.5. Wealth shocks
We now consider the e¤ects of nancial shocks that lead to exogenous declines in the banks
net worth or in the rms net worth.124 The shock to the rms net worth has been used in
the numerous models with nancial frictions at the rm level (e.g. Christiano et al., 2010;
124Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the shock to the banks net worth might be interpreted as a
credit crunch, since it is caused by sudden deteriorations in the balance sheets of the banks due to asset
losses and the bank reduces the loan to non-nancial rms.
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Nolan and Thoenissen, 2009).125 Recent upheavals in nancial markets worldwide, charac-
terised by growing asset losses and dramatic reductions in prots of nancial institutions,
appear to reect disturbances of this kind (Meh and Moran, 2010).
Figure 3-6 jointly displays both the response to the banks net worth shock in the
bank friction model and the one to the rms net worth shock in the rm friction model.
The wealth shock is a negative one percent shock in the rms net worth or in the banks
net worth, respectively. Output declines in both models, but the response of the rm
friction model is much stronger than that of the bank friction model. And this di¤erence
mainly results from a stronger decline in investment.126 Specially, the responses of output
and investment in the rm friction model are deeper and more persistent than the bank
friction model, whereas the instant responses are similar between the two models. In the
rm friction model, the reduction of the rms net worth increases the rms leverage,
since the intermediate goods rms need to borrow more to fund their capital stock. This
increase in leverage causes a rise in the external nance premium, thus a drop in the price of
capital, which reinforces the initial drop in the net worth. This further lowers investment.
The decline of the banks net worth, meanwhile, increases capital asset ratio of the bank,
and this increases the external nance premium, since increased banks leverage requires a
higher protability. The implied increase in the nancing cost causes a contraction of the
price of capital, thus, investment, and output.
Then, what makes the greater responses of output and investment in the rm friction
model than the bank friction model? This di¤erence is related to the mechanism which
125Christiano et al. (2010) suggested that this shock reects irrational exuberance or asset price bubble,
since it raises the rms net wealth independently of movements in fundamentals. And Nolan and Thoenissen
(2009) interpreted this shock as a shock to the e¢ ciency of contractual relations between borrowers and
lenders.
126The trough of output is -0.30% and the one of investment is -1.94% in the rm friction model. In the
bank friction model, output declines in response to the shock and reaches a trough of -0.17% in quarter 4.
The output contraction is mainly driven by a drop in investment, which declines by 0.52% on impact and
reaches a trough of -1.09% in quarter 4.
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causes more persistent responses of output and investment in the rm friction model.
Particularly in the rm friction model the negative shock to the rms net worth increases
nancial frictions and forces the rm to invest less. This results in a lower level of capital
and further reduces the rms net worth in the following period. This fall again leads
to lower investment and lowers the net worth in the following periods. However, the
bank friction model doesnt have this kind of mechanism. In the bank friction model, as
explained in section 3.4.2.1 the decreased net worth of the bank increases the external
nance premium and this lowers investment. But decreased investment means a fall of
the demand for the loan. This decreased demand for the loan rather lowers the external
nance premium and investment rebounds with the decrease in nancing costs. And this
increase of investment contributes to the recovery of the banks net worth. Through this
process the e¤ect of nancial frictions is mitigated and the bank friction model shows less
persistent and lighter responses of output and investment than the rm friction model.
The importance of the shock to the rms net worth explained above is consistent with
Nolan and Thoenissen (2009). And this chapter shows that the shock to the banks net
worth reduces both output and ination in the bank friction model. By contrast, in the
models of Gerali et al. (2010) and Meh and Moran (2010) this shock lowers output, but
increases ination. This di¤erent response of ination in these papers is connected to the
movement of wages. The contraction at the banks net worth causes the rms to raise labour
demand to increase capital utilisation, pushing up wages. The higher wages and nancing
costs result in the increase in ination.127 Empirical studies on the macroeconomic e¤ects
of this wealth shock have mixed results. While Maddaloni et al. (2011), for the euro area,
found that their proxy for a shock to bank capital moves output and ination in the same
direction, Fornari and Stracca (2012) also found that a negative shock to bank capital
127 In contrast, in our bank friction model the labour demand falls following the reduction in investment
and this pushes down wages. This lower wages contribute to the decrease in ination.
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persistently reduces output, but do not nd a statistically signicant and robust decline of
ination.
Figure 3-6. Response to wealth shocks
3.5. Robustness analysis
This section assesses the robustness of our main ndings regarding the dynamics of the
three models. We modify the baseline model and apply the ve shocks to the three models
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as in the previous section. Figures 3-7 to 3-10 display the responses of output, consumption
and investment to the ve standard shocks in the modied models.
3.5.1. No habit formation in consumption
Figure 3-7 presents an impact of no habit formation in consumption. For this purpose,
we set the value of habit parameter as zero. We nd that on impact the response of
consumption is larger than before. Thus, the the maximum decrease of output is larger
than the baseline model and the timing of the trough is faster. However, the patterns of
the amplication and the persistence found in section 3.4 are not modied because habit
formation in consumption equally applies to the three models. This result conrms that
our ndings are not inuenced by the specication of habit formation in consumption.
3.5.2. Constant capital utilisation
Figure 3-8 shows the impact of constant capital utilisation. As explained in section 3.4.
the variable capital utilisation we adopted contributes to the persistence of the responses
in output and investment. We also introduced the variable depreciation rate considering
this variable capital utilisation. This subsection investigates the sensitivity of our key
ndings without the variable capital utilisation and the variable depreciation rate. Thus,
we redo the exercises of the section 3.4 setting the values of U = 1 and  = 0:025. We
also nd that the responses of investment and output a little decrease, whereas the role of
nancial frictions a¤ecting the amplication and the persistence of economic uctuations
is unchanged. Therefore, Figure 3-8 also suggests that our ndings are robust to the
specication of the capital utilisation and the depreciation rate.
3.5.3. Alternative monetary policy rule
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To examine the robustness of nancial frictions to the specication of monetary policy, we
change the specication of the monetary policy rule (3.22). Instead of using the standard
Taylor rule, we set the smoothing parameter  to zero and all other coe¢ cients of the
rule unchanged. Using this monetary policy rule, Figure 3-9 shows the responses of the
three models to the ve exogenous shocks. We nd that our ndings are also robust to the
specication of the monetary policy rule, as nancial frictions continue to play a key role
in amplifying and propagating shocks: the responses of output and investment in the bank
friction model display more amplied declines following the shocks and those in the rm
friction model exhibit more persistent declines than other two models, much like they did
in Figures 3-2 3-5. The main di¤erence between Figure 3-9 and Figures 3-2 3-5 is that
the magnitude of the responses is much smaller in Figure 3-9 because an initial impact in
interest rate is not transmitted to the next periods under the alternative monetary policy
rule.
3.5.4. Higher value of the steady state capital to asset ratio
In this subsection, we examine the e¤ect of the rms leverage. The steady state capital to
asset ratio K=N governs the nancial accelerator e¤ect in the rm friction model because
it directly a¤ect the equation (3.35) - (3.36). To assess the sensitivity of our results to the
value of the steady state capital to asset ratio, we use a higher value of 2 instead of 1.42,
implying 50% of the rms capital expenditure is externally nanced. Figure 3-10 displays
the responses of the three economies to the shocks according to the modied steady state
capital to asset ratio. We nd that in this Figure the responses of investment and output in
the rm friction model are greater than the baseline model described in Figures 3-2 3-5.
This deeper response of output mainly comes from investment. When the rms heavily
depend on the external funding, the shock to the rms net worth expands the rise in
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the external nance premium. This further aggravates investment and output. Thus, the
responses in the rm friction model are more amplied and more persistent than the bank
friction model. This nding shows the amplication of responses to the exogenous shocks
heavily depends on the extent of leverage. In addition, this result suggests that the bank
friction model with high leverage is appropriate for explaining the recent nancial crisis.
The banks high leverage contributes to amplifying and propagating the repercussion of
the crisis.
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Figure 3-7. Impact of no habit formation in consumption
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Figure 3-8. Impact of constant capital utilisation
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Figure 3-9. Impact of parameter of the Taylor rule
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Figure 3-10. Impact of capital to net wealth ratio
3.6. Conclusion
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The repercussion of the recent nancial crisis varied across the countries. In specic, Es-
tonias GDP declined by roughly 20%, whereas U.S. and Germany experienced relatively
modest economic contraction. Also, Spain still did not overcome the economic crisis, while
U.S. and Germany soon rebounded surpassing the pre-crisis level of GDP in 2011. We pay
attention to nancial frictions as the cause of these di¤erences because in the countries
which experienced the abrupt and persistent economic slump private credit considerably
increased before the crisis. We try to analyse the relationship between the economic uc-
tuation and nancial frictions in the DSGE model. The idea is whether nancial frictions
in the DSGE model are crucial to account for the uctuations of economic variables or
not. To this purpose, we introduce the models which embed Bernanke et al. (1999) nan-
cial accelerator or Gertler and Karadi (2011) model into the standard DSGE framework.
This chapter compares the three DSGE models - the no friction model, the rm friction
model, and the bank friction model - according to the moment comparison and the impulse
response functions analysis. The three models are calibrated with the U.S. data for the
period 1960Q12015Q4. In the impulse response functions we introduce ve exogenous
shocks such as monetary policy shock, technology shock, capital quality shock, scal policy
shock and wealth shock to analyse the importance of nancial frictions on the magnitude
and the persistence of uctuations in economic activity.
Our main results are as follows. First of all, the introduction of nancial frictions at the
rm level improves the models t, whilst the introduction of nancial frictions at the bank
level shows mixed results. Thus, the rm friction model is perferred by the data according
to the comparison of the second moments.
Second, in the impulse response functions the introduction of nancial frictions, either at
the rm level or at the nancial intermediaries level, amplies and propagates the uctu-
ation of economic variables. This is because exogenous shocks a¤ect the credit market. In
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the rm friction model, the fall in the price of capital due to the exogenous shock reduces
the rms net worth and the external nance premium rises. Capital and investment fur-
ther decrease. This amplies the original response of output. In the bank friction model,
the fall in investment due to the exogenous shock reduces the banks asset. The bank raises
the lending rate to restore the prot and the external nance premium rises. This further
reduces loans. The negative impact on investment accelerates the fall of output. However,
the rm friction model does not show the accelerator e¤ect on output and investment to
the technology shock. The entrepreneurial leverage causes this di¤erence. The fall in the
marginal product of capital due to the technology shock decreases investment, thus, the
rms loan. The improved leverage ratio reduces the external nance premium and a¤ects
positively both investment and output.
Third, the model with higher leverage displays more amplied responses of output and
investment to the exogenous shocks. When we introduce higher values of the leverage in
the subsection 3.5.4, we conrm that the response of output is extended.
Fourth, the rm friction model shows more persistent responses than the bank friction
model. This is because the feedback e¤ect of tightened nancial frictions works. The fall
of the rms net worth owing to the exogenous shock makes the rm invest less. This
reduces capital, hence, the rms net worth. More contraction of the rms net worth
sequentially decreases investment and output. However, in the bank friction model the
decline of investment due to the exogenous shock reduces the demand for the loan and the
external nance premium falls. Thus, investment and output have not decreased any more
and soon rebound.
In the impulse response functions analysis our sensitivity analysis shows that our ndings
are robust to the modications of the model such as habit formation in consumption,
variable capital utilisation and the monetary policy rule. To sum up, the comparison
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shows that the e¤ect of shocks on macroeconomic variables is strongly dependent on the
assumptions made about the type of nancial frictions, and the source of shocks. However,
it can be concluded that the bank friction model with high leverage may better capture
the amplication of uctuations of macroeconomic variables to the shocks and the rm
friction model may better capture the persistence of uctuations to the shocks.
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Appendix
A. The linearized model
In this appendix we provide the log-linear form of the model. We represent all transformed
variables by lower-case letters. We also dene the steady state value of a variable by
dropping the time subscript t and indicate the logarithmic deviation from its steady-state
value by a hat (b).
A1. The no friction model
rkk
brk;t+1 + bqt + bkt+1 (A1.1)
= pmy (bpm;t+1 + byt+1) + k bqt+1 + bt+1 + bkt+1  k bt+1 + bt+1 + bkt+1
byt = bat + but + bt + bkt+ (1  )blt (A1.2)
bpm;t + byt   but = but + bt + bkt (A1.3)
bint = ibit   k bt + bt + bkt (A1.4)
bqt = 
bint  bint 1
i
  
bint+1  bint
i
(A1.5)
kbkt = kbkt 1 + kbt +bint (A1.6)
130
bt =   (bct   hbct 1)
((1  h) (1  h))   h (bct+1   hbct) (A1.7)
bt = bt   bt 1 (A1.8)
bt+1 + brt+1 = 0 (A1.9)
ybyt = cbct + ibit + gbgt (A1.10)
bpm;t + byt   blt =  bt + blt (A1.11)
cmct + bpm;t = 0 (A1.12)
bt = 1
1 + P

bt+1 + P bt 1   (1  ) (1  ) bpm;t

(A1.13)
brn;t = brt + bt+1 (A1.14)
brn;t = brn;t 1 + (1  ) (bt + ybyt) + bRt (A1.15)
brk;t = brt (A1.16)
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bt = bt 1 + bt (A1.17)
bat = Abat 1 + bAt (A1.18)
bgt = Gbgt 1 + bGt (A1.19)
A2. The rm friction model
rkk
brk;t+1 + bqt + bkt+1 (A2.1)
= pmy (bpm;t+1 + byt+1) + k bqt+1 + bt+1 + bkt+1  k bt+1 + bt+1 + bkt+1
byt = bat + but + bt + bkt+ (1  )blt (A2.2)
bpm;t + byt   but = but + bt + bkt (A2.3)
bint = ibit   k bt + bt + bkt (A2.4)
bqt = 
bint  bint 1
i
  
bint+1  bint
i
(A2.5)
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kbkt = kbkt 1 + kbt +bint (A2.6)
bt =   (bct   hbct 1)
((1  h) (1  h))   h (bct+1   hbct) (A2.7)
bt = bt   bt 1 (A2.8)
bt+1 + brt+1 = 0 (A2.9)
ybyt = cbct + ibit + gbgt (A2.10)
bpm;t + byt   blt =  bt + blt (A2.11)
cmct + bpm;t = 0 (A2.12)
bt = 1
1 + P

bt+1 + P bt 1   (1  ) (1  ) bpm;t

(A2.13)
brn;t = brt + bt+1 (A2.14)
brn;t = brn;t 1 + (1  ) (bt + ybyt) + bRt (A2.15)
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brk;t+1   brt+1 = sbnt+1   bqt   bkt+1 (A2.16)
bnt+1 = erk k
n

(brk;t+1   brt) + brt + bnt+1 + bNt (A2.17)
bt = bt 1 + bt (A2.18)
bat = Abat 1 + bAt (A2.19)
bgt = Gbgt 1 + bGt (A2.20)
A3. The bank friction model
rkk
brk;t+1 + bqt + bkt+1 (A3.1)
= pmy (bpm;t+1 + byt+1) + k bqt+1 + bt+1 + bkt+1  k bt+1 + bt+1 + bkt+1
byt = bat + but + bt + bkt+ (1  )blt (A3.2)
bpm;t + byt   but = but + bt + bkt (A3.3)
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bint = ibit   k bt + bt + bkt (A3.4)
bqt = 
bint  bint 1
i
  
bint+1  bint
i
(A3.5)
kbkt = kbkt 1 + kbt +bint (A3.6)
bt =   (bct   hbct 1)
((1  h) (1  h))   h (bct+1   hbct) (A3.7)
bt = bt   bt 1 (A3.8)
bt+1 + brt+1 = 0 (A3.9)
ybyt = cbct + ibit + gbgt (A3.10)
bpm;t + byt   blt =  bt + blt (A3.11)
cmct + bpm;t = 0 (A3.12)
bt = 1
1 + P

bt+1 + P bt 1   (1  ) (1  ) bpm;t

(A3.13)
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brn;t = brt + bt+1 (A3.14)
brn;t = brn;t 1 + (1  ) (bt + ybyt) + bRt (A3.15)
bt = (1  ) (rkbrk;t+1   rbrt+1) + (1  ) (rk   r) bt+1 (A3.16)
+x
bt+1 + bxt+1 + bt+1
bt = (1  )r bt+1 + brt+1+ z bt+1 + bzt+1 + bt+1 (A3.17)
bbt    bt + bt = bt (A3.18)
zbzt =  (rkbrk;t+1   rbrt+1) +  (rk   r) bt + rbrt+1 (A3.19)
bxt = bt+1   bt + bzt (A3.20)
bqt + bkt+1 = bt + bnbt (A3.21)
bnbt = nbenb bnbet + nbnnb bnbnt (A3.22)
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bnbet = bzt + bnbt 1 (A3.23)
bnbnt = bqt + bkt + bt (A3.24)
bt = bt 1 + bt (A3.25)
bat = Abat 1 + bAt (A3.26)
bgt = Gbgt 1 + bGt (A3.27)
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Chapter 4
The E¤ects of alternative scal consolida-
tion strategies
4.1. Introduction
In the recent nancial crisis, many countries around the world have taken extraordinary
scal measures in order to stimulate their economies with the hope of boosting demand
and limiting job losses. The launch of large-scale scal stimulus packages has triggered a
lively debate in both academic and policy circles about the e¤ectiveness of scal policy.
However, there is no consensus among economists on the e¤ects of scal policy on GDP
(Zubairy, 2014). On the one hand, some researches nd that the scal stimulus is e¤ective
at the zero lower bound (e.g. Woodford, 2010; Christiano et al., 2011; Eggertsson, 2011;
Erceg and Linde, 2014). On the other hand, other works insist that the e¤ects of the scal
stimulus programs are reduced because of signicant implementation lags and nancing
problems (e.g. Cogan et al., 2010; Drauzburg and Uhlig, 2011)
Apart from the aggregate e¤ectiveness of scal stimulus, the large scal stimulus pack-
ages and a slow ensuing recovery have put severe strains on the scal positions of many
industrial countries. Figure 4-1 displays the general government gross debt to GDP ra-
tio in selected countries from 2000 to 2018.128 Ireland and Spain show a fall in the debt
ratio before the crisis, whereas the ratio slightly increases in the U.S., the U.K., Greece,
and Portugal. However, the government debt begins to deteriorate rapidly in all countries
without exception after the nancial crisis. The debt ratio is predicted to decrease mildly
around 2015, but it is still higher than the pre-crisis level. Since most developed countries
128 Its source is the IMF World Economic Outlook (2013). The values after 2012 are forecasts.
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have scal pressure in social security related to the aging problem, increasing public debt
may jeopardise economic stability (IMF, 2009). Furthermore, as shown in some countries
example, public debt surge can cause a sharp increase in sovereign debt spread.129 They,
thus, cannot help taking immediate and signicant actions to decrease public debt. In this
context, how public debt can be reduced has become a main policy issue in most countries
and many researchers become interested in this topic.
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Figure 4-1. General government gross debt in some countries
Most developed countries are already reducing their public debt. However, their auster-
ityhas varied across nations. The Economist (May 26, 2012)130 shows that scal consoli-
129For example, in 2006 Greeces debt to GDP ratio stood at 108%, and the spread of its 10-year bond
at 409 basis points (bps). In 2010, Greeces debt to GDP ratio was 148%, and the 10-year spread was 909
bps.
130The Economist uses forecast change in government primary balance 2011-2013 according to the OECDs
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dation is mainly done by cutting government spending. For example, Greece is supposed
to cut the government spending in order to decrease public debt. European countries such
as the U.K., Spain, Portugal, and Ireland follow a similar pattern. However, Italy largely
adopts the revenue increase for scal consolidation. The U.S., and Australia take a similar
position.
We analyse the e¤ects of an array of di¤erent scal actions to consolidate public debt us-
ing an open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a variety
of scal instruments. Many previous papers examine the e¤ects of government expendi-
ture cut and tax hike in the DSGE model (Stahler and Thomas, 2012; Almeida et al.,
2013; Cogan et al., 2013). Above all, the main structure of this model is based on the
extended version of the ECBs New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) described by Coenen et
al. (2013).131 However, we develop this framework for scal policy analysis in three impor-
tant ways. First, our model builds in a new dimension by endogenising government bond
premia. The risk premium of government bond is positively associated with the expected
debt to GDP ratio (Laubach, 2009; 2010). The relationship between two variables be-
comes more manifest during the recent nancial crisis (Laubach, 2010; Schuknecht, 2010).
Some euro area countries case, especially, suggests that we need to consider the e¤ects of
variable risk premia of government bonds on economic variables in the process of scal
consolidation. Second, our model has a more extended scal policy block. We consider
both expenditure and revenue based policies to conduct the scal consolidation strategy.
Specically, the expenditure based policy includes a cut in government consumption, gov-
ernment investment, and lump-sum transfers, whereas the revenue based policy covers a
Economic Outlook.
131The basic NAWM is an an open-economy DSGE model estimated for the euro area. Christo¤el et
al. (2008) describe the model in detail. Coenen et al. (2013) extend the basic NAWM as follows. First,
households fall into two categories: Ricardian and non-Ricardian households. Second, a complementarity
between government consumption and private consumption is assumed. Third, a time-to-build technology
for public capital is adopted. Fourth, scal instruments react to changes in public debt and output.
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hike in consumption tax, wage income tax, and capital income tax.132 Therefore, we can
simulate diverse scal measures which are implemented to decrease government debt and
quantify their consequences. Third, we consider a relatively rich description of scal policy
rules. Following Bohn (1998) most papers on scal policy assume the scal rule to prevent
the public debt from increasing innitely. In particular, since allowing more scal tools to
respond to public debt in the model is the best suitable for the data according to Leeper
et al. (2010), we dene scal policy rules on all scal instruments.
Our another contribution is a variety of robustness checks within the model. First
of all, we provide evidence on how the endogenous risk premium of government debts has
consequences for the stimulative e¤ects of scal consolidation. For this, we analyse whether
the endogenous risk premium causes the di¤erence in the e¤ect of scal consolidation or
not. Also we simulate di¤erent scal rules. Unlike monetary policy, since there is no
widely accepted specication for the scal policy rule, this chapter not only incorporates
dynamic adjustments of scal instruments in response to the level of economic activity
and to the state of government debt, but also tries to understand how the e¤ects of scal
consolidation strategies depend on the interaction with the scal policy rule. In additon, we
test the consumption substitution e¤ect mentioned by Benk and Jakab (2012). According
to a complementary relationship between private consumption and public consumption the
e¤ect of scal policy di¤ers. However, their relationship varies depending on the paper.
Some papers nd that it is substitute (Forni et al., 2010), while others nd that it is
complementary (Leeper et al., 2009). Thus, we analyse the e¤ects of the complementarity
of both private consumption and government consumption on scal consolidation with
di¤erent parameterisations.
The main results can be summarised as follows. For the expenditure based policies,
132Coenen et al. (2013) introduce capital income tax in their model, but the tax rate is constant. However,
we allow the capital income tax rate to change.
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the cut in government consumption is the most damaging in the short run. The cut
in government investment has smaller contractionary e¤ects than the cut in government
consumption unlike previous literature. This is related to the complementarity between
government consumption and private consumption. The reduction in lump-sum transfers
has relatively small negative e¤ect on output because it is not a determinant of output.
With regard to the tax hike, we nd that the hike in consumption tax has a larger negative
e¤ect on output than other distortionary taxes in the short run. However, negative e¤ects
of other tax hikes are bigger than consumption tax in the long run. In particular, the
increase in capital income tax has a permanent dampening e¤ect on output by impeding
private investment. Regarding robustness tests, the response of macroeconomic variables to
the consolidation strategies under alternative risk premium schemes and alternative scal
policy rules varies considerably, especially for distortionary taxes.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we summarise
previous related literature. Section 4.3 presents a detailed description of the model, while
Section 4.4 reports calibration of parameters and steady state values of variables. In
Section 4.5 we investigate the e¤ects of alternative scal consolidation strategies. Section
4.6 provides robustness checks regarding other types of models and parameterisations.
Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. Literature review
4.2.1. Fiscal consolidation
Previous literature examining scal consolidation can be divided into three categories.
First, some works compare the e¤ects of scal policy shocks through the cut in government
expenditures and the rise in tax rates (Stahler and Thomas, 2012; Almeida et al., 2013;
Cogan et al., 2013). Stahler and Thomas (2012) nd that a reduction in the public sector
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wage bill is the least damaging, whereas a cut in government investment is the most
damaging.133 Almeida et al. (2013) nd that in a small euro area economy like Portugal,
scal consolidation with a permanent reduction in government expenditure causes short-
run costs, whereas output increases and welfare improves in the long run. In addition, they
show that scal consolidation involving a tax reform which changes the tax burden from
wage income to consumption raises its gain. Cogan et al. (2013) nd that GDP increases
in both the short run and the long run according to scal consolidation plans with the mix
of government expenditure reductions and labour tax cuts in the U.S.134
Second category is the so-called narrative approach that examines a wide range of policy
documents to identify scal adjustment motivated by a desire to reduce the budget decit
(Leigh et al., 2010; Guajardo et al., 2014; Alesina et al., 2015). Guajardo et al. (2014)135
and Alesina et al. (2015) focus on 17 developed countries during 1978-2009. In addition,
Alesina et al. (2015) construct scal plans with a 3-years horizon. This method is based
on the belief that the simulation of a multi-year scal plan is proper than of individual
scal shocks to evaluate the e¤ects of scal consolidation. The two papers show similar
results. These investigations nd that scal consolidation generally has contractionary
e¤ects on output. They also suggest that the increase in taxation is much more costly,
in terms of output losses, than the cut in government spending. The two papers agree
with the fact that private investment makes this di¤erence between the two types of scal
consolidation. However, they show di¤erent views on the importance of the monetary
policy. Guajardo et al. (2014) suggest that more negative e¤ect of the tax hike can be
explained by accompanying monetary policy. In particular, the degree of monetary easing
133Stahler and Thomas (2012) develop a medium scale DSGE model with a two-country monetary union
for scal policy simulations. They calibrate the model to Spain and the European Monetary Union.
134They present three causes of this "expansionary austerity": (i) lower expected taxes due to the reduction
of government expenditure increase consumption even in the short run. (ii) the present cut in the labour
tax rate stimulates employment and production. (iii) a reduction in exchange rate raises net exports.
135Leigh et al. (2010) are mostly similar to Guajardo et al. (2014).
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is higher following spending cuts that following tax hikes. However, Alesina et al. (2015)
reject this explanation through both the constraint of the Euro area and a counterfactual
experiment of zero policy rate. They insist that this is because Guajardo et al. (2014) is
based on the analysis of isolated shocks rather than plans.
Lastly, other papers analyse the consequences of a permanent reduction in the debt
ratio (Coenen et al., 2008; Forni et al., 2010; Erceg and Linde, 2013). Specically, Co-
enen et al. (2008) examine the e¤ects of the permanent cut in the targeted debt ratio
through expenditure or revenue-based policy.136 They nd that scal consolidation causes
macroeconomic costs such as declines in output and consumption in the short run. Among
various scal strategies, the negative e¤ect of the government consumption cut is larger
than the transfers cut. However, the macroeconomic e¤ects become positive in the long
run when the resulting scal surplus due to the reduction in government debt is used to
reduce distortionary taxes. Forni et al. (2010) nd that the permanent reduction of both
expenditures and taxes is the best scal consolidation scenario by estimating the macroeco-
nomic impacts of permanently decreasing the debt ratio in Germany and Belgium. Erceg
and Linde (2013) examine the e¤ects of a 25% reduction in the long run debt target using
a two country DSGE model. Their results vary depending on the constraints on monetary
policy and exchange rate adjustment. Under an independent monetary policy, government
spending cuts are much less costly than tax hikes. This is because the government spend-
ing cut lowers the interest rate further and causes exchange rate depreciation, whilst the
labour tax hike induces a relatively modest fall of the interest rate and exchange rate ap-
preciation. However, in a currency union, the labour tax hike has smaller negative e¤ects
on the economy than the government spending cut in the short run. This is caused by two
136They use a two country open economy model of the euro area, which is based on the NAWM. In
the model, expenditure-based consolidation includes transfers and government consumption. In addition,
revenue-based consolidation operates through changes in either consumption tax or labour income tax.
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factors - a constraint on interest rate adjustment and xed nominal exchange rates. Even
so, because real interest rates and real exchange rates gradually move toward their exible
price levels, the tax hike is more costly in the long run. This result, thus, means trade-o¤s
between the short and the long-run e¤ects of scal consolidation strategies.
We adopt the rst approach in this chapter and compare how the e¤ects of scal
consolidation change depending on scal policy tools. Especially, we focus on which scal
instrument is the least damaging impact on output and the most e¤ective to reduce public
debt.
4.2.2. Fiscal instruments
All models investigating scal consolidation have in common a consumption tax, a wage
income tax and lump-sum taxes on the revenue side as well as government consumption and
lump-sum transfers on the expenditure side.137 However, the specic structures of scal
block are di¤erent depending on the characteristics of models. In Forni et al. (2010), total
government revenues are composed of four taxes including the above and capital income tax.
They add public employment in government expenditures, but do not consider government
investment. Stahler and Thomas (2012) segment the government expenditures side by
di¤erentiating public consumption, public investment, and the public sector wage bill. On
the other hand, Almeida et al. (2013) consider an employerssocial security contribution
and corporate income tax on the revenues side. Cogan et al. (2013) also introduce a variety
of taxes, but the expenditure side is relatively simple by only considering government
consumption and transfers.
Based on these papers, our model has a wider array of scal instruments on both
the expenditure and revenue side. In particular, the government nances its expenditure
137An exception is Erceg and Linde (2013). They consider only two scal instruments: a wage income tax
hike and a government spending cut.
145
requirements with lump-sum tax and three types of distortionary taxes, over consumption,
wage income and capital income. We consider social security contribution of both employees
and employers, but do not analyse their e¤ect because it is similar to wage income tax.
In regard to the government expenditure, we take account of three instruments such as
government consumption, government investment, and lump-sum transfers. Based on the
extended scal framework, we examine the transmission mechanism of these scal measures
and compare their relative merits.
4.2.3. Fiscal rule
Bohn (1998) nds on the basis of U.S. data that the government takes corrective actions by
increasing the primary budget surplus in response to the accumulation of public debt. Since
then most research associated with scal policy has assumed a scal rule to prevent the debt
ratio from increasing innitely. Leeper et al. (2010) emphasise the importance of the scal
rule in order to accurately predict the impacts of scal policy stating "Understanding which
scal instruments have historically responded to debt and how quickly they have done so
is essential to accurately predict the impacts of scal policy."
However, since there is no widely accepted specication for the scal policy rule, there are
various forms of the scal rule. Some literature only adjust a scal instrument following the
rule (Coenen et al., 2008; Furceri and Mourougane, 2010; Erceg and Linde, 2010; Almeida
et al., 2013; Cogan et al., 2013). Coenen et al. (2008) suppose a simple rule that the
government changes one among scal instruments - i) on the expenditure side transfers
and government consumption ii) on the revenue side consumption tax and labour income
tax - according to debt. Furceri and Mourougane (2010) rely on a lump-sum tax which is
less detrimental to growth because it does not a¤ect saving and labour supply decision. In
their set-up, the lump-sum tax is adjusted according to the debt ratio. Erceg and Linde
(2010) introduce a scal rule that labour income tax responds to both the debt and the
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decit. Almeida et al. (2013) consider a scal rule which one of scal instruments responds
to both tax revenues and the debt. Lump-sum taxes are adjusted according to the debt in
Cogan et al. (2013). Erceg and Linde (2013) assume that government spending or labour
income tax is adjusted according to government debt and decit.
Other papers further develop the scal rule and allow all scal instruments to be adjusted
(Forni et al., 2010; Leeper et al., 2010). For example, Forni et al. (2010) assume that all
scal items respond to the debt, public decit, and GDP growth. Leeper et al. (2010)
not only specify scal rules for more instruments, but also estimate four scenariostness
for the U.S. data.138 According to them, the model allowing more scal instruments to
respond to debt is the best suitable for the time series data.
Like this, there is no generally accepted scal policy rule. Thus, we consider various scal
rules. Our model basically assumes that government expenditures are adjusted according
to the variation of output and government debt. However, tax rates only depend on the
debt ratio because the coe¢ cients on output gap are insignicant according to Forni et al.
(2009). Moreover, we simulate alternative scal rules as a robustness test following Leeper
et al. (2010). One rule is that only the government expenditures are adjusted and the
other is that only the distortionary taxes are adjusted.
4.2.4. Non-Keynesian e¤ect
If indirect responses of private consumption and private investment overwhelm a direct
negative e¤ect of scal consolidation, the economy becomes expansionary in spite of scal
consolidation. This favorable e¤ect is labelled as a "non-Keynesian e¤ect" in some papers
because it contrasts with the traditional Keynesian view. Benk and Jakab (2012) present
some channels to explain possible non-Keynesian e¤ects. Among them, the mechanisms
138Four scenarios of the scal rule are as follows: (i) four items such as government spending, lump-sum
transfers, capital income tax, and labour income tax respond to debt (ii) only capital and labour income
taxes respond (iii) only lump-sum transfers respond (iv) only government spending responds.
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which are related to this chapter are expectation channel, risk premium channel, and
consumption substitution e¤ects.
4.2.4.1. Expectation channel
Since the present scal consolidation reduces the probability of a future scal contraction,
households increase their consumption (Benk and Jakab, 2012). However, this expectation
e¤ect is limited under a marked fraction of non-Ricardian households139. Many previous
research departs from standard neoclassical models and adopts non-Ricardian households
(Coenen and Straub, 2005; Gali et al., 2007; Furceri and Mourougane, 2010; Erceg and
Linde, 2010; Coenen et al., 2013).140 An increase in the share of non-Ricardian households
raises the negative impact of scal consolidation on output. For example, Erceg and Linde
(2010) nd that the negative impact of a coordinated cut in government expenditures is
larger when the ratio of non-Ricardian households is higher. We follow the assumption of
the two types of households in the model.
4.2.4.2. Endogenous risk premium of bonds
The fall in the debt ratio through scal consolidation may reduce a risk default premium
of government bonds. A decrease in real interest rate associated with this e¤ect stimulates
private investment and increases output (Benk and Jakab, 2012). Many previous literature
has examined the e¤ects of scal variables on the risk premium of government bonds,
but their results are mixed. However, some papers nd signicant results. For example,
using U.S. data Laubach (2009) nds that one percentage point increase in the decit to
139Households who do not have any assets, and just consume their current labour income are called
as various names: non-Ricardian households, rule-of-thumb households, hand-to-mouth households. On
the other hand, households who have full access to capital markets are called as Ricardian or optimising
households. We use Ricardian and non-Ricardian households throughout this chapter.
140Ricardian equivalence does not hold with the two types of households since non-Ricardian households
do not anticipate the future tax burden (Coenen et al., 2008).
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GDP ratio raises the risk premium by about 25 basis points, and one percentage point
increase in the debt ratio adds 3 to 4 basis points to the risk premium. Laubach (2010)
analyses cross-sectional relationships between scal stance and the risk premium using
a panel of 10 euro area countries and nds that the e¤ect of scal position depends on
circumstances. Specically, before 2008 a one percentage point increase in the surplus to
GDP ratio decreases the risk premium by at most 3 basis points, and the e¤ect of the
debt ratio is 0.3 basis points at most. However, during the recent nancial crisis, the
e¤ect becomes larger signicantly. A one percentage point reduction in the surplus ratio
increases the risk premium by 20 basis points, and a percentage point increase in the debt
ratio increases it by 0.8 basis points. Schuknecht et al. (2010) also nd that coe¢ cients
for the decit ratio are 3-4 times higher and for the debt ratio 7-8 times higher during the
recent nancial crisis than earlier using the data of 15 EU countries.141
Previous work develops DSGE models with endogenous government bond yields to
examine the e¤ects of scal policy. The real interest rate is allowed to increase with a rise
in the debt target in Coenen et al. (2008).142 Furceri and Mourougane (2010) develop
a closed economy DSGE model with endogenous government bonds yields. Specically,
the risk premium reects market expectations on public debt (or public decit) and it is
calibrated following Laubach (2009). Erceg and Linde (2010) also allow credit spreads to
depend inversely on the decit and the debt to examine a possibility of output expansion
by scal consolidation. On the other hand, Almeida et al. (2013) simply model the risk
premium as a shock following an AR (1) process.
Following these approaches, we allow for the endogenous response of the risk premium.
141Specically, one percentage increase in the decit ratio raises the spread by 3.49 basis points before
the crisis, but the e¤ect is 12.64 basis points during the crisis. Similarly, an increase in the debt ratio by
one percentage point results in the risk premium by 1.25 basis points during the crisis, whereas the e¤ect
is 0.16 basis points before the crisis.
142They use relatively a small coe¢ cient implying that a one percentage-point fall in the debt ratio leads
to a one basis point reduction in the interest rate.
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In order to capture marked increases of the risk premium in a number of euro area countries
during the recent nancial crisis, we assume that the risk premium reacts to the future
path of the debt ratio. As a robustness test, we examine how the impact of various scal
consolidation strategies on macroeconomic variables changes when the endogenous risk
premium is omitted.
4.2.4.3. Consumption substitution e¤ects
Bouakez and Rebei (2007) analyse the consequences of a complementary relationship be-
tween private consumption and public consumption on the response of economic variables
to a positive government spending shock. According to their results, lower values of the
elasticity of substitution tend to further increase private consumption. Specically, when
the elasticity is set to 1, the government spending shock causes a larger crowding-out e¤ect
on private consumption. However, when the elasticity is 0.25, the complementarity e¤ect
dominates the negative wealth e¤ect and private consumption is crowded-in in spite of the
increase of government spending. If government consumption has a substitution e¤ect with
private consumption, a cut in government consumption may increase private consumption,
thus, output.
Some models have incorporated a substitutability between private and public consump-
tion. For example, Forni et al. (2010) also assume higher degree of substitutability between
private and public consumption. However, other literature nds that the relationship be-
tween government consumption and private consumption may be complementary (Leeper
et al., 2009; Coenen et al., 2013). In this case, scal consolidation through the cut in
government consumption further worsens the economic situation.143
143Ni (1995) estimates substitutability between private consumption and government consumption and
nd that inconclusive result. Specically, the estimates depend on the specication of utility function and
the measurement of interest rates.
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In our model, government consumption is assumed to have a complementary relation-
ship with private consumption following Coenen et al. (2013). In addition, we test the
robustness of our results with di¤erent values of complementarity between private and
government consumption.
4.3. The model (Coenen et al., 2013)
This section describes our model. The model is based on Coenen et al. (2013), but it is a
little di¤erent. Many previous papers examine the e¤ects of scal consolidation utilising the
DSGE model (Stahler and Thomas, 2012; Almeida et al., 2013; Cogan et al., 2013). Above
all, this model is based on the extended version of the ECBs NAWM described by Coenen
et al. (2013). The basic structure of the model is as follows. There are two countries,
a home country and a foreign country. We focus mainly on the home country. In the
home country, there are households, rms, a government. Households are divided into two
types, Ricardian and non-Ricardian households. There are two forms of rms. Specically,
within the home country, domestic intermediate goods rms produce wholesale goods that
are sold to both domestic and foreign markets using labour and capital under monopolistic
competition. And domestic nal goods producers combine domestic intermediate goods and
imported intermediate goods into a private consumption good, a private investment good,
and a public consumption good in a perfectly competitive market. Finally, the government
is composed of a scal authority which implements scal policy and a monetary authority
which sets the nominal interest rate.
However, we develop the framework for scal policy analysis in three important ways.
First, our model builds in a new dimension by endogenising government bond premia as a
function of the expected debt to GDP ratio. This allows us to examine the e¤ects of variable
risk premia of government bonds on economic variables in the process of scal consolidation.
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Second, our model has a more developed scal policy block. On the government expenditure
side, we include the cut in government consumption, government investment and lump-sum
transfers. On the scal revenues side, we cover the hike in consumption tax, wage income
tax and capital income tax. Therefore, we can simulate diverse scal measures which
are implemented to decrease government debt and quantify their consequences. Third, we
develop a relatively rich description of scal policy rules. Specically, we dene scal policy
rules on all scal instruments because allowing more scal measures to respond to public
debt in the model is the best suitable for the data following Leeper et al. (2010).
In this section we describe the households, the domestic rms, and the government
shortly. Appendix presents their detailed set-up and structures of the foreign rms.
4.3.1. Households
Households consume consumption goods and investment goods and supply di¤erentiated
labour services to domestic rms. We introduce non-Ricardian households in the form
of rule-of-thumb consumers, following Gali et al. (2007). To this end, we assume that
there is a continuum of households, indexed by h 2 [0; 1], which is split into two groups:
(i) Ricardian households, indexed by i 2 (!; 1], who accumulate physical capital and have
access to nancial markets and (ii) non-Ricardian households, indexed by j 2 [0; !), who do
not. As a result, the former group of households can smooth consumption intertemporally
by trading domestic and foreign bonds, whereas the latter simply consume their after-tax
disposable income.
Furthermore, we suppose that government consumption is a complement with private
consumption following Leeper et al. (2009), as in Coenen et al. (2013). The consumption
bundle eCh;t of household h is given by
eCh;t = (1=GG C(1 1=G)h;t + (1  G)1=GG(1 1=G)t )G=(G 1) (4.1)
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where G 2 [0; 1] is a share of the households consumption of private goods, Ch;t, G > 0
measures the elasticity of substitution between private consumption, Ch;t, and government
consumption, Gt.144
4.3.1.1. Ricardian households
Each Ricardian household i derives its utility from purchases of the private consumption
good, Ci;t and supplies of the labour services provided to rms, Ni;t. The households
lifetime utility function takes the form
Et
( 1X
k=0
kCt+k

ln( eCi;t+k    eCt+k 1)  1
1 + 
(Ni;t+k)
1+
)
(4.2)
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount rate,  2 (0; 1) is an external habit formation parameter in
consumption, eCt 1 is the lagged economy-wide aggregate consumption bundle, and  > 0
is an inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply: The variable Ct is also a general preference
shock and follows an autogressive process given by
ln Ct = C ln 
C
t 1 + 
C
t ; 0 < C < 1; 
C
t  N(0; C ) (4.3)
Then their budget constraint is given by
(1 + Ct )PC;tCi;t + PI;tIi;t +
Bi;t+1
Rg;t
+
StB

i;t+1
[1   B(sB;t+1)]Rt
+ Ti;t
= (1  Nt   Wht )Wi;tNi;t + [(1  Kt )RK;t + Kt PI;t]Ki;t + (1  Dt )Di;t + TRi;t
+Bi;t + StB

i;t + 
B
i;t + 
B
i;t ; (4.4)
144G ! 0 means that government and private consumptions are perfect complements; G !1 indicates
that the two are perfect substitutes; and G ! 1 gives the Cobb-Douglas case.
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where PC;t and PI;t denote the prices of a unit of the private consumption good Ci;t and
the investment good Ii;t, respectively. Wi;t indicates the wage rate for the labour services
provided to rms, Ni;t; the capital services, Ki;t, is rented to rms for the rental rate,
RK;t; and Di;t represents the dividend paid by the household-owned rms. Rg;t145 and Rt
denote the respective returns on domestic government bonds, Bi;t+1, and internationally
traded foreign bonds, Bi;t+1.
146 The latter are denominated in foreign currency and, thus,
their domestic value depends on the nominal foreign exchange rate St. Ct indicates the
consumption tax rate that is levied on the households consumption purchases; and Nt ,
Kt , and 
D
t are the tax rates levied on the di¤erent sources of the householdss income;
wage income, capital income, and dividend income, respectively. We assume that the
physical capital depreciation, PI;tKi;t, is exempted from taxation. 
Wh
t is the households
contribution to social security. The term Ti;t and TRi;t denote lump-sum taxes and lump-
sum transfers, respectively. When taking a position in the international bond market, the
household encounters an external nancial intermediation premium.
 B(sB;t+1) = B

exp

StB

t+1
PY;tYt

  1

(4.5)
where sB;t+1 = StBi;t+1=PY;tYt is holdings of internationally traded foreign bonds ex-
pressed in domestic currency relative to domestic nominal output.147 The incurred inter-
mediation premia are rebated in the form of lump-sum payments, Bi;t and 
B
i;t .
145One of the main features of the model is that Ricardian households make economic decisions by the
interest rate on government bonds rather than the policy rate. The spread between the returns on gov-
ernment bonds and the policy rate is a function of the level of government debt. The central bank sets
the policy interest rate by a Taylor rule (4.36). The interest rate on government bonds is decided by the
endogenous risk premium mechanism (4.37).
146Coenen et al. (2013) assume that there is a wedge between the nominal interest rate set by the monetary
authority and the return acquired by the households by an exogenous domestic risk premium shock. Since
this wedge is invariable over time, capital income tax rate is also constant. However, our model leaves out
this wedge and allows for changes of capital income tax rate.
147This specication implies that, in the steady-state, households have no incentive to hold foreign bonds
and the economys net foreign asset position is zero (Christo¤el et al., 2008).
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Finally, the law of motion for capital stock is given by
Ki;t+1 = (1  )Ki;t + It (1   I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1)) Ii;t, (4.6)
where  is the depreciation rate of the capital stock and It is an investment-specic tech-
nology shock. An adjustment cost function in investment,  I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1), is given by the
form
 I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1) =
I
2

Ii;t
Ii;t 1
  gz
2
(4.7)
where I > 0 is the adjustment cost parameter in investment and gz represents the econ-
omys trend growth rate in the steady state.
Maximisation of householdspreferences (4.2) subject to the budget constraint (4.4) gives
the following rst order conditions with respect to eCi;t, Ii;t, Ki;t+1, Bi;t+1, and Bi;t+1:
eCi;t : (1 + Ct )i;t = Ct ( eCi;t    eCt 1) 1 (4.8)
Ii;t : pI;t = Qi;t
I
t

1   I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1)   0I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1)
Ii;t
Ii;t 1

+Et
"
i;t+1
i;t
Qi;t+1
I
t+1 
0
I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1)
I2i;t
I2i;t 1
#
(4.9)
Ki;t+1 : Qi;t = Et

i;t+1
i;t
((1  )Qi;t+1 + (1  Kt+1)rK;t+1 + (Kt+1   (1  Kt+1))pI;t+1

(4.10)
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Bi;t+1 : Rg;tEt

i;t+1
i;t
 1C;t+1

= 1 (4.11)
Bi;t+1 : (1   B(sB;t+1))RtEt

i;t+1
i;t
 1C;t+1
St+1
St

= 1 (4.12)
where i;t=PC;t and i;tQi;t denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the bud-
get constraint (4.4) and the capital accumulation equation (4.6)148, respectively, pI;t =
PI;t=PC;t is the relative price of the investment good, rK;t+1 = RK;t=PC;t is the real rental
rate of capital, and C;t+1 = PC;t+1=PC;t the ination rate of the consumption good.
In equilibrium, with all households choosing identical allocations, the combination of the
rst-order conditions with respect to the holdings of domestic and internationally traded
bonds, (4.11) and (4.12), yields a risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition,
reecting the assumption that the return on internationally traded bonds is subject to an
exteranl nancial intermediation premium.
4.3.1.2. Non-Ricardian households
Each non-Ricardian household j has the same utility function, equation (4.2), with the
Ricardian household. However, the non-Ricardian households fully consume after-tax dis-
posable income and lump-sum transfers because they do not invest in physical capital and
trade bonds. Thus, their budget constraints are given by
(1 + Ct )PC;tCj;t + Tj;t = (1  Nt   Wht )Wj;tNj;t + TRj;t (4.13)
148Here, i;t represents the shadow price of a unit of the consumption good; that is, the marginal utility
of consumption out of income. Similarly, Qi;t measures the shadow price of a unit of the investment good;
that is, Tobins Q.
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4.3.1.3. Wage setting
We assume that monopolistically competitive unions set the wages for the two types house-
holds following Coenen and Straub (2005), as in Coenen et al. (2013). Each rm also
decides how much labour to hire given the wage, and allocate labour uniformly across
households, independently of their type. Therefore, the wages for both types of households
are the same, Wi;t =Wj;t =Wt, and the amounts of labour for the two types of households
are also identical, Nt = Ni;t = Nj;t.
Each household h supplies its di¤erentiated labour inpus Nh;t in monopolistically com-
petitive markets. Wage is adjusted according to staggered wage contracts a la Calvo (1983).
Unions are permitted to optimally adjust its nominal wage Wh;t in a given period t with
probability 1   W . All unions that are allowed to reset their wages in a given period t
choose the same wage fWt = fWh;t. Those unions which are not permitted to optimally reset
their wages partially adjust their wages to productivity developments and ination:
Wh;t = gz;t
y
C;tWh;t 1; (4.14)
where gz;t indicates the rate of labour productivity growth and 
y
C;t = 
W
C;t 1
1 W
t means
a geometric average of past consumer price ination, C;t 1 = PC;t 1=PC;t 2, and the
monetary authoritys ination target, t. The weight of past ination is determined by
the indexation parameter W .
Each union h who is allowed to optimally reset its wage contract in period t maximises its
utility function (4.2) subject to the demand for its labour inputs and the wage-indexation
scheme (4.14). Thus, the rst-order condition for the unionoptimal wage-setting decision
is given by
157
Et
" 1X
k=0
(W)
k
 
t+k(1  Nt+k   Wht+k)gz;t;t+k
yC;t;t+k
C;t;t+k
fWt
PC;t
  'Wt+kNt+k (Nh;t+k)&
!
Nh;t+k
#
= 0,
(4.15)
where t+k indicates the marginal utility out of income (equal across all households),
gz;t;t+k = 
k
s=1gz;t+s, 
y
C;t;t+k = 
k
s=1
W
C;t+s 1
1 W
t+s , C;t;t+k = 
k
s=1C;t+s 1 and 'Wt
denotes the markup of the real after-tax wage.
Aggregate labour Nt is decided by the following equation
Nt =
Z 1
0
(Nh;t)
1='Wt dh
'Wt
(4.16)
Given equation (4.14) and equation (4.15), the aggregate wage index Wt evolves according
to
Wt =

W

gz;t
y
C;tWh;t 1
1=1 'Wt
+ (1  W )
fWt1=1 'Wt 1 'Wt : (4.17)
4.3.1.4. Aggregation
Most aggregate variables are given by a weighted average of the equivalent variables for
each consumer type. Thus, aggregate consumption and aggregate labour services are given
by
Ct = (1  !)Ci;t + !Cj;t, (4.18)
Nt = (1  !)Ni;t + !Nj;t (4.19)
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Similarly, aggregate lump-sum taxes and lump-sum transfers149 are given by
Tt = (1  !)Ti;t + !Tj;t (4.20)
TRt = (1  !)TRi;t + !TRj;t (4.21)
Since only Ricardian households invest on physical capital and trade in bonds, aggregate
holdings of bonds, aggregate investment and the physical capital are given by
Bt+1 = (1  !)Bi;t+1 (4.22)
It = (1  !)Ii;t (4.23)
Kt+1 = (1  !)Ki;t+1 (4.24)
4.3.2. Domestic intermediate goods rms
At the end of period t, each intermediate goods rm f 2 [0; 1] produces a di¤erentiated
intermediate good Yf;t, using physical capital eKf;t and labour services Nf;t. according to
the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yf;t = t
 eKf;t (ztNf;t)1    zt (4.25)
149Coenen et al. (2013) assume that lump-sum taxes are levied on Ricardian households and a distribution
of lump-sum transfers is favorable to non-Ricardian households. However, we adopt a di¤erent structure
because an analysis of redistribution policy is not our objective. Cogan et al. (2013) stay in line with our
model.
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where t denotes transitory technology shock that a¤ects total factor productivity and
follows an AR(1) process:
ln t =  ln t 1 + 

t; 0 <  < 1; 

t  N(0; ) (4.26)
and the variable zt denotes a permanent technology shock that augments the productivity
of labour permanently. The rate of labour-augmenting productivity gz;t = zt=zt 1 fol-
lows a serially correlated process and determines the models balanced growth path. The
parameter  is e¤ective capital share and the term zt is xed costs of production.
Physical capital eKf;t is a constant-returns-to-scale (CES) aggregate of private capital
services Kf;t and the public capital stock KG;t
eKf;t = (1=KK (Kf;t)(1 1=K) + (1  K)1=K (KG;t)(1 1=K))K=(K 1) (4.27)
where K is a share of private capital services, and the parameter K denotes the elasticity
of substitution between private capital services and the public capital stock.150
We adopt a time-to-build technology for public capital following Leeper et al. (2009), as
in Coenen et al. (2013). We, thus, assume that it takes L periods to complete government
investment and add the public capital stock. The law of motion for public capital is then
given by
KG;t+1 = (1  G)KG;t +AIG;t L+1 (4.28)
where G denotes the depreciation rate of the public capital stock. AIG;t L+1 is the autho-
rised budget for government investment in period t  L+ 1. Government investment that
150K ! 0 implies perfect complements, K ! 1 gives perfect substitutes, and K ! 1 yields the
Cobb-Douglas case.
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is actually implemented is dened by
IG;t =
L 1X
n=0
bnAIG;t n (4.29)
with
L 1P
n=0
bn = 1, and enters the government budget constraint, as well as the economys
aggregate resource constraint.
We assume that the domestic intermediate goods rm charges di¤erent prices at home
and abroad, setting prices in domestic currency regardless of the market of destination. In
both markets, prices are adjusted following staggered price contracts of Calvo (1983).151
Therefore, the aggregate price index of product sold domestically PH;t is given by this
equation:
PH;t =

(1  H)
 ePH;t1=1 'Ht + H HH;t 11 Ht PH;t 11=1 'Ht 1 'Ht (4.30)
Also the aggregate price index of product sold abroad PX;t is given by a similar equation:
PX;t =

(1  X)
 ePX;t1=1 'Xt + X XX;t 11 Xt PX;t 11=1 'Xt 1 'Xt (4.31)
Only a fraction 1   H or 1   X of the rms are permitted to re-set their prices each
period. ePH;t and ePX;t are optimal prices in each market, respectively. 'Ht and 'Xt are
price indexation parameters. We also assume that those rms which are not permitted
to optimise its price can adjust their prices according to an average of past intermediate
goods ination and the ination target of the domestic monetary authority t. H and
X are indexation parameters determining the weight on past ination.
4.3.3. Domestic nal goods producers152
151A detailed explanation of price setting is found in Appendix A.
152Appendix C2 describes a structure of domestic nal goods producers in detail.
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The nal goods rms produce three distinct non-tradable nal goods by combining the
domestically-produced intermediate goods with the imported intermediate goods, namely
a private consumption good, QCt , a private investment good, Q
I
t , and a public consumption
good, QGt .
The representative rm producing the non-tradable nal private consumption goods and
investment goods integrates a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, HCt ,
with a bundle of imported foreign intermediate goods, IMCt , using the CES technology,
QXt = [
1=X
X
 
HXt
1 1=X
+(1  X)1=X
  
1   IMX
 
IMXt =Q
X
t ; 
IM
t

IMXt
1 1=X ]X=X 1
X 2 fC; Ig (4.32)
where X denotes the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between the distinct bundles
of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, while the parameter X indicates the home
bias in the production of the consumption goods and the investment goods. The nal
goods producers is subject to a cost  IMX
 
IMXt =Q
X
t ; 
IM
t

when varying the use of the
bundle of imported goods in producing the consumption goods and the investment goods.
In contrast, the nal public consumption good, QGt , is produced by only using domestic
intermediate goods; that is, QGt = H
G
t .
4.3.4. Fiscal policy
The government budget constraint has the following form.
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PG;tGt + PIG;tIG;t +Bt + TRt
= Ct PC;tCt +

Nt + 
Wh
t + 
Wf
t

WtNt + 
K
t (RK;t   PI;t)Kt
+Dt Dt +Bt+1=Rg;t + Tt, (4.33)
where Gt is government consumption, IG;t denotes government investment, and 
Wf
t im-
plies the rate of rms contributions to social security. PG;t and PIG;t also indicate the
prices of a unit of the public consumption good and the public investment good, respec-
tively. This budget constraint is based on Coenen et al. (2013). However, we develop the
budget constraint allowing capital income tax rate to change. The government has three
instruments on the expenditure side: the government consumption, Gt, the government
investment, IG;t, and the lump-sum transfers, TRt. On the revenue side, it also has seven
means: the consumption tax rate, Ct , the wage income tax rate, 
N
t , the capital income
tax rate, Kt , the dividend income tax rate, 
D
t , the lump-sum taxes, Tt, the households
contribution to social security, Wht , and the rms contribution to social security, 
Wf
t .
The scal rules in this chapter is similar to Coenen et al. (2013), but we amend their
scal rules as follows: (i) in Coenen et al. (2013) scal instruments respond to a deviation
from debt values implied by the steady state, whereas our model explicitly introduces the
debt target and scal instruments respond to a gap between the actual debt ratio and the
targeted ratio. (ii) Coenen et al. (2013) add to their scal rules the debt to GDP ratio and
output gap.153 However, we assume that tax rates only depend on the debt ratio following
Forni et al. (2009). Forni et al. (2009) show that the coe¢ cients relating tax rates to the
output gap are insignicant.
All the scal instruments are assumed to follow simple feedback rules with a uniform
153However, for consumption tax they only allow for a persisence rule and a pre-announcement rule.
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specication. Specically, scal policy rules have following characteristics. First, all s-
cal instruments react to their own lagged values. Second, there may be some automatic
stabiliser component to movements in government expenditures. This is modelled as a
contemporaneous response to deviations of output from the steady state. Third, all s-
cal instruments are permitted to respond to the state of real government debt, Bt=Pt to
prevent the debt from increasing innitely. Fourth, we allow for pre-announcement e¤ects
following Leeper et al. (2013), as in Coenen et al. (2013). For government expenditure and
tax rates, we assume that scal instruments adjust endogenously according to the rule:
Xt = X + XXt 1 + X;B(Bt  Bt ) + X;Y (Yt   Y ) + (1   X)Xt +  XXt 1, (4.34)
for X 2
n
G; IG; TR; 
C
t ; 
N
t ; 
K
t ; Tt; 
Wh
t ; 
Wf
t
o
, where variables without time subscript
indicate corresponding steady state values, X is the smoothing parameter, B

t denotes
the targeted debt ratio, X;B measures the responsiveness of corresponding instrument
to deviations in the debt ratio from its target value, X;Y also means the responsiveness
of these scal instruments to deviations in output from its steady state value, and  X
is a weight of pre-announcement e¤ects. Xt is a shock of corresponding instrument and
distributed i.i.d. N(0; 1).
The targeted debt ratio Bt follows an AR(2) process to reduce the debt gradually
according to Erceg and Linde (2013). This logic is because an abrupt reduction of the debt
may cause large adverse consequences on output. Thus, the targeted debt ratio evolves
according to the following equation
Bt+1  Bt = d1
 
Bt  Bt 1
  d2Bt + Bt (4.35)
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where 0  d1 < 1 and d2 > 0.
4.3.5. Monetary policy
We assume that the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate to stabilise output
and ination according to a simple Taylor rule
log (Rt=R) = R log (Rt 1=R) + (1  R)

log
 
t=

+  log
 
C;t 1=t

+ Y log Yt

+4 log (C;t=C;t 1) + 4Y log (Yt=Yt 1) + 
R
t , (4.36)
where rt denotes the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady state value, r,
C;t = PC;t=PC;t 1 indicates the consumer price ination,  is the monetary authoritys
long run ination objective. Similarly, yt is output gap154, and Rt is a serially uncorrelated
shock to the nominal interest rate. Therefore, the monetary authority sets the nominal
interest rate based on ination rate, changes in ination rate, and changes in the output
gap.
4.3.6. Endogenous risk premium of government bonds
In order to take into account the e¤ect of scal policy on the interest rate spread, we
suppose that the spread between the interest rate on government bond and the nominal
interest rate set by the monetary authority, in other words, a risk premium is a function of
the government decit and debt level. The risk premium on government bond is decided
by the following equation.
Rg;t  Rt =  b(Bt+1  B) +  d(Bt+1  Bt) (4.37)
154The output gap is dened as the deviation of aggregate output from the trend output level implied by
the permanent technology shock.
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4.3.7. Market clearing and aggregate resource constraint
In the markets for domestic intermediate goods, we obtain the following aggregate resource
constraint in nominal terms:
PY;tYt = PH;tHt + PX;tXt; (4.38)
Market clearing in the fully competitive nal goods markets also implies: QCt = Ct; Q
I
t =
It +  I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1)Kt; QGt = Gt, Q
IG
t = IG;t:
Subsequently, combining the market clearing conditions for domestic intermediate goods
and nal goods results in the following representation of the nominal aggregate resource
constraint (4.38):
PY;tYt = PH;tHt + PX;tXt
= PC;tCt + PI;t (It +  I (Ii;t=Ii;t 1)Kt) + PG;tGt + PIG;tIG;t + PX;tXt
 PIM;t
 
IMCt
1   IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t

 y
IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t
 + IM It 1   IMI  IM It =QIt ; IMt 
 y
IMI
 
IM It =Q
I
t ; 
IM
t
 ! ,
(4.39)
where the last equality has been obtained using the demand functions for the bundles of the
domestic and foreign intermediate goods utilised in the production of the nal consumption
and investment goods, HCt and H
I
t as well as IM
C
t and IM
I
t , along with the prices of the
two types of nal goods, PC;t and PI;t.
Finally, the terms of trade (dened as the domestic price of imports relative to the price
of exports) are given by:
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ToTt =
PIM;t
PX;t
. (4.40)
4.4. Calibration
For most parameter values we generally resort to previous literature such as Coenen et
al. (2013). Table 4.1 reports chosen parameter values for preferences and technology. The
discount factor, , is 0.997, so that the steady state real interest rate is equal to 1.2%
per annum, while on the nominal side, the steady state ination rate is set to 1.9% on
an annual basis. The inverse of the Frisch labour elasticity is equal to 2. The share of
private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle, G, is 0.75. The elasticity of
substitution between private and government consumption goods, G, is set to 0.29 meaning
the two goods are strong complements.155 And the share of non-Ricardian households, !,
is equal to 0.18.
Turning to the models supply side, we set the capital share of output, , to 30% and the
depreciation rate of both private capital, , and public capital, G, to 0.015, implying an
annual depreciation rate of 6%. The elasticity of substitution between private and public
capital is K = 0:84, giving rise to moderate complementarities in the composite capital
stock. Furthermore, we assume b0 = 1 with one period time to build for public capital
and set the share of private investment in the aggregate investment bundle, G = 0:9. In
addition, we set the parameter for nominal wage stickiness W to 0.85, which means that
nominal wages are xed on average for 6.7 quarters. Regarding the domestic prices Calvo
parameter, we set H = 0:92.
156
155Bouakez and Rebei (2007) estimates the value of the elasticity of substitution as 0.332 based on U.S.
data. Leeper et al. (2009) also nd that G = 0:33 using U.S. data.
156These parameters are higher relative to previous researches.
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Table 4.2 shows parameter values for both monetary policy and scal policy. Our cali-
bration of the parameters of the monetary policy rule and the scal rule is generally based
on the values estimated by Coenen et al. (2013). In particular, we set the parameters of the
monetary policy rule such that R = 0:86,  = 1:73, 4 = 0:20, and 4Y = 0:11. We
set  b = 0:05,  d = 0 following Erceg and Linde (2010). This suggests that one percentage
point increase in the debt ratio raises the risk premium by 5 basis points.157 As regards the
scal sector, the feedback coe¢ cients on government expenditures vary depending on scal
instruments. For example, government investment has a marked feedback coe¢ cient on
government debt with IG;B =  0:18, whereas the coe¢ cient of government consumption
to debt is set to be small with G;B =  0:02. The coe¢ cients on output are not signicant
except government investmen with IG;Y = 0:55. On the revenue side, the parameters of
tax rates are set according to Forni et al. (2009).158 In addition, the parameters of the
debt target equation (4.35), d1 and d2 are set following Erceg and Linde (2013).
Table 4.3 shows steady state values. The expenditure shares of private consumption,
private investment, government consumption, and government investment are set to, re-
spectively, 57.5%, 18.3%, 21.5%, and 2.8% of nominal GDP, while the export and import
shares are set to 16% following Coenen et al. (2013). The steady state tax rates are also
calibrated according to Coenen et al. (2013). Regarding government debt, we assume the
debt target ratio of 60% per annum.
157As mentioned in Erceg and Linde (2010), these coe¢ cients are somewhat higher considering previous
works. However, these high coe¢ cients are appropriate for the analysis of scal consolidation during the
crisis.
158Coenen et al. (2013) omit the feedback of consumption tax and capital income tax.
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Table 4.1 Parameter values for preferences and technology
Households
 0.997 Discount factor
 0.57 Habit parameter
 2 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
G 0.75 Private consumption share in aggregate consumption
G 0.29 Elasticity of substitution between private and government consumption
! 0.18 Share of non-Ricardian households
W 0.85 Wages Calvo parameter
W 0.53 Wages indexation
Intermediate goods rms
 0.3 E¤ective capital share
 0.015 Depreciation rate of private capital
K 0.015 Depreciation rate of public capital
K 0.9 Private capital share in aggregate capital
b0 1 Time to build parameter
K 0.84 Elasticity of substitution between private and government investment
H 0.92 Domestic prices Calvo parameter
H 0.82 Domestic prices indexation
I 6.10 Investment adjustment costs
Final goods rms
C 1.98 Elasticity of substitution in consumption
I 1.75 Elasticity of substitution in investment
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Table 4.2. Parameter values for policy
Monetary policy coe¢ cient
 1.9 Ination target
R, 0.86 Interest rate smoothing
 1.73 Response on ination
4 0.20 Response to change in ination
4Y 0.11 Response to output growth
 b;  d 0.05, 0 Debt coe¢ cient of risk premium
Fiscal policy coe¢ cient
G;B, G;Y , G,  G -0.02, 0.06, 0.77, 0.06 Government consumption
IG;B, IG;Y , IG ,  IG -0.18, 0.55, 0.70, 0.93 Government investment
TR;B, TR;Y , TR,  TR -0.14, 0.10, 0.72, 0.81 Lump-sum transfers
C ;B, C ;Y , C ,  C 0.02, 0, 0.91, 0.31 Consumption tax
N ;B, N ;Y , N ,  N 0.0252, 0, 0.81, 0.11 Wage income tax
K ;B, K ;Y , K ,  K 0.0171, 0, 0.97, 0.0 Capital income tax
T;B, T;Y , T ,  T 0.07, 0, 0.68, 0.90 Lump-sum tax
Wh ;B, Wh ;Y , Wh ,  Wh -0.01, -0.05, 0.74, 0.26 Employeessocial security contribution


Wf ;B
, 

Wf ;Y
, 

Wf ,  Wf 0.01, -0.03, 0.69, 0.77 Employerssocial security contribution
d1 , d2 0.935, 0.0001 Autoregressive debt target
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Table 4.3. Steady state values
GDP components share
C
Y 0.575 Proportion of private consumption
I
Y 0.183 Proportion of private investment
G
Y 0.215 Proportion of government consumption
IG
Y 0.028 Proportion of government investment
X
Y 0.16 Proportion of export
IM
Y 0.16 Proportion of import
Tax rates
C 22.3 Consumption tax
N 11.6 Wage income tax
K 35.0 capital income tax
Wh 12.7 Employeessocial security contribution
Wf 13.2 Employerssocial security contribution
D 0.0 Prot income tax
Fiscal policy
BY 2.40 Government debt to GDP ratio
4.5. E¤ects of alternative scal policy strategies
This section estimates the macroeconomic e¤ects of alternative scal consolidation strate-
gies in the model explained above. We consider two scal consolidation strategies: the
expenditure based strategy and the revenue based strategy. These strategies are simu-
lated using a variety of scal instruments. The simulation results are assessed on a basis
of impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables. All responses are reported as the
percentage changes from their steady state.
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4.5.1. E¤ects of the expenditure based strategy
Figures 4-2  4-3 show the dynamic responses of economic variables to the temporary
scal policy shock under the expenditure-based strategy and the revenue-based strategy,
respectively. The temporary scal policy shock is equivalent to a one-percentage point
decline in the steady state output. Regarding simulations in this subsection, all dynamic
responses are displayed for the rst 10 years.
In Figure 4-2 we compare three scal instruments - government consumption, government
investment and lump-sum transfers. In the short run the cut in government consumption
is the most harmful to the economy because output immediately falls by 0.98%.159 The
reduction in government investment follows closely with the minimum value of -0.84%.
The cut in lump-sum transfers does not show a noticeable e¤ect with the trough of -0.01%.
This is because the lump-sum transfers are not an element of aggregate output and do not
directly reduce it. This result is contradictory to previous researches showing that the cut
in government investment is the most damaging in GDP and employment (e.g., Stahler
and Thomas, 2012). The response of consumption mainly causes this di¤erence and the
complementarity between private consumption and government consumption contributes to
the disparity of consumption.160 Of course, since the cut in government investment reduces
the aggregate capital and negatively a¤ects investment, it can be more damaging to the
economy in the long run. On the other hand, the responses of the debt ratio are similar
among the three scal instruments. The debt ratio remarkably falls on impact. According
to the scal rule the government expenditures rise and the taxes fall. As the scal rule has
a counterbalancing role on the debt ratio, it gradually approaches to the steady state. The
reduction in the debt ratio also translates into a fall in the risk premium. For example, in
159Since the pre-announcement coe¢ cient in government consumption is very low, most of the decline of
output takes place immediately.
160See Section 4.6.3.1.
172
the government consumption cut an decrease in the debt ratio by 1.22% in 5 quarter leads
to an improvement in the debt renancing cost by 0.24% on impact.
The transmission mechanism of scal consolidation is also di¤erent among the three
scal instruments. Starting with the government consumption, as government consumption
returns to the steady state over time, output is adusted quickly161 and turns positive in
7 years. In this case, the responses in consumption and net export contribute to the
output recovery. Specically, the decline in government consumption makes rms curtail
production and this has a negative impact on wage and employment. Thus, non-Ricardian
households who are not a¤ected by the wealth e¤ect reduce consumption in the short
run. As the wage rate and employment get back to the steady state with the output
recovery, their consumption improves. Ricardian households also reduce their consumption
for quite some time. This is because the decline in income overwhelms the positive wealth
e¤ect due to the debt reduction. Combining the two types of consumption, the aggregate
consumption falls. At the same time, the fall in output makes rms bring down prices and
ination rate falls. The drop in the ination rate decreases production costs and domestic
products become cheaper than foreign goods. This impact is displayed in an increase in
the terms of trade. Both this deterioration in the terms of trade and a modest increase in
the foreign exchange rate cause the increase in net export. In addition, real interest rates
fall immediately, and investment increases modestly. The fall in the risk premium further
reduces the real interest rates and contributes to the improvement in private investment.162
Regarding the e¤ects of the temporary cut in government investment, the time path of
output is similar to the cut in government consumption.163 The debt ratio also displays a
similar pattern. Private investment rises because the real interest rate signicantly falls.
161For example, output declines by 0.52% after one year and 0.14% after two years
162See Section 4.6.1.
163There is a di¤erence in instant responses between two shocks. The initial response of government
investment is much muter because of a higher pre-announcement coe¢ cient.
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The increase is smaller than the government consumption cut. The complementarity be-
tween private and government investment causes this di¤erence. In other words, the cut
in government investment further decreases physical capital used by the rms and this
o¤sets the positive e¤ect of lower interest rates on private investment. However, there
are remarkable di¤erences in the dynamics of the constituents of output compared to gov-
ernment consumption. Private consumption increases on impact, but does not display a
signicant change since then. Non-Ricardian households decrease their consumption be-
caue of the fall in wage income, whilst Ricardian householdsconsumption increases as the
positive wealth e¤ect due to expected future tax cuts dominates. The e¤ects on labour
supply and wage rate mostly look similar to government consumption. This is because a
lower accumulation in public capital reduces workersproductivity. A related reduction in
the production possibility frontier also increases ination in spite of the drop in the unit
labour cost. Since the foreign exchange rate rises in the short run, the export also increases.
The time path of import is similar to private consumption.
Now we analyse the e¤ects of lump-sum transfers. The cut in transfers results in a small
rise in output initially. Modest increases in private consumption and investment contribute
to the economic expansion. The reduction in transfers has a remarkable dampening e¤ect
on non-Ricardian householdsconsumption. Their consumption gets better because of the
recovery of transfers. For Recardian households, meanwhile, they slightly increase their
consumption because the loss in transfers counteracts the positive wealth e¤ect. Investment
increases due to the fall in the real interest rate. Since the response of consumption is partly
shared by the consumption of imported products, import displays a similar response to
private consumption. The depreciation in the foreign exchange rate also increases the
export.
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Figure 4-2. E¤ects of expenditure based strategy
4.5.2. E¤ects of the revenue based strategy
We now analyse the e¤ects of the revenue based strategies. Figure 4-3 summarises the
impulse response of positve shocks to the tax rate on, respectively, consumption, wage
income, and capital income, all set in order to obtain a decrease in revenues equal to 1%
of the steady state output. The e¤ects of the revenue based strategies vary depending on
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the taxes. The strongest drop in output on impact is found for the consumption tax with
the lowest value of -0.34% in quarter 2. The rise of the wage income tax reduces output by
0.30% on impact. In contrast, the hike of capital income tax increases output on impact.
This is a kind of the non-Keynesian e¤ect explained in section 4.2.4. The endogenous risk
premium causes this economic expansion.164 However, the increase of output gradually
diminishes and output begins to decrease in quarter 22. The debt reduction e¤ect is the
strongest in the wage income tax in the short run, followed by the consumption tax and
the capital income tax. As the scal rule raises the government expenditures and reduces
the taxes, the debt ratio gradually comes to the steady state. However, in the wage income
tax the debt ratio rather increases in 4 years. The risk premium appears to be similar to
the dynamics of the debt ratio because the former is positively correlated with the latter.
Macroeconomic variables in each tax hike change as follows. First, regarding the con-
sumption tax hike, the response of tax rate peaks at about 7.2%. The economic contraction
mainly comes from a reduction in comsumption because the consumption tax raises the
price of products.165 The fall in output slightly dampens the employment and the wage
rate also diminishes. The rms which face a decreasing demand of products cut prices and
the ination rate also starts to fall. This deation improves the terms of trade. Depreci-
ation in the foreign exchange rate with this favorable price e¤ect results in an increase in
the export. And the drop in private consumption and the improvement in the terms of
trade reduce the import for quite some time. Private investment increases in the short and
mid terms because the real interest rate generally falls.
Second, the initial rise in the wage income tax rate is nearly 12.1%. Private consumption
164See Section 4.6.1.
165The negative impact on consumption applies to two types of households. Non-Ricardian households
reduce consumption by the maximum of 6.2%. Ricardian households expect the fall in the future tax rate
and this positive wealth e¤ect increases their consumption. However, as this e¤ect is o¤set by the price
e¤ect of the tax hike, they also reduce private consumption.
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decreases because the tax hike dampens households income. Non-Ricardian households
noticeably decrease their consumption.166 Ricardian households rather raise consumption
on impact because of the positive wealth e¤ect. However, their consumption falls in quarter
30 because the e¤ect of income loss dominates the wealth e¤ect. The reduction in the public
debt makes other tax rates fall through the scal rule. These e¤ects contribute to a gradual
rebound in consumption. The favorable movement of the real interest rate increases private
investment. However, private investment becomes aggravated in quarter 9 because the rise
in the debt ratio increases the risk premium in quarter 12. The fall in output reduces
labour demand by the rms, and the aggregate employment also drops on impact. It soon
begins to increase in the following period due to the improvement in investment. Wage
slightly rises despite the fall in employment because the wage income tax hike also increases
the gross demand wage by employees (Stahler and Thomas, 2012). In addition, the foreign
exchange rate depreciates in the short run. As this movements of the foreign exchange rate
determines the time path of the export, the export increases. The import generally falls.
This time path of the import is similar to private consumption implying the demand of
foreign products accounts for a substantial portion of the change in private consumption.
Third, the hike in capital income tax rate has a notable e¤ect on investment. Private
investment falls with the minimum value of -2.11% in quarter 10 because the rms utilise
less capital in the production. Unlike investment, consumption slightly rises for the most
periods. This is because the e¤ect of capital income tax on comsumption is limited com-
pared to other taxes. Specially, non-Ricardian households are not a¤ected by the capital
income tax rate167, and their consumption does not show a notable change. In addition,
higher tax burden makes Ricardian households choose consumption instead of investment.
166Specially, non-Ricardian consumption declines by 12.9% on impact.
167Thus, on the occasion of the change in capital income tax, non-Ricardian households contribute to
stabilise output (Forni et al., 2009).
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Thus, they increase consumption in spite of the fall in capital income. Ination rate also
increases slightly. For the response of employment, there are two conicting e¤ects. On the
one hand, capital can be substituted with labour because of the higher tax rate. On the
other hand, the decrease of production reduces employment. In this case, the employment
persistently rises because the former e¤ect is bigger than the latter one. Depreciation in
the foreign exchange rate and the increase in the terms of trade raise net export in the
short run. As a result, output increases temporarily owing to the increases in consumption
and net export. However, output begins to decline in quarter 22 because the persistent
decrease of investment shrinks the production capability and this has a negative impact on
net export.
To list scal instruments in the order to have a bigger impact in output is as follows : (i)
the government consumption cut (ii) the government investment cut (iii) the consumption
tax hike (iv) the wage income tax hike (v) the lump-sum transfers cut (vi) the capital income
tax hike. Between the expenditure based strategies and the revenue based strategies, much
stronger impact on output is found for the former. This result is not consistent with the
previous literature.168 This distinction may result from the structure of the model such as
the complementarity between private and government consumption, and the endogenous
risk premium.169 As the debt ratio increases, the real interest rate further rises through the
endogenous risk premium. This worsens investment and increases the output loss. Since
the change of the debt ratio is bigger in the tax hike, the e¤ect of the endogenous risk
premium is also more noticeable in the tax hike. Thus, when the endogenous risk premium
is omitted, the result of scal consolidation is totally di¤erent.170
In addition, the revenue based strategies are more e¤ective in the government debt
168The previous literature generally shows that the tax hike is much more detrimental to the economy
(e.g., Guajardo et al., 2014; Alesina et al., 2015).
169We examine the impact of the structure of the model in the next section.
170See Chapter 4.6.1.
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reduction. This suggests that the tax hike is superior to the expenditure based strategy.
The tax hike is not only recommendable to decrease the government debt, but also has the
advantage in preventing more serious economic downturn. However, we need to carefully
interpret this result because its feasibility depends on the structure of the model.
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Figure 4-3. E¤ects of revenue based strategy
4.6. Robustness analysis
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In this section, we provide additional robustness analysis regarding the structure and the
parameterisation of the model. We begin by modifying the endogenous risk premium of
government bonds which responds to the debt ratio. Then, we show that the scal rule
is an important factor deciding the e¤ects of scal consolidation. Finally, we investigate
the sensitivity of our ndings to the parameters determining the complementarity between
government consumption and private consumption.
4.6.1. Endogenous risk premium of government bonds
In the baseline model, we assume that the interest rate faced by the government equals the
policy rate set by the monetary authority plus the risk premium which depends positively
on the government debt. In this subsection, we simulate the e¤ect of scal consolidation
to estimate the e¤ects of the endogenous risk premium mechanism on economic variables
when the mechanism is omitted. Figure 4-4 4-5 report the results of this experiment in
the expenditure based strategy and the revenue based strategy, respectively.
We nd that the e¤ects of the risk premium schemes di¤er considerably depending
on the scal instruments. Regarding the expenditure based strategies in Figure 4-4, the
endogenous risk premium does not make signicant impacts on output. Compared to
Figure 4-2 the output contraction is bigger, but the di¤erence is not noticeable. The
troughs of each scal instrument are as follows: the government consumption cut is -
1.05%; the government investment cut is -0.94%; the lump-sum transfers cut is -0.07%.
The impact on the debt ratio is also similar to the baseline model. Even though the e¤ects
are not noticeable, the endogenous risk premium has favorable e¤ects on investment and
private consumption. In the short run, the endogenous risk premium based on the debt
ratio falls. This stimulates investment and private consumption through the fall in the real
interest rate. Thus, the endogenous risk premium reduces the output loss. This is labelled
as the non-Keynesian e¤ect by some papers.
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Regarding the revenue based strategies in Figure 4-5, the endogenous risk premium
makes notable di¤erences. The output decrease is much bigger than the baseline model.
Specically, the consumption tax hike has the minimum value of -1.33%. The wage income
tax hike also shows an amplied e¤ect on output with the lowest value of -1.04%. The
capital income tax hike reduces output with the trough of -0.26% unlike the baseline
model. We nd that the endogenous risk premium further crowds in private consumption
and investment through the decline in the real interest rate. This di¤erence comes from the
time paths of the debt ratio. Since the debt ratio further declines, the risk premium also
falls. Specically, in Figure 4-4 the maximum decrease of the debt ratio is -1.29% with the
government investment cut, and the risk premium falls by -0.26%. In contrast, in Figure
4-5 the value builds up to -12.04% with the wage income tax hike. When the endogenous
risk premium is omitted, this favorable e¤ect vanishes and the real interest rate bounds.
Therefore, the existence of the endogenous risk premium has much more favorable e¤ects
on output in revenue based strategies.
In addition, when the risk premium is omitted, the scale of the impact on output among
the scal instruments changes. Arranging the scal instruments in the order to have greater
inuence is as follows: (i) the consumption tax hike (ii) the government consumption cut
(iii) the wage income tax hike (iv) the government investment cut (v) the capital income tax
hike (vi) the transfers cut. The negative e¤ect of the tax hike is larger than the expenditure
based strategy when the risk premium mechanism is omitted. This result follows the
previous literature (e.g., Guajardo et al., 2014; Alesina et al., 2015).171 This suggests that
the endogenous risk premium signicantly a¤ects the e¤ect of the scal consolidation. This
is also consistent with the notion that the response of private investment is very important
for the e¤ect of the scal consolidation.
171This conrms that the discrepancy between the baseline result in Section 4.5 and the previous literature
is mainly caused by the endogenous risk premium mechanism.
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Thus, there is a scal policy tradeo¤. The tax hike is superior to the government
expenditure cut for the reduction of the debt ratio. However, we need to take the possibility
of more serious economic downturn with the tax hike.
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Figure 4-4. E¤ects of expenditure based strategy (no risk premium)
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Figure 4-5. E¤ects of revenue based strategy (no risk premium)
4.6.2. Fiscal rule
Under our baseline calibration, the government expenditures respond to the evolution of
both output and public debt, whereas the tax rates correlate with public debt. In this
section, we simulate two more versions of the scal rule to analyse how adjustments in
the scal rule a¤ect the impact of scal consolidation on macroeconomic variables. First,
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only three government expenditures - government consumption, investment, and lump-
sum transfers - are adjusted. Second, only three distortionary taxes - consumption tax,
wage income and capital income taxes - are adjusted. Figure 4-6 4-7 plot the impulse
responses following the expenditures adjusted rule, while Figure 4-8  4-9 illustrate the
impulse responses following the taxes adjusted rule.
As in the baseline model shown in Figure 4-2, in Figure 4-6 and 4-8 the declines in
government expenditures decrease both employment and output on impact. The govern-
ment expenditure cut crowds in investment and its positive wealth e¤ect leads Ricardian
householdsconsumption to rise in the short run.172 The debt ratio generally drops. This
makes the real interest rate drop with decreasing risk premium. This raises investment
and reduces the fall in output. In the two additional rules the economic contraction is
relatively modest compared to the baseline result. However, the di¤erence is negligible. As
the absolute size of de-leveraging is small, there is little to create the di¤erence.
In contrast, the e¤ects of the revenue based srategies shown in Figure 4-7 and 4-9 are
considerably di¤erent from the baseline result. Specially, we nd that output increases
in spite of the tax hike. This di¤erence can be explained by the impact of the scal rule
on the debt ratio. In the case of scal consolidation the scal rule makes the government
expenditure rise and the tax rate fall. Thus, the level of deleverage relatively declines.
Without one of the two scal rules, the debt ratio sharply declines in relative to the base-
line result. This strengthens the positive wealth e¤ect and spurs Ricardian households
consumption. Thus, the rms increase employment and this accelerates investment by
increasing the productivity of capital. Also, the real interest rate considerably declines
through the e¤ect of the debt on the risk premium. This contributes to increasing invest-
ment. The surplus in net export also rises by the depreciation of the real exchange rate.
172An exception is government consumption. Ricardian households reduce private consumption because
of the complementarity between government consumption and private consumption.
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Ultimately, output increases persistently in spite of scal consolidation. In addition, we
can nd a little di¤erence between the expenditure adjusted rule and the tax adjusted rule.
The expenditure adjusted rule shows better economic performance than the tax adjusted
rule. This is because the adjustment of the tax rate in the scal rule leads to more change
in the debt ratio. Thus, in the expenditure adjusted rule the debt ratio declines further
more than the tax adjusted rule and its non-Keynesian e¤ect is relatively amplied.
In summary, the results imply that the scal rules signicantly a¤ect the e¤ects of scal
consolidation. This is consistent with Leeper et al. (2010). In addition, the inuences of
the scal rules are relatively stronger in the revenues based strategies than the expenditures
based strategies.
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Figure 4-6. E¤ects of expenditure based strategy (expenditure adjusted rule)
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Figure 4-7. E¤ects of revenue based strategy (expenditure adjusted rule)
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Figure 4-8. E¤ects of expenditure based strategy (tax adjusted rule)
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Figure 4-9. E¤ects of revenue based strategy (tax adjusted rule)
4.6.3. Impact of the relationship between private consump-
tion and government consumption
The baseline model assumes that government consumption is a complement with private
consumption. However, in this section we allow government consumption to be a less close
complement or a substitute with private consumption to examine the e¤ects of comple-
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mentarity between private consumption and government consumption. Figure 4-10 displays
the e¤ects of the negative government consumption shock depending on di¤erent values of
complementarity. We consider three di¤erent scenarios by setting the elasticity of substitu-
tion between private and government consumption, G, to 0.29, 0.8, and 1.5, respectively.
The bigger G is, the larger crowding-out e¤ect on private consumption the government
consumption shock generates. Thus, when G is set to 0.8, and 1.5, private consumption
begins to increase in the short run. For higher values of G, the cut in government spending
raises the marginal utility of private consumption, which strengthens the positive wealth
(Bouakez and Rebei, 2007). This reinforced wealth e¤ect is illustrated in the increase in
Ricardian householdsconsumption. On the other hand, higher values of G alleviates an
increase in investment. More increases in private consumption also cause a rise in the im-
port. However, since the positive e¤ect on consumption dominates other negative impacts,
the degree of output reduction decreases with higher values of G. Similarly, the degree of
reduction in employment and wage decreases.
In addition, under higher values of G, the e¤ect of government consumption shock
on output is rather less than other scal instruments. Specically, as shown in Figure
4-11, when G is calibrated to 0.8, the immediate e¤ect on output is -0.60%. This value
is smaller than the dampening e¤ect of government investment with the lowest value of
-0.80%. We nd that the negative e¤ects of the distortionary tax hike also become larger
than before in Figure 4-12. Specically, the consumption tax hike has the largest negative
e¤ect on output with the minimum value of -0.38%. The wage income tax hike has smaller
contractive e¤ects with the lowest values of -0.21.
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Figure 4-10. E¤ects of complementarity between private and government consumption
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Figure 4-11. E¤ects of expenditure based strategy (weak complementarity)
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Figure 4-12. E¤ects of revenue based strategy (weak complementarity)
4.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine the macroeconomic e¤ects of alternative scal consolidation
strategies. In order to achieve this objective, we develop the open economy DSGE model
with a comprehensive scal block. The model is based on the ECBs NAWM described
by Coenen et al. (2013), but it is a little di¤erent. We divide the scal expenditure side
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into government consumption, government investment, and lump-sum transfers. We also
consider a variety of distortionary taxes on the scal revenues side. Our model incorporates
the endogenous risk premium of government bonds and the scal rule. It is calibrated for
the euro area.
We simulate the tax hike as well as the reduction of the government expenditure equiv-
alent to a one percentage point of GDP to achieve scal consolidation. The results show
that there are remarkable variations in the responses of macroeconomic variables following
scal consolidation strategies. Fiscal consolidation is found to dampen the economy in the
short run, but the magnitude of the e¤ect varies across scal instruments. Specically, the
e¤ect of the government consumption cut is worst in the short run. Even if the cut in
government investment negatively a¤ects the economy, its e¤ect is less than government
consumption. This result is associated with the complementarity between private con-
sumption and government consumption. The tax hike also has smaller e¤ects on impact
than the government consumption cut. Among the taxes, the consumption tax hike has
the largest negative impact on output in the short run. The wage income tax hike shows
less reduction of output than the consumption tax hike. The capital income tax hike rather
increases output in spite of scal consolidation. This is because the wealth e¤ect due to
higher tax burden on investment increases Ricardian households consumption and the
favorable movement of the exchange rate increases the net export.
We also nd that both the endogenous risk premium and the scal rule have consid-
erable inuences over the e¤ects of scal consolidation. Specially, the inuence of these
mechanisms is relatively stronger in the revenues based strategies than the expenditures
based strategies. This is because in the revenue based strategies the debt ratio decreases
more signicantly than the expenditure based strategies. As the real interest rate falls with
the endogenous risk premium, both private consumption and investment are crowded in.
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Therefore, when the endogenous risk premium is excluded from the model, the e¤ect of the
revenue based strategies is larger than the expenditures based strategies. Specically, the
consumption tax cut has the largest negative impact on output unlike the baseline model.
In addition, the scal rule that only the government expenditures or the tax rates are
adjusted is superior to the baseline scal rule because the economic downturn is smaller
and the magnitude of the debt restructuring is larger. This result is associated with the
fact that the number of the scal instruments responding to output and debt decreases and
the non-Keynesian e¤ect is strengthened in the two alternative scal rule. Furthermore,
the expenditure adjusted rule is superior to the tax adjusted rule. The tax rates only
respond to the debt ratio, whilst the expenditures respond to both output and the debt
ratio. Thus, in the tax adjusted rule the non-Keynesian e¤ect is constrained.
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Appendix
A. The model appendix
Apart from the extensions by both Coenen et al. (2013) and our model, this model appendix
follows mostly Christo¤el et al. (2008), with minor changes to unify the notation.
A.1. Price setting of the domestic intermediate goods rms
The intermediate goods rm, taking the rental cost of capital, RK;t, and the wage, Wt, as
given, uses optimally capital and labour services and minimises total input cost RK;t eKf;t+
(1 + 
Wf
t )WtNf;t subject to the technology constraint (4.25). Dening as MCf;t the La-
grange multiplier associated with the technology constraint (4.25)173, the rst-order con-
ditions of the rms cost minimisation problem with respect to capital and labour inputs
are given, respectively, by
eKf;t : Yf;t + zt eKf;t MCf;t = RK;t (A1)
Nf;t : (1  ) Yf;t + zt 
Nf;t
MCf;t = (1 + 
Wf
t )Wt (A2)
or, more compactly,

1  
Nf;teKf;t = RK;t(1 + Wft )Wt (A3)
Marginal cost is given by a following equation because the rms face the same marginal
cost174.
173MCf;t can be interpreted as nominal marginal cost because it computes the shadow price of varying
the use of capital and labour services (Christo¤el et al., 2008).
174This is because all rms are subject to the same production technology and the same input prices.
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MCt =
(RK;t)


1 + 
Wf
t

Wt
1 
tz
1 
t 
1  (1  )1  (A4)
The rms are permitted to re-set their prices each period with probability 1   H or
1   X , depending on whether the product is sold in the domestic or the foreign market.
Dening as PH;f;t the domestic price of good f and as PX;f;t its foreign price, all rms that
are permitted to reset their prices in a given period t choose the same price ePH;t = ePH;f;t
and ePX;t = ePX;f;t, depending on the market of destination. Those rms which are not
permitted to optimise its price can adjust their prices according to an average of past
intermediate goods ination and the ination target of the domestic monetary authority:
PH;f;t = 
H
H;t 1
1 H
t PH;f;t 1, (A5)
PX;f;t = 
X
X;t 1
1 X
t PX;f;t 1. (A6)
where H;t 1 = PH;t 1=PH;t 2, X;t 1 = PX;t 1=PX;t 2, t is the ination target, H and
X are indexation parameters determining the weight on past ination.
Each rm f that is allowed to optimally reset its domestic and foreign price in period t
maximises the discounted sum of its expected nominal prots,
Et
" 1X
k=0
t;t+k

kHDH;f;t+k + 
k
XDX;f;t+k
#
, (A7)
subject to the price-indexation schemes (A5) and (A6) and taking as given domestic and
foreign demand for its di¤erentiated output, Hf;t and Xf;t. DH;f;t and DX;f;t are period t
nominal prots yielded in the domestic and foreign markets, respectively, and are given by
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DH;f;t = PH;f;tHf;t  MCtHf;t, (A8)
DX;f;t = PX;f;tXf;t  MCtXf;t. (A9)
These nominal prots are distributed as dividends to the households. Thus, the rst
order condition characterising the rms optimal pricing decision for its output sold in the
domestic market is given by
Et
" 1X
k=0
kHt;t+k

yH;t+k ePH;t   'Ht+kMCt+kHf;t+k
#
= 0 (A10)
where we replace the equation (A5), noting that PH;f;t+k = 
y
H;t;t+k
ePH;t with yH;t;t+k =
ks=1
H
H;t+s 1
1 H
t+s . This equation means that the optimal price is adjusted to equate the
rms discounted sum of expected revenues to the discounted sum of expected marginal
cost. In the absence of price staggering (H = 0), the factor '
H
t is a time-varing markup
of the price charged in domestic markets over nominal marginal cost, indicating the degree
of monopoly power on the part of the intermediate goods rm.
We obtain a similar condition for its output sold in the foreign market:
Et
" 1X
k=0
kXt;t+k

yX;t+k ePX;t   'Xt+kMCt+kXf;t+k
#
= 0 (A11)
where the equation (A6) also is substituted with a equation showing that PX;f;t+k =
yX;t;t+k ePX;t with yX;t;t+k = ks=1XX;t+s 11 Xt+s .
On the basis of equation (A5) and equation (A10), respectively, the aggregate price
index PH;t is decided by this equation:
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PH;t =

(1  H)
 ePH;t1=1 'Ht + H HH;t 11 Ht PH;t 11=1 'Ht 1 'Ht (A12)
Also PX;t is given by a similar equation:
PX;t =

(1  X)
 ePX;t1=1 'Xt + X XX;t 11 Xt PX;t 11=1 'Xt 1 'Xt (A13)
A.2. Domestic nal goods producers
The representative rm producing the non-tradable nal private consumption good, QCt ,
integrates a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, HCt , with a bundle of
imported foreign intermediate goods, IMCt , using a constant-returns-to-scale (CES) tech-
nology,
QCt =
h

1=C
C
 
HCt
1 1=C + (1  C)1=C   1   IMC  IMCt =QCt ; IMt  IMCt 1 1=CiC=C 1
(A14)
where C denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the distinct bundles
of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, while the parameter C indicates the home
bias in the production of the consumption goods.
The nal goods producers incur a cost  IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t

when varying the use of
the bundle of imported goods in producing the consumption good,
 IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t

=
IMC
2
  
IMt
 1=
IMC
IMCt =Q
C
t
IMCt 1=QCt 1
  1
!2
(A15)
with the import adjustment cost parameter IMC > 0. As a result, the import share is
relatively unresponsive in the short run to changes in the relative price of the bundle of
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imported goods, while the level of imports is permitted to jump in response to changes in
overall demand. We will refer to IMt as an import demand shock.
Dening asHCf;t and IM
C
f;t the use of the di¤erentiated output produced by the domestic
intermediate goods rm f and the di¤erentiated output supplied by the foreign exporter
f, respectively, we have
HCt =
Z 1
0
 
HCf;t
1='Ht df'Ht , (A16)
IMCt =
Z 1
0
 
IMCf;t
1='t df't , (A17)
where the markup parameters in the markets for domestic and imported intermediate
goods 'Ht , '

t > 1 are inversely related to the intra-temporal elasticities of substitution
between di¤erentiated outputs supplied by the domestic rms and the foreign exporters,
respectively, with 'Ht =('
H
t   1) > 1 and 't =('t   1) > 1.
With nominal prices for the di¤erentiated goods f and f being set in monopolistically
competitive markets, the nal goods rm takes their prices PH;f;t and PIM;f;t as given and
chooses the optimal use of the di¤erentiated goods f and f by minimising the expenditure
for the bundles of di¤erentiated goods,
R 1
0 PH;f;tH
C
f;t and
R 1
0 PIM;f;tIM
C
f;t, subject to the
aggregation constraints (A16) and (A17). This yields the following demand equations for
the di¤erentiated goods f and f:
HCf;t =

PH;f;t
PH;t
 'Ht ='Ht  1
HCt , (A18)
IMCf;t =

PIM;f;t
PIM;t
 't ='t 1
IMCt , (A19)
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where PH;t =
hR 1
0 (PH;f;t)
1=1 'Ht df
i1 'Ht
, PIM;t =
hR 1
0 (PIM;f;t)
1=1 't df
i1 't
are the
aggregate price indexes for the bundles of domestic and imported intermediate goods,
respectively.
Next, taking the price indexes PH;t and PIM;t as given, the consumption goods rm
chooses the combination of the domestic and foreign intermediate goods bundles HCt and
IMCt that minimises PH;tH
C
t + PIM;tIM
C
t subject to aggregation constraint (A14).
HCt = C;t

PH;t
PC;t
 C
QCt , (A20)
IMCt = (1  C;t)
 
PIM;t
PC;t 
y
IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t
! C QCt
1   IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t
 , (A21)
where PC;t =
"
C;t (PH;t)
1 C + (1  C;t)

PIM;t
 y
IMC
(IMCt =QCt ;IMt )
1 C#1=1 C
is the price
of a unit of the private consumption good and  y
IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t

= 1  IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t
 
 
0
IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t

IMCt .
The representative rm producing the non-tradable nal private investment good, QIt , is
modelled in an analogous manner. Specically, the rm combines its purchase of a bundle
of domestically-produced intermediate good, HIt , with the purchase of a bundle of imported
foreign intermediate goods, IM It , using a constant returns to scale (CES) technology,
QIt =
h

1=I
I
 
HIt
I 1=I + (1  I)1=I   1   IMI  IM It =QIt ; IMt  IM It I 1=IiI=I 1 ,
(A22)
where I denotes the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between the distinct bundles
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of domestic and foreign intermediate inputs, while the parameter I measures the home bias
in the production of the investment good. All other variables related to the production of
the investment good import adjustment cost,  IMI
 
IM It =Q
I
t ; 
IM
t

: the optimal demand
for rm-specic and bundled domestic and foreign intermediate goods, HIf;t, H
I
t and IM
I
f;t,
IM It , respectively; as well as the price of a unit of the investment good, PI;t are dened
or derived in a manner analogous to that for the consumption good.
In contrast, the non-tradable nal public consumption good, QGt , is assumed to be a
composite made only of domestic intermediate goods; that is, QGt = H
G
t with
HGt =
Z 1
0
 
HGf;t
1='Ht df'Ht . (A23)
Hence, the optimal demand for the di¤erentiated intermediate good f is given by
HGf;t =

PH;f;t
PH;t
 'Ht ='Ht  1
HGt , (A24)
and the price of a unit of the public consumption good is PG;t = PH;t.
Aggregating across the three nal goods rms, we obtain the following aggregate demand
equation for domestic and foreign intermediate goods f and f.
Hf;t = H
C
f;t +H
I
f;t +H
G
f;t =

PH;f;t
PH;t
 'Ht ='Ht  1
Ht, (A25)
IMf;t = IM
C
f;t + IM
I
f;t =

PIM;f;t
PIM;t
 't ='t 1
IMt, (A26)
where Ht = HCt +H
I
t +H
G
t and IMt = IM
C
t + IM
I
t .
A.3. Foreign intermediate goods rms
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Each foreign intermediate goods rm f sells its di¤erentiated good Y f;t in domestic market
under monopolistic competition, setting the price in local (thata is, domestic) currency, as
in Betts and Devereux (1996). Again, there is sluggish price adjustment due to nominal
rigidities following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Specically, only a fraction 1   of the
foreign intermediate goods rms is allowed to adjust its price each period and has access
to the following indexation scheme with parameter :
PIM;f;t = 

IM;t 1
1 
t PIM;f;t 1, (A27)
where PIM;f;t = P X;f;t and IM;t 1 = PIM;t 1=PIM;t 2 with PIM;t = P

X;t. Here, we
have utilised the fact that, with foreign exporters setting prices in domestic currency, the
price of the intermediate good imported from abroad (the import price index of the home
country) is equal to the price changed by the foreign exporter in the home country (the
export price index of the foreign country).
Each foreign exporter f receiving permission to optimally reset its price in period t
maximises the discounted sum of its expected nominal prots,
Et
" 1X
k=0
t;t+k(
)kDf;t+k=St+k
#
, (A28)
subject to the price-indexation schemes (A27) and the domestic (import) demand for its
di¤erentiated output, IMf;t = Xf , where period t nominal prots (net of xed costs)
Df;t is given by
Df;t = PIM;f;tIMf;t  MCt IMf;t (A29)
with MCt = St (PO;t)
!

P Y;t
1 !
representing the foreign exporters nominal marginal
cost. The latter is dened as a simple geometric average of the price of oil, PO;t, and foreign
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prices, P Y;t, with !
 measuring the share of oil in imports.
Hence, we obtain the following rst order condition characterising the foreign exporters
optimal pricing decision for its output sold in the domestic market.
Et
" 1X
k=0
()k t;t+k

yIM;t+k ePIM;t   't+kMCt+k IMf;t+k=St+k
#
= 0, (A30)
where we have substituted the indexation scheme (A27), noting that PIM;f;t+k = 
y
IM;t;t+k
ePIM;t
with yIM;t;t+k = 
k
s=1

IM;t+s 1
1 
t+s .
The associated aggregate index of price contracts for the di¤erentiated products sold in
domestic markets evolves according to
PIM;t =

(1  )
 ePIM;t1=1 't +  IM;t 11 t PIM;t 11=1 't 1 't . (A31)
A.4. Foreign retail rms
We assume that a representative foreign retail rm combines the purchases of the di¤eren-
tiated goods, Xf;t, that are produced by the domestic intermediate goods rm f and sold
abroad, using a constant returns to scale technology,
Xt =
Z 1
0
(Xf;t)
1='Xt df
'Xt
, (A32)
where the parameter 'Xt is inversely related to the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between the di¤erentiated goods supplied by the domestic rms, with 'Xt =('
X
t   1) > 1.
With nomianl prices for the exported intermediate goods f being set in producer cur-
rency under monopolistic competition, the foreign retailer takes its input prices PX;f;t=St as
given and decides on the optimal use of the di¤erentiated inputs by minimising the expen-
diture for the bundle of di¤erentiated goods,
R 1
0 PX;f;t=StXf;tdf , aubject to the aggregation
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constraint (A32). This yields the following demand equation for the di¤erentiated good f :
Xf;t =

PX;f;t
PX;t
 'Xt ='Xt  1
Xt, (A33)
where PX;t =
hR 1
0 (PX;f;t)
1=1 'Xt df
i1 'Xt
is the aggregate price index for the bundle of
exported domestic intermediate goods in producer currency.
The retailer takes the aggregate price index PX;t as given and supplies the quantity of
the export bundle, Xt, that satises foreign demand. The latter is given by an equation
similar in structure to the domestic import equation,
Xt = 

0@ PX;t=St
P c;X;t 
y
X

Xt=Y
d;
t ; 
X
t

1A  Y d;t
1   X

Xt=Y
d;
t ; 
X
t
 (A34)
with  denoting the price elasticity of exports. Here  represents the export share of the
domestic intermediate goods rms, which captures the foreign non-price related preferences
for domestic goods. The variable P c;X;t denotes the price of foreign rms that are competing
with the domestic rms in their export markets, Y d;t is a measure of overall foreign demand,
and  X

Xt=Y
d;
t ; 
X
t

is an adjustment cost function given by
 X

Xt=Y
d;
t ; 
X
t

=

2
  
Xt
 1= Xt=Y d;t
Xt 1=Y
d;
t 1
  1
!2
(A35)
and  yX

Xt=Y
d;
t ; 
X
t

= 1   X

Xt=Y
d;
t ; 
X
t

   0X

Xt=Y
d;
t ; 
X
t

Xt.
A.5. Market clearing and aggregate resource constraint
A.5.1. Market clearing in the markets for domestic intermediate goods
Each intermediate goods producer f acts as price setter in domestic and foreign monopo-
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listically competitive markets. Hence, in equilibrium the supply of its di¤erentiated output
needs to equal domestic and foreign demand,
Yf;t = Hf;t +Xf;t (A36)
Aggregating over the continuum of rms f , we obtain the following aggregate resource
constraint:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yf;tdf =
Z 1
0
Hf;tdf +
Z 1
0
Xf;tdf
=
Z 1
0

PH;f;t
PH;t
 'Ht ='Ht  1
Htdt+
Z 1
0

PX;f;t
PX;t
 'Xt ='Xt  1
Xtdt
=
^
sH;tHt +
^
sX;tXt, (A37)
where the variables
^
sH;t =
R 1
0

PH;f;t
PH;t
 'Ht ='Ht  1
dt,
^
sX;t =
R 1
0

PX;f;t
PX;t
 'Xt ='Xt  1
dt mea-
sures the degree of price dispersion across the di¤erentiated goods f sold either domestically
or abroad.
Given the optimal price setting strategies for intermediate goods rms, the two measures
of price dispersion evolve according to
^
sH;t = (1  H)
 ePH;t
PH;t
! 'Ht ='Ht  1
+H
 
H;t

H
H;t 1
1 H
t PH;t 1
! 'Ht ='Ht  1
^
sH;t 1, (A38)
^
sX;t = (1  X)
 ePX;t
PX;t
! 'Xt ='Xt  1
+X
 
X;t

X
X;t 1
1 X
t PX;t 1
! 'Xt ='Xt  1
^
sX;t 1, (A39)
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where ePH;t and ePX;t denote the optimal price contracts chosen by those rms that have
received permission to reset their prices in their home and foreign markets in period t, and
H;t = PH;t=PH;t 1 and X;t = PX;t=PX;t 1.
Similarly, in nominal terms we have
PY;tYt =
Z 1
0
PH;f;tHf;tdf +
Z 1
0
PX;f;tXf;tdf
= Ht
Z 1
0
PH;f;t

PH;f;t
PH;t
 'Ht ='Ht  1
dt+Xt
Z 1
0
PX;f;t

PX;f;t
PX;t
 'Xt ='Xt  1
dt
= PH;tHt + PX;tXt; (A40)
where the second to last equality has been obtained using the aggregate demand relation-
ships for the domestic intermediate goods sold in home and foreign markets, and , while
the last equality has been obtained using the properties of the aggregate price indexes Hf;t
and Xf;t.
Finally, as regards aggregate intermediate goods rmsprots, we have
Dt =
Z 1
0
DH;f;tdf +
Z 1
0
DX;f;tdf
= PH;tHt + PX;tXt  MCt

^
sH;tHt +
^
sX;tXt +  zt

(A41)
or, written as prot share,
sD;t =
Dt
PY;tYt
= 1  MCt
PY;t
^
sH;tHt +
^
sX;tXt +  zt
Yt
. (A42)
A.5.2. Market clearing in the markets for imported intermediate goods
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Each foreign exporter f acts as price setter for its di¤erentiated output in domestic mo-
nopolistically competitive markets. Hence, in equilibrium the supply of its di¤erentiated
output needs to equal demand, IMf;t. Aggregating over the continuum of rms f, we
have
Z 1
0
IMf;tdf
 =
Z 1
0

PIM;f;t
PIM;t
 't ='t 1
IMtdf

=
^
s IM;tIMt; (A43)
where the variable
^
s IM;t =
R 1
0

PIM;f;t
PIM;t
 't ='t 1
df measures the degree of price dis-
persion across the di¤erentiated goods f. Given the optimal price setting strategies for
foreign exporters, the measure of price dispersion evolves according to
^
s IM;t = (1  )
 ePIM;t
PIM;t
! 't ='t 1
+ 
 
IM;t


IM;t 1
1 
t PIM;t 1
! 't ='t 1
^
s IM;t 1,
where ePIM;t denotes the optimal price contracts chosen by those exporters that have re-
ceived permission to reset their prices in period t, and IM;t = PIM;t=PIM;t 1.
A.5.3. Market clearing in the nal goods markets
Market clearing in the fully competitive nal goods markets implies:
QCt = Ct, (A44)
QIt = It +  u(ut)Kt, (A45)
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QGt = Gt. (A46)
Subsequently, combining the market clearing conditions for domestic intermediate goods
and nal goods results in the following representation of the nominal aggregate resource
constraint (A40):
PY;tYt = PH;tHt + PX;tXt
= PC;tCt + PI;t (It +  u(ut)Kt) + PG;tGt + PX;tXt
 PIM;t
 
IMCt
1   IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t

 y
IMC
 
IMCt =Q
C
t ; 
IM
t
 + IM It 1   IMI  IM It =QIt ; IMt 
 y
IMI
 
IM It =Q
I
t ; 
IM
t
 ! ,
(A47)
where the last equality has been obtained using the demand functions for the bundles of the
domestic and foreign intermediate goods utilised in the production of the nal consumption
and investment goods, HCt and H
I
t as well as IM
C
t and IM
I
t , along with the prices of the
two types of nal goods, PC;t and PI;t.
A.5..4. Market clearing in the domestic government bond market
The equilibrium bolding of domestic government bonds evolove over time according to the
scal authoritys budget constraint, reecting the scal authoritys need to issue debt in
order to nance its debt.
As a given point in time , the supply of internationally traded foreign bonds is fully elastic
and matches the (net) holding of foreign bonds accumulated by domestic households,
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Bt =
Z 1
0
Bh;tdh. (A48)
A.5.5. Net foreign assets, trade balance and terms of trade
The domestic economys net foreign assets equal the economy wide net holdings of foreign
bonds (denominated in foreign currency) and evolve according to
(Rt )
 1Bt+1 = B

t +
TBt
St
, (A49)
where TBt = PX;tXt   PIM;tIMt is the domestic economys trade balance. For reporting
purposes, the net foreign assets, as well as the trade balance, are conveniently expressed
as a share of domestic output, with sB;t+1 = StBt+1=PY;tYt and sTB;t = TBt=PY;tYt,
respectively.
Finally, the terms of trade (dened as the domestic price of imports relative to the price
of exports) are given by:
ToTt =
PIM;t
PX;t
. (A50)
B. The linearized model
In this appendix we provide the log-linear form of the model. We represent all transformed
variables by lower-case letters. We also dene the steady state value of a variable by
dropping the time subscript t and indicate the logarithmic deviation from its steady-state
value by a hat (b).
bt =   1
1  g 1z
bect + g 1z
1  g 1z
bect 1   g 1z
1  g 1z
bgz;t   1
1 + C
bCt +bCt (B1)
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bpI;t = bQt +bIt + Ig2z  Et hbit+1i bit (B2)
 
bit  bit 1+ Et [bgz;t+1   bgz;t]
bqt =  (1  )
gz
Et [bqt+1] + Et hbt+1i  bt   Et [bgz;t+1] (B3)
 
 
1  K
gz
Et

1
1  K bKt+1   bRK;t+1

+
pI
gz
Et
h
KbpI;t+1 + bKt+1i
Et
hbt+1i  bt   Et [bgz;t+1] + brg;t   Et [bC;t+1] = 0 (B4)
brg;t   brt = Et [bst+1]  bst + Et bY;t+1   bY;t+1  BbsB;t+1 (B5)
bkt+1 = (1  ) g 1z bkt   (1  ) g 1z bgz;t (B6)
+
 
1  (1  ) g 1z
bIt +  1  (1  ) g 1z bit
bwt = 
1 + 
Et [ bwt+1] + 1
1 + 
bwt 1 + 
1 + 
Et [bC;t+1] (B7)
 1 + W
1 + 
bC;t + 1
1 + 
bC;t 1    (1  W )
1 + 
Et [bC;t+1] + 1  W
1 + 
bC;t
  (1  W ) (1  W )
(1 + ) W

1 + '
W
'W 1
    bNt + bWht
1  N   Wh + bwt+1  bNt + & bNt   bt   b'Wt
!
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byt =  1 +  y 1bt + bekt   bgz;t+ (1  ) bnt (B8)
brK;t = bgz;t + bnt +  1 + Wf  1 bWft + bwt   bekt (B9)
(bH;t   bt) = 
1 + H
Et
hbH;t+1   bt+1i+ H
1 + H
(bH;t 1   bt) (B10)
+
H
1 + H

Et
hbt+1   bti+ (1  H) (1  H)
H (1 + H)
cmct   bpH;t + b'Ht 
(bX;t   bt) = 
1 + X
Et
hbX;t+1   bt+1i+ X
1 + X
(bX;t 1   bt) (B11)
+
X
1 + X

Et
hbt+1   bti+ (1  X) (1  X)
X (1 + X)
cmct   bpX;t + b'Xt 
(bIM;t   bt) = 
1 + 
Et
hbIM;t+1   bt+1i+ 
1 + 
(bIM;t 1   bt) (B12)
+

1 + 

Et
hbt+1   bti
+
(1  ) (1  )
 (1 + )
(bst + bpY;t   bpIM;t + !bpO;t + b't )
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bqCt = 1=CC hCqC
1 1=C bhCt + (1  C)1=C  imCqC
1 1=C cimCt (B13)
+
1
C   1
 

1=C
C

hC
qC
1 1=C
  C
1  C (1  C)
1=C

imC
qC
1 1=C!bC;t
bpC;t = C pH
pC
1 C bpH;t + (1  C)pIM
pC
1 C bpIM;t   b yIMC ;t (B14)
+
C
1  C
 
pH
pC
1 C
 

pIM
pC
1 C!bC;t
bqIt = 1=II hIqI
1 1=I bhIt + (1  I)1=I  imIqI
1 1=I cimIt (B15)
+
1
I   1
 

1=I
I

hI
qI
1 1=I
  I
1  I (1  I)
1=I
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bxt = bt     bpX;t   bpY;t   bst   bpCX;t       (bxt   byt )   bxt 1   byt 1+ byt (B18)
brt = Rbrt 1+(1  R) hbt +  bC;t   b+ 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4 (bC;t   bC;t 1)+4Y (byt   byt 1)+bRt
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis empirically contributes to the macroeconomic analysis on both nancial frictions
and government debt emphasised during the recent economic crisis.
Chapter 2 examines how both nancial development and government debt a¤ect out-
put volatility utilising the system GMM panel regression. Conventionally nancial devel-
opment is thought to stabilise the economy. With regard to government debt there was
no systematic analysis. However, the recent nancial crisis highlights the destabilising role
of the two factors. Thus, this chapter attempts to revisit the relationship between these
economic variables and output volatility. Besides, this chapter adds several new issues on
the determinants of output volatility. It analyses the e¤ect of the interaction of the two
factors on output volatility. This is based on some European countries case suggesting
both the nancial crisis and the scal crisis are closely connected. In addition, we examine
the impact of both private credit and government debt at the beginning of the period on
the following periods output volatility using the lagged values of the two macroeconomic
factors. It also divides the sample countries according to OECD membership and examines
whether or not the income level a¤ects the result.
The estimation establishes the following results. First, higher nancial development
reduces output volatility. However, above the certain threshold it rather increases economic
instability suggesting the non-linear relationship. The estimated threshold gets lower from
152.6 % to 140.9% when the recent nancial crisis periods are included. It suggests that
the destabilising role of private credit was strengthened during the recent nancial crisis.
Second, we nd that increased government debt levels are statistically associated with in-
creased macroeconomic volatility. This relationship is not estimated to be non-linear unlike
217
nancial development. However, as macroeconomic variables can a¤ect government debt,
there is also the possibility of endogeneity. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret carefully
the relationship between government debt and output volatility. Third, the interaction
term between the two does not signicantly a¤ect output volatility. This is because the
private credit is pro-cyclical, whilst government debt is counter-cyclical. Thus, regarding
some European countriescase as general may be a bit hasty. Furthermore, lagged values
of the two variables do not a¤ect signicantly output volatility. When we also divide the
sample countries, non-OECD countries show similar results with the total sample. How-
ever, in OECD countries the signicant results wholly disappear. We need to acknowledge
the fact that the sample is too small to get reliable results for the OECD countries.
These conclusions have meaningful policy implications. Many developed countries may
need to decrease private credit levels to stabilise their economies because their private credit
levels exceed the estimated threshold during the recent nancial crisis. In addition, we nd
that government debt can destabilise the economy. However, it would be premature to
recommend the reduction of government debt given endogeneity. Thus, we need to develop
appropriate instrumental variables for government debt to tackle the endogeneity problem.
Chapter 3 investigates how nancial frictions empirically amplify and propagate eco-
nomic uctuations. This chapter is based on the empirical assumption that the repercussion
of the recent nancial crisis is related to nancial frictions. Specically, GDP values have
showed di¤erent time paths depending on countries since 2008. Estonias GDP declined
by nearly 20% in the third quarter of 2009 and still didnt recover the pre-crisis level. This
is similar to other countries such as Spain and Iceland. However, the U.S. experienced a
modest economic contraction compared to other countries and surpassed the pre-crisis level
from 2011. Germany also showed a similar pattern. The interesting fact is that Estonia
and Spain experienced the abrupt rise in private credit before the crisis. In contrast, there
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was the modest increase of private credit in the U.S. and Germany. In order to examine
the impact of nancial frictions, this chapter compares three DSGE models - the no friction
model, the rm friction model, and the bank friction model - according to the comparison
of the second moments and the impulse response functions analysis. The three models are
calibrated with the U.S. data for the period 1960Q12015Q4.
The results of the moment comparison reveal that the introduction of nancial frictions
at the rm level improves the models t. However, the introduction of nancial frictions
at the bank level generates mixed impacts on the models t. And the rm friction model
is the most preferred model by the data.
The impulse responses to the exogenous shocks in the three models show following
important results. First, nancial frictions, either at the rm level or at the nancial
intermediaries level, amplify and propagate the uctuation of economic variables to the
exogenous shocks. The impact on credit market gives rise to this di¤erence. As the
shock induces the rms or the banks net worth to fall and increases the risk premium,
investment and output further declines in the models with nancial frictions. Second, the
response of macroeconomic variables in the model with nancial frictions depends on the
leverage. We nd that higher leverage in the rm or the bank increases the repercussion
of the shock. Its impact is displayed in the rise of the risk premium. Thus, investment and
output more signicantly respond to the shock. Third, the rm friction model displays
more persistent responses than the bank friction model. The fall in the rms net worth
to the shock causes the continuous deterioration in investment and output through the
response of the risk premium. Therefore, the result suggests that the bank friction model
with high leverage is appropriate for explaining a deeper nancial crisis, whilst the rm
friction model well explains much longer nancial crisis.
However, this analysis also has some limitations. This chapter assumes a closed econ-
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omy and calibrates parameter values. However, most countries except the U.S. are open
economies. Thus, when we adopt an open economy DSGE model and estimate the para-
meter values based on the data, the above results may be di¤erent. These issues can be
interesting future research areas.
Chapter 4 attempts to nd which scal consolidation strategy minimises the economic
recession and maximises the reduction of government debt. For this purpose, the open
economy DSGE model based on Coenen et al. (2013) is utilised. We develop this model by
introducing the endogenous risk nance premium and various scal rules. In addition, we
apply rich scal instruments as follows; (i) the cut in government consumption, government
investment, and lump-sum transfers, (ii) the hike in consumption tax, wage income tax,
and capital income tax. This chapter argues that the e¤ect of the government consumption
cut on output is the worst in the baseline model. Some assumptions of the model give rise
to this result. The e¤ect of the government investment cut is less than the government con-
sumption cut because the complementarity between private consumption and government
consumption expands the e¤ect of the government consumption cut. As this assumption
also a¤ects the ranking of a series of tax hikes, the impact of the consumption tax hike
on output is the largest among distortionary taxes. However, the e¤ect of the tax hike is
generally smaller than the expenditure cut because of the endogenous risk premium. The
e¤ect of this mechanism is noticeable in the revenue based strategies because the fall in the
debt ratio is larger than in the expenditure based strategies. The model with the endoge-
nous risk premium crowds in private consumption and investment due to the fall in the real
interest rate. Thus, this alleviates the recession and accelerates the debt reduction. The
capital income tax hike rather increases output in the short run due to this non-Keynesian
e¤ect. The endogenous risk premium makes a remarkable change in the ranking of the
scal instruments based on the response of output. In the model without this mechanism
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the e¤ect of the tax hike becomes larger than the expenditure based strategies. This result
follows the previous literature (e.g., Guajardo et al., 2014; Alesina et al., 2015). Specially,
the consumption tax cut has the largest negative impact on output.
Chapter 4 also examines how the scal rule signicantly a¤ects the impact of scal
consolidation strategies on economic variables. Its e¤ect is also noticeable in the tax hike
like the risk premium mechanism. Compared to the baseline rule the number of the scal
instruments responding to output and debt decreases in the two alternative rules such as
the expenditure adjusted rule and the tax adjusted rule. Thus, the debt ratio and the risk
premium move more than in the baseline model and this strengthens the non-Keynesian
e¤ect by raising private consumption and investment. As a result, the two optional rules are
more e¤ective in both the alleviation of economic recession and the reduction of government
debt. Moreover, the expenditure adjusted rule is better than the tax adjusted rule. As the
adjustment of the tax rate in the scal rule leads to more change in the debt ratio, in the
expenditure adjusted rule the debt ratio declines further more than in the tax adjusted
rule and its non-Keynesian e¤ect is relatively amplied.
This chapter nds that the e¤ect of scal consolidation can di¤er according to the
assumption of the model. This result suggests that we need to pay attention to the economic
situation before the choice of the scal consolidation strategy. In addition, this chapter can
be developed in the following ways. First, some European countries like Greece and Italy
show that the risk premium of the government bonds does not respond linearly to the debt
ratio. Specially, when investors realised the default risk, the risk premium skyrocketed.
Thus, when we apply the default risk to the endogenous risk premium mechanism, more
accurate analysis may be possible. Second, we calibrate the coe¢ cients of the scal rule
according to the previous literature. As the coe¢ cients can di¤er depending on countries,
it is necessary to estimate those coe¢ cients. We leave these topics in future research.
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